

November 12, 2012

Dear Colleagues,

I am delighted to share with you the final version of the attached report entitled "Purdue University Report on the International Peace and Prosperity Project in Guinea-Bissau." The report has been created by the Purdue Peace Project in collaboration with Milt Lauenstein and Dr. Evan Hoffman.

The Purdue Peace Project (PPP) encourages and assists local leaders to take constructive action to prevent violence in conflict-prone regions of the world. Where local groups already exist, PPP offers to assist them. Where such groups do not exist, PPP convenes local leaders and supports them to take action. PPP seeks to contribute to knowledge about preventing violence in fragile states and to disseminate that knowledge to the peace-building community and beyond.

Please feel free to contact me at 765.494.9107 or [sconnaug@purdue.edu](mailto:sconnaug@purdue.edu) if you have any questions about the report.

Sincerely,



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Purdue University Report on the  
International Peace and Prosperity Project in Guinea-Bissau

November 2012

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Purdue Note:

This report is intended to serve as a useful resource for individuals working in the area of violence prevention and peace around the world, particularly those interested in using unique approaches based within local communities. Secondary data sources including IPPP project reports and evaluation reports by the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation were major sources for this report. The authors especially acknowledge the following persons: Benjamin Hoffman, Michael Lund, Peter Woodrow, and Stephen Murphy, as parts of their reports are incorporated in this document. Purdue is playing a conduit role in that we assembled, and we are circulating, this report on behalf of the funder of IPPP, Milt Lauenstein.

## Summary

Guinea-Bissau is an ethnically diverse country of 1.5 million people in West Africa located between Senegal and Guinea. Guinea-Bissau has endured political instability since its independence from Portugal in 1974. With a desire for promoting global peace, a retired U.S. business executive, Milt Lauenstein, convened a series of small gatherings of key individuals from academia and the peacebuilding community at his home in Gloucester, Massachusetts in 2003. From this gathering, the International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP), an innovative, violence prevention initiative implemented in Guinea-Bissau, was created.

This report describes the genesis of IPPP, overviews its key work through four distinct project phases between 2004 and 2009, notes some of its shortcomings, and offers key lessons for individuals who are undertaking similar violence prevention work in other parts of the world.

The IPPP meaningfully contributed to peace in Guinea-Bissau by engaging in numerous diverse activities across different sectors and at various levels with many actors and collaborators. Some indicators of success of the IPPP include orderly elections in Guinea-Bissau, and greater openness to dialogue, debate, and public criticism of the government, a practice that was once considered abominable. Moreover, the IPPP increased local capacities to prevent and resolve violent conflicts, drew international attention to and attracted additional resources to Guinea-Bissau, helped to promote peaceful values that diminish the use of violence, and worked to reform structures so that they would embody the rule of law.

Based on five years of working towards peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau, two key lessons were learned. First, an effective violence prevention initiative needs to maintain maximum flexibility and pursue multiple initiatives simultaneously, especially during times of impending crisis. Second, leadership and engagement by local people is necessary for success in violence prevention and peace initiatives. Other important key lessons, as outlined later on in this report, were also gleaned from the IPPP experience.

Map of Guinea-Bissau



Source: The World Factbook by the Central Intelligence Agency, 2006. Available online at: <http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/index.html>

## Background: Genesis of IPPP

A novel approach to violence prevention was conceived in 2003 when Milt Lauenstein, a retired U.S. business executive, was seeking ways to contribute to a reduction in armed conflict. Conventional peace initiatives are often tailored to suit the expectations of funders and outsider organizations, a strategy that neglects local participation in identifying problems and developing proper solutions. Unlike conventional approaches, the IPPP entrusted local leaders with the power to identify problems and to propose and implement solutions. This is one of the unique qualities of the IPPP. During the initial development of this approach, Lauenstein sponsored some research, provided a prize on action to reduce violence, and convened a small group of people to present informal papers on violence reduction. The group included Ben Hoffman, Necla Tschirgi, Mari Fitzduff, and Milt Lauenstein, and they met at Lauenstein's home in Gloucester, Massachusetts in 2001.

Subsequently, in 2003, Lauenstein convened another group with the objective of obtaining advice on actions that would yield tangible results in violence reduction. Thirteen people including lawyers, international relations consultants, individuals in higher education, and peace and mediation specialists, attended this second meeting. The group brainstormed strategies to prevent violence around the world, focusing in particular on developing countries and fragile states that are often prone to political violence. In response, the Reducing Political Violence Action Group (RPVAG) was formed.

The members of the RPVAG include the following (listed alphabetically):

- Eileen Babbitt, Assistant Professor of International Politics and Director of the International and Conflict Resolution Program at Fletcher, who is also an Associate of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.
- Karen Colvard, Senior Program Officer at the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.
- R. Brian Ferguson, Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Rutgers University, Newark.
- Mari Fitzduff, Professor of Conflict Studies and Director of UNU/INCORE (International Conflict Research), Brandeis University
- Ben Hoffman, President of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIAN).
- Milt Lauenstein.
- Michael S. Lund, International Relations Consultant.
- Ellen L. Lutz, an attorney with over two decades of experience as a non-governmental human rights advocate.
- Rama Mani, an established international practitioner and the author of *Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
- Jack Snyder, the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Political Science Department and Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
- William A. Stuebner, Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution.

The RPVAG became the think tank for the initial conception, planning, and implementation of the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau. Through its brainstorming sessions and subsequent meetings from 2003 to 2004, the RPVAG identified several weaknesses with existing peacebuilding and violence prevention efforts. Some of the weaknesses included a lack of collaboration between individuals and organizations involved in violence prevention initiatives, a disconnect between theory and practice, an uneven application of theory in real world contexts, and a delay in taking decisive action to stem political violence.

In a key background paper drafted for the RPVAG, Dr. Michael Lund summarized the international context at that time as follows:

- Recent deadly, intra-state conflicts create human, development, and security consequences.
- Prospects of further failed states and intra-state conflicts continue.
- Learning has occurred in understanding and addressing conflicts with regard to:
  - Causes of conflicts
  - Various outside influences and domestic conditions proven effective in heading off escalation to violence or return to violence.
- Governmental donors, multilaterals, and NGOS are not only doing early warning and conflict assessments but also taking preventive actions in specific cases.
- These multiple efforts, however, are not focused sufficiently in threatened places at their most vulnerable but opportune times. Thus the efforts fail to concentrate on an adequate range of incentives and disincentives for reversing the critical forces that escalate conflicts and for aiding the existing capacities for peaceful management of emerging disputes.
- There is increasing recognition of the wider international impacts of failed states and civil conflicts, the ways preventive action serves national interests, and growing advocacy for an international strategic approach.
- Nevertheless, an alert-action gap (or findings-follow through gap) as well as a knowledge-action gap still exist. Actions are driven by sectoral and organizational mandates and thus different timetables, rather than by specific country analyses and detailed attention to conflict dynamics.
- No one organization is acting as a significant catalytic force to stimulate and galvanize timely and coherent preventive action.

The RPVAG next set out a “Basic Concept” for interventions aimed at tackling political violence in fragile states. It agreed to focus on reducing political violence in a selected country by:

- Reviewing the best available research on conflict and its sources and stages with particular emphasis on interventions and what is needed to make them effective;
- Establishing a core group of internal and external actors to work together closely on the project;
- Carrying out a joint analysis of the situation to determine the greatest threats to security;



- Agreeing on measures to be undertaken such as conciliation efforts at various political and other levels;
- Considering how such measures might help to address immediate violence and conflict issues as well as the underlying sources of discord that might be addressed over time;
- Galvanizing a coalition of actors and supporting groups who could be encouraged to direct parts of their own activities in the country toward addressing the identified threats;
- Using mainly non-official channels for this work, but with selective involvement of governmental as well as non-governmental actors; and, encouraging all these actors to develop policies, incentives, and disincentives that would support stability and peace;
- Stimulating appropriate and complementary actions aimed at addressing the kind of escalating tensions that can very often lead toward serious violence.

The next step for the RPVAG was to issue a call for proposals for a prevention project that captured the RPVAG's basic concept.

### **Project Name, Mission Statement, and Finding an Institutional Home**

The RPVAG sent out a call for proposals for a prevention project that would capture the RPVAG's basic concept. Lauenstein funded the project selected.

The motivation for this call for proposals was that the project would serve as a pilot case for the basic concept developed by the RPVAG. However, the proposals received did not effectively capture the RPVAG's basic concept of violence prevention. In the end, the RPVAG decided instead to demonstrate the effectiveness of its approach by initiating a "test case" on its own. Consequently, Dr. Ben Hoffman became the Project Director of the test case. It was decided that the new project would be housed at the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIAN) in Ottawa, Canada, the NGO for which he was president. Financial support was provided through the Alliance for Peacebuilding in Washington D.C.

Having selected Guinea-Bissau as the project site, as described in the next section, the RPVAG discussed a suitable name for the project. Guided by the need to reflect that overlap between peace and prosperity, the project was named the **International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP)** and a mission statement was formulated.

The mission of the IPPP in Guinea-Bissau was to prevent violence by working toward peace and prosperity using a rigorous conflict analysis of specific conditions and capacities on the ground; by playing a value-added, catalytic role in assisting Guinea-Bissau citizens and international actors to implement concrete and synergistic actions through dialogue and focused actions; by providing a small grants program to stimulate security and development initiatives; and by undertaking global advocacy to mobilize international resources.

## Selection of Guinea-Bissau

Guinea-Bissau was selected because it met the RPVAG's criteria for a country in which to work. These criteria were:

- The potential for extensive, state-destabilizing violence or political disintegration that invited eventual violence;
- The growing perception of potential crises, with possibly some signs of violence, but not yet significant levels of violence, or political polarization and confrontation ("unstable peace");
- The existence of civil society organizations and forums to work with (often open to or seeking assistance, even though they could not undertake violence prevention on their own).

Following the establishment of these selection criteria, the RPVAG commissioned Dr. David Carment of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, to select a country that met the criteria where the pilot project would be run.

Lauenstein funded Dr. Carment's services which commenced in May 2004. Dr. Carment was chosen on the recommendation of IPPP's Technical Advisor, Dr. Michael Lund, on Carment's expertise in assessing indicators and correlates of conflict.

In order to select the country, Dr. Carment and his students first examined publicly available databases regarding risk and environmental factors, such as access and context. Next, they narrowed down their assessment to states where there were few or no outside actors already working to prevent violence. They did so in order to make the change that took place more feasible and measurable, as well as to focus on national level conflict, rather than acts of criminal violence. The selection began with a list of thirty countries that exhibited many of the factors that indicated a likelihood of serious violent conflict within the next one to three years.

The RPVAG also had decided to limit the list of possible countries to those who were not already receiving significant outside help but might likely receive assistance in the future if its situation "unraveled" for various geo-political or economic reasons.

The list of finalists included Papua New Guinea, Guyana, and Guinea-Bissau. Papua New Guinea was rejected largely because of the dispersion of violence across the country as well as its uniqueness, making it a hard case to apply to other cases. Guyana was rejected partly because others had implemented efforts there. Ultimately the group chose Guinea-Bissau.

They did so for the following reasons:

- Early information from contacts familiar with the country indicated that there was a small group of civil society actors in Guinea-Bissau who would likely be receptive to a new violence prevention project;
- There was a significant absence of many other external actors in Guinea-Bissau. Even though Guinea-Bissau did have some local NGOs and a few in-country international



NGOs (INGOs), the relative lack of interest by other actors made it appear to be a “forgotten” country;

- Guinea-Bissau was attractive because of its closer physical proximity to Europe and North America. This meant less time and money spent on travel, so that available funds could be directed to violence prevention work in the country;
- Guinea-Bissau was in a stage of “potential crisis,” with some signs of minor violence; but at the same time no major violence. It was, in other words, in a state of “unstable peace.”

The RPVAG agreed that a scouting mission to learn more about local context was a necessary first step. The trip served to provide the IPPP an opportunity to validate initial selection assessment as well as an opportunity for the team to identify local partners for collaboration in the project implementation phase.

### Scouting Trip

The IPPP took the scouting trip in October 2004. The team consisted of five members: Dr. Ben Hoffman, Head of Team and Project Director; Dr. Michael Lund, Senior Technical Advisor to the IPPP; Mr. Jeffrey Mapendere, Senior Associate, The Carter Center; Mr. Peter Lauenstein-Denjongpa, Logistics; and Ms. Silja Paasilinna, consultant and interpreter. The mission was to ascertain whether there were significant needs that the IPPP could tackle that would add real value in helping to stabilize and capacitate Guinea-Bissau so it could make progress toward prosperity.

Ten days before the scheduled departure date, on October 6, 2004, the head of the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau, General Verissimo Correia Seabra, was assassinated, murdered for alleged non-payment of peacekeeping services then performed by 700 soldiers in neighboring Liberia. General Seabra’s assassination was a cause of great concern for the IPPP team, as it indicated that the level of tension and potential for violence were greater than previously thought. Given the political situation in the country following the assassination, it was not clear they would be able to meet freely with people to get a complete and accurate view of the potential viability of the project. The United States did not have any formal diplomatic presence in Guinea-Bissau, but the political officer in Senegal advised the group that the situation on the ground was secure. Given this assurance, and the recommendations of local contacts, the team decided that it was possible and worthwhile to travel and they departed on October 16, 2004.

During its first visit, the team met with a wide range of actors, including local NGO contacts, international NGO representatives, local business leaders, officials from the UNDP, the World Bank, and members of the diplomatic community. Unfortunately, they were not able to meet with senior government officials or the military leadership due to their preoccupation with the mutiny and its aftermath.

The team found a consensus agreement among all those they interviewed about steps needed to build peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau. These included: (a) security sector reform; (b) resolution of the economic crisis and laying the foundation for long-term development; (c) improved governance; and (d) building a robust civil society. Further, the team

learned of the army's longtime involvement in politics through a number of coups d'état assassinations, and a devastating war in 1998 and 1999. During this trip, the team also learned that some politicians were exploiting discontent and mobilizing inter-ethnic hostilities. This meant that mass-violence was possible, which pointed to an urgent need to stabilize the country.

The trip was cut short by a few days, however, due to rumors of an impending military coup that Dr. Ben Hoffman found sufficiently credible to warrant an early departure. Worth noting is that despite the early departure of the scouting team, it had, through interviews and observations, gathered reliable data on the major threats facing Guinea-Bissau. These included: (a) the potentially destabilizing role of the armed forces; (b) the lack of a well-functioning legal system; and (c) the desperate state of the economy. Of these, the concerns about the state of the armed forces were the most pressing, given the very recent assassination of General Seabra. The size of the armed forces exceeded both the security requirements of the state and the ability of the treasury to provide adequate support. Also, the ethnic composition of the forces was skewed toward the Balanta, a tribe in Guinea-Bissau. While the Balanta make up 40% of the general population, they made up 95% of the armed forces. Given the ethnic nature of some of the disputes, most notably the mutiny and assassination of General Seabra, and the long history of military involvement in politics, this seemed to be a troubling issue.

Despite these challenges, the team also found several sources of strength that would contribute to the success of the pilot project: (a) a committed civil society group, (b) a devoted private sector, (c) successful 2004 parliamentary elections, and (d) a population willing to engage in actions to address the challenges facing the country, particularly in regard to the war which took place in 1998-1999.

The scouting trip also confirmed that international activities in Guinea-Bissau were limited. Only five agencies were present in Guinea-Bissau at the time. The United Nations (UN) Peace Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was one of those agencies, and it was focusing on security sector reform and reconciliation programs. The UN Development Program (UNDP) was active in the country, and fell under UNOGBIS. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had operations in the country. Although there was not a US Embassy in Guinea-Bissau, the US Ambassador to Senegal served as the US contact in Guinea-Bissau at the time. A Dutch not-for-profit organization, Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), was also present. Although SNV had an office in Guinea-Bissau and had been in the country for many years, its program was not very visible there. In addition, two regional organizations, the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were in the process of expanding their operations in Guinea-Bissau. WANEP had started a program in 2004 called Women in Peacebuilding (WINEP) designed to mobilize women's support for peaceful parliamentary elections. The Guinea-Bissau chapter of the network was planned to begin work in 2004.

Upon return to the US, the scouting team met in Washington and decided that Guinea-Bissau was a good fit for the pilot project. The team articulated the following key steps to implementation:

- Institute a process of reporting IPPP's decisions and operational modes to partners including religious leaders, NGOs, donor agency representatives, and government representatives in Guinea-Bissau.
- Institute a process of reporting to violence prevention organizations, namely the US agencies and peace and security foundations about the needs of Guinea-Bissau.
- Institute a series of activities to support ongoing efforts to stabilize the country.

## **Second IPPP Trip**

A second IPPP trip took place in January 2005. This time the trip was to determine appropriate steps needed to stabilize the country before moving forward on the long-term goals initially articulated by the RPVAG's basic concept.

On this trip, Dr. Hoffman took special note of a public comment made by General Tagmé Wai, Head of the Armed Forces. General Tagmé called for reconciliation of factions within the Armed Forces. The IPPP team recognized that the military could either serve as a threat to stability or as a force for national reconciliation, a critical distinction as the country moved toward elections scheduled for March 2005. The most pressing concern was that the Army would become directly involved in the elections. The Armed Forces had many young, unpaid, angry soldiers who were living in barely tolerable conditions, a potential threat as revolt was possible. This sub-group within the military represented a threat to stability should they become so discontented with their situation that they would turn to arms on the occasion of the upcoming presidential election.

Realizing this, Dr. Hoffman put together a concept paper on reconciliation that the IPPP circulated among civil society leaders in Guinea-Bissau. The paper pointed to the positive work being undertaken by General Tagmé together with his civilian counterpart, Defense Minister Daniel Gomes, and to the renewed mandate of UNOGBIS and the commitment of its head, SRSG Joao Honwana, to reconciliation, stability, and peace. These developments, the paper argued, presented an opportunity to move the country forward. The March 2005 elections were postponed due to continued threats, and as such, IPPP continued with its peace stabilization efforts in Guinea-Bissau.

## **Third IPPP Trip**

Following the postponement of the election in March 2005, the IPPP team visited Guinea-Bissau. They convened a meeting in April 2005 to explore the question of whether reconciliation could serve as a violence prevention strategy; that is, could reconciliation activities precede a traumatic event and act as a preventive tool? Participants included UN personnel, representatives of the Armed Forces, and local leaders. The participants agreed unanimously that the country needed reconciliation on a national level, pointing out that some 34 political-security violations had occurred in recent years. The participants insisted, however, that unless the upcoming presidential election was without violence the opportunity to work on reconciliation would be lost. A fair, free, and nonviolent election was crucial to long-term peace.

The decision to campaign for orderly elections resulted, and the importance of a local task force to take the lead led to the formation of the Citizens' Goodwill Task Force (CGWTF). Ms. Macaria Barai, a local business woman and civil society leader who was an active participant in the sub-group of WANEP, the Women in Peacebuilding (WINEP), was appointed by the group to chair the Task Force. Dr. Hoffman immediately gave a \$3,000 cash grant to support the group's work. The swift funding support provided by Dr. Hoffman avoided the bureaucracy normally associated with funding procedures in conventional peace and conflict interventions and recognized that the momentum of the group could have been quickly lost if they had to spend several more weeks or even months to secure funds for their activities.

The manner in which the IPPP grants were made is unique and symbolizes the flexibility of the IPPP as well as its desire for swift actions to prevent violence. The IPPP would go on to make many more small grants via its small grant mechanism. This proved to be one of the vital features of the IPPP since the small grants mechanism allowed the IPPP to swiftly respond to urgent peacebuilding needs as they emerged.

Upon the formation of the CGWTF, the group drafted an Electoral Code of Conduct to encourage an issues-based and peaceful campaign, and they obtained the signatures on the Code of all candidates, with the exception of Kumba Yala. The Code was then broadly distributed in the countryside, through the channels of the country's main religious organizations and other civil society organizations. The IPPP provided meaningful support in drafting the Code of Conduct and in funding its distribution.

Simultaneously, the CGWTF organized a national campaign to promote peaceful elections, through sponsoring media events and distributing t-shirts and banners that promoted the idea that all Guinea-Bissau voters should vote according to issues and not ethnicity or promised favors. They also broadcast "ads" for peaceful elections; IPPP funded these ads. On Election Day, the CGWTF mobilized a large number of people around the country to help distribute ballots and work as "Peace Brigades." The election was orderly, with 89% of the electorate participating.

#### **Fourth IPPP Trip**

A fourth IPPP trip began on June 13, 2005. The team included Dr. Hoffman, Dr. Lund, Milt Lauenstein, and two consultants: Jeff Mapendere and Brigadier Vere Hayes. The trip aimed to:

- Continue focused discussions with civil society on the role and relevance of reconciliation and renewal in Guinea-Bissau;
- Provide senior military consultation to the Armed Forces, in concert with other planned and ongoing UN and other internationally-led actions in the sector;
- Finalize arrangements for an IPPP evaluation study;
- Ascertain the results to date of the actions that IPPP had taken during previous visits;
- Learn more about recent developments affecting the country to determine new actions that the IPPP might undertake in the coming months.



The two military consultants were to meet with representatives of the Armed Forces and build upon the work Dr. Hoffman had begun earlier in the year to engage General Tagmé in support of reconciliation with the military. This was an especially important task given the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for June 19, 2005.

The two military consultants, Mapendere and Hayes, were veterans and had considerable knowledge in violence prevention and peacebuilding. Mapendere was a former Senior Advisor of Security Arrangements for the United Nations Mediation Standby Team and a Field Office Director for the Carter Center's Election Observation Mission in Sudan among other positions. Hayes was a retired (UK) security and military specialist. He was Commander British Military Advisory and Training Team (Harare), Commander 2 (SE) Brigade in the UK, Chief of Staff at the United Nations Headquarters in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Commander of British Forces in Iraq. He also worked with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in delivering courses in peace support operations doctrine and techniques to the nations within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). He held many other positions including working with the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) as Training Advisor on the Sudan People's Liberation Army Transformation Project.

Brigadier Hayes and Mapendere spent a week consulting with the Army. They made specific recommendations about how to provide the soldiers with a shower, weather-proof sleeping quarters, and other standard elements of living at a minimum cost. The IPPP offered to pay for these in order to boost morale among the soldiers and to reduce their growing discontent.

At this time, Dr. Hoffman also asked General Tagmé whether to fund the reconciled soldiers or fund the military reconciliation commission. With Tagmé interested in supporting the military reconciliation commission, he accepted funds to visit villages to spread the word of the continued unity of the Armed Forces and disengagement from politics. Dr. Hoffman gave \$1,000 in start-up funds to General Tagmé to commence implementation, but Tagmé never requested the balance of \$9,000 which was pledged at the meeting. The IPPP team later realized that the defense ministry and UN agencies strongly opposed IPPP's direct funding to the Army, and consequently prevented Tagmé from requesting the balance of the funds as agreed to in the proposal. Conventional protocol grants funding directly to the defense ministry which in turn funds the Army. However, often such a method is slowed by bureaucracy. Dr. Hoffman had also been told by local sources that if the money were given to the Department of Defense, it would never reach the Army where it was needed. The direct funding incident may be partly responsible for the refusal of the UN's mission to Guinea-Bissau to collaborate with IPPP at the time.

With IPPP support, the CGWTF continued its work leading up to the second round of voting and it continued to urge the military to remain neutral. Following the successful second round of presidential elections in July 2005, the IPPP remained engaged in support of the reconciliation with the Armed Forces. In this context, another important activity that dealt with reconciliation was undertaken. The project planned to spend \$10,000 to bring in former soldiers from other conflict regions who had reconciled, particularly for training sessions with the Armed Forces in Guinea-Bissau. To actualize this plan, Dr. Hoffman began looking for suitable candidates, possibly from the former Yugoslavia, over the 2005 winter holidays through 2006.

Unfortunately, no suitable candidates could be identified who would work within the budget. This concluded Phase I of the IPPP's stabilization efforts in Guinea-Bissau.

## Phase II

After the campaigns for orderly elections and consultations with the Army, the IPPP returned to the original RPVAG concept of doing joint diagnostics and action planning. This marked the beginning of the second phase of the initiative.

The drafting of a National Action Plan (NAP) involved bringing together key players from all sectors of society to work together to identify the key threats facing Guinea-Bissau and articulate a plan to meet those threats, including a timetable, resources needed, and monitoring and evaluation requirements. The NAP planning session was held February 15-18, 2006, in Guinea-Bissau.

The session attendees identified eight root problems leading to conflict within the region. These were:

- Lack of a trade culture
- Lack of education/professional training
- Lack of political tools to solve ethnic, religious, and military issues
- Lack of good administration
- The Army
- Economic stagnation
- Lack of justice

The noted consequences of these problems included: (a) political instability, (b) corruption, (c) lack of a national image, (d) a rise in HIV, (e) unemployment, (f) extreme poverty, (g) strikes and late payment of salaries, (h) criminality, (i) lack of development, (j) permanent conflicts, (k) permanent political crises, (l) lack of democracy, (m) violence, and (n) lack of political goodwill.

The main causes of the problems were identified as a crisis in state affirmation, a lack of qualified human resources, inadequacy and lack of clear goals in the educational and professional training systems, manipulation of national security and defense for political means, a lack of favorable climate for business and investment, an increase in non-conciliatory interest groups, and a struggle for power. The group worked to outline specific steps to address the main problems by dealing with their identified causes.

Next, the IPPP turned to the task of finding a local partner who could oversee the implementation of the NAP. In looking for a partner for this implementation, Dr. Hoffman decided to work with Platform for the Coordination of NGOs (PLACON) rather than with WANEP, because it is the umbrella organization for all NGOs including WANEP. A Local Implementation Committee was established and housed at PLACON, and a Local Implementation Coordinator was hired for one year with IPPP funding.



In the months following the February 2006 workshop and the production of the NAP, the IPPP attempted to use it as a guide for follow-up activities. However, by late 2006, the NAP was dropped as a guide because it was too rigid and did not account for the ever-changing dynamics on the ground. Instead, the IPPP used ongoing, real-time analysis to guide its efforts in order to remain responsive to the emerging threats to peace and security.

The NAP suffered from other shortcomings, however. Lauenstein suggests that the NAP may have exceeded available resources to meet its needs, and as that barrier became evident, interest in pursuing the activities from the NAP diminished. Moreover, the IPPP addressed immediate problems, whereas the NAP sought to tackle longer-term structural issues. The NAP also lacked the strength to achieve results because there were not specific instructions on what roles were to be taken. The production of the NAP also illustrated another fundamental flaw in the logic of the RPVAG's basic concept for a violence prevention project: It assumed that a project with no previous history in a given country had sufficient convening power early on in a project cycle (before sufficient time has passed to build positive working relationships with local actors grounded in trust) to bring all parties together. It also assumes that even if these actors can be successfully convened that they will change their programming to fit in with the NAP.

Nevertheless, the planning session leading up to the production of the NAP can still be considered successful because it achieved a number of other important results, including:

- Producing a comprehensive, multi-thematic conflict analysis using a participatory approach at a time when no one else had done so;
- Increasing workshop participants' capacity to facilitate small working groups and to conduct their own conflict analyses;
- Deepening workshop participants' understanding of the causes of conflict in Guinea-Bissau. An important self-awareness function created by conducting the national action planning session. Moreover, the workshop created a safe place for some of these contentious issues to surface and be discussed in a relatively free manner.

Also during this phase, the IPPP sponsored a conference that built on the reconciliation theme, expanding it beyond the military to include religious, political, and civil society leaders. The conference, "The Road to Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: Informal Dialogue," was convened by ECOWAS and funded by the IPPP. Attendees included the Head Imam of Guinea-Bissau, two bishops, two major representatives of civil society, representatives of all three major political parties, the Chairman of the parliamentary commission on reconciliation, General Tagmé's representative (Col. Balde), the President's security advisor, and the General in charge of the military reconciliation commission and his associates who had gone out into the countryside with IPPP support.

Last, in anticipation of a major donor's conference to be held in Geneva in November 2006, it became necessary for the relevant actors to compose a national security strategy for Guinea-Bissau. UN representatives could not bring in support for their programs until after such a strategy paper was completed. Recognizing a real and immediate need for which the IPPP could effectively provide assistance, a defense strategy paper was created with IPPP support. It was well-received at the November donor's conference, opening the door for substantial support

to be released through UNOGBIS for military reform. The IPPP was able to once again demonstrate the value in acting quickly and remaining responsive to emerging issues.

### **Phase III**

Phase III of the IPPP focused on the completion and continuation of some activities from earlier phases, including continued lobbying and awareness raising, continued development of lessons learned, and continued technical support for the implementation of some activities from the NAP. Additionally, Phase III included new activities such as undertaking political mediation and making a larger contribution to the reconciliation movement within Guinea-Bissau.

In August 2007, responding to a direct request from the Prime Minister made in June 2007, the IPPP convened and facilitated a secret, out-of-the-country anti-drug trafficking strategy session. On September 1, 2007, Philippe Patry and Vere Hayes, consultants to IPPP, plus two other Canadian experts contracted by the IPPP (including a senior police official), met with various UN officials, diplomats, and government officials from Guinea-Bissau to discuss the issue of drug trafficking. The session produced a strategic framework which was then presented to the Prime Minister. It called for the Prime Minister to take specific actions at specific times, starting with the appointment of a senior official designated to lead anti-drug trafficking activities sketched out to some extent in the strategy document.

On September 22, 2007, Dr. Hoffman visited Guinea-Bissau to meet with various project partners regarding national reconciliation, re-activating the CGWTF, and anti-drug trafficking initiatives. When Dr. Hoffman met with the Prime Minister on this trip he confirmed that he had read and agreed with the strategy document. Indeed, the Prime Minister had appointed the Minister of Justice as the head of a new anti-drug trafficking commission. Dr. Hoffman and the Minister of Justice subsequently had a meeting with the Prime Minister and a number of actions by the IPPP were agreed upon, starting with a direct grant of \$10,000 to a new account established for the Anti-Drug Trafficking Commission. At the same time, the IPPP through Vere Hayes in the UK, worked closely with UK officials to foster European donor support for the Commission.

Also in September, an initial series of emails was sent concerning the possible re-activation of the CGWTF which had become dormant. General fatigue among those whom were initially involved in its creation and operation was cited as a cause. Later in September 2007, the CGWTF had been re-activated with some new membership and still under the leadership of Macaria Barai.

From October 13-19, 2007, Philippe Patry traveled to Bissau to present the idea and build support for having the IPPP convene a national reconciliation process design session in 2008. At the same time, Jeff Mapendere joined the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIIAN) as its newly-appointed Executive Director. On October 26, 2007, he attended the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy and Conference on Conflict Prevention (CIFP-CPCC) in Ottawa where he was able to promote the IPPP approach and activities.

From October 29<sup>th</sup> onwards, the project had extensive email communications with UNOGBIS concerning possible collaboration on reconciliation. At this time, the IPPP was also approached by the Guinea-Bissau Association of Journalists who requested that they provide training in “investigative journalism.” This was done through a contract relationship with Resau Liberte, an international network of journalists specializing in the development of an independent press in new democracies. The 5-day workshop was delivered to some 12 participants from each of the key media outlets in Guinea-Bissau from November 13-17, 2007.

In December 2007, Philippe Patry traveled to Bissau again to pursue plans with ECOWAS, UNOGBIS, and the Religious Leaders (heads of the national reconciliation commission) for the IPPP reconciliation process design session. He also traveled to Bissau to meet with the CGWTF to discuss plans for their re-activation, to explore the possibility of delivering IPPP training on election matters, and to follow-up with participants from the investigative journalism workshop.

In late 2007, the National Assembly passed a proposal, crafted by IPPP and ECOWAS, to reconstitute the National Reconciliation Commission. The IPPP working with ECOWAS and UNOGBIS held a national reconciliation design session in January 2008. A question was asked about whether efforts at national reconciliation should go forward in a climate of insecurity related to the drug trafficking issue. All key informants and collaborators on the ground responded “yes.” The process design session engaged the three religious leaders who had been named to lead the Commission and eight others. In January 2008, Patry traveled to Bissau again to meet with the delegation from the UN and to conduct follow-up meetings with local actors.

On February 19, 2008, Dr. Hoffman met with Mark White from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and a colleague from the stabilization branch to discuss Security Sector Reform (SSR). They wanted IPPP to channel some \$100,000 into projects perhaps using the CGWTF as the local mechanism for vetting the projects and grants for transparency and accountability purposes (and to make sure the money was directed to the project, not lost in corruption or bureaucratic red tape). The British also pressed for a multi-donor joint planning exercise to take place in Guinea-Bissau, pressing for more effective UN interventions where all key stakeholders (UNOGBIS, EU, European Commission, ECOWAS, key donor countries, national government key actors) could be there for a week of training and planning. Consequently, by the end of February 2008, Dr. Hoffman traveled to New York to meet with Mr. Otobo, the Head of Peace Building Support Delegation that was just in Bissau and to whom Philippe Patry made an IPPP presentation while in Bissau. He also met with Nick Harvey of the UK Mission to the UN. Dr. Hoffman met with these individuals to discuss how to make UN interventions in Guinea-Bissau more effective.

In terms of the IPPP’s efforts to initiate more political mediation during this phase of the project, it began with a direct invitation from the President and other senior government officials. During a meeting with the President, the IPPP was invited to begin a new dialogue between the President and the former Prime Minister that would also involve leaders from the other political parties since they recognized that dialogue at this level – which at the time was not occurring – would be very important to the success of the national dialogue process. In future meetings, the IPPP also gained the support of the Armed Forces to launch a new mediation process. However,

despite this initial invitation to mediate, the IPPP deferred to ECOWAS's country representative who maintained that he was conducting mediations at this level.

#### **Phase IV**

Phase IV focused on capacity-based violence prevention. Based on lessons learned from earlier phases of the project, the need for increasing the core capacities of the country to prevent violence became evident. This phase of the project would identify specific capacities, utilize a Local Advisory Group (LAG) to monitor them on a monthly basis, and strive to build those capacities through a combination of catalytic actions, direct service delivery, and international advocacy.

With national elections occurring once again in 2009 and a continued need for a civil society to be active in a highly partisan and politically unstable environment, the IPPP again worked to re-activate the CGWTF. At the time, the members of the CGWTF still in the country were emotionally and physically drained. They had returned to their private lives after considerable effort expended in 2005 and 2007. This illustrated for the IPPP that there are limitations and considerations that should be accounted for when working with local actors.

The IPPP focused on mediation skills training as a core capacity. In October 2008, the IPPP facilitated a four-day mediation training workshop for several community leaders and civil society representatives in Guinea-Bissau. In February 2009, the IPPP facilitated a second four-day mediation training workshop with the same participants in order to further assist them to develop and refine their mediation skills. Efforts were also made to further institutionalize these skills and to help professionalize the newly-trained mediators. After the training, CIAN and the CGWTF approached the British embassy for funding to create a new community mediation centre in Bissau which would provide free mediation services.

During this same period, the IPPP also launched a new monthly publication, *The Bissau Monitor*, which would identify the vulnerabilities in violence across different sectors and any corresponding efforts that would help to address these vulnerabilities. A local researcher was hired with IPPP funds to oversee the production of publication and to identify peacebuilding gaps. The IPPP circulated the publication widely to other NGOS, embassy staff, military, government officials, and UN officials in Guinea-Bissau. The IPPP received some very positive feedback about *The Bissau Monitor* since no one else at the time was undertaking any systematic, monthly monitoring of the changing conflict dynamics and sharing insights with the wider community so that it could inform audiences.

The IPPP also had a new oversight process placed upon it that required the IPPP to establish and follow a set of pre-established project activities. This moved the IPPP away from the approach it had taken earlier of being responsive and flexible to emerging needs as they arise. However, in March 2009, the head of the Armed Forces and the country's president were both brutally assassinated within a matter of days. The resulting turmoil during the months to follow combined with the IPPP being locked into pre-established programming meant that it was now



unable to act as quickly and responsively as it had done before. The IPPP was unable to deliver all of the pre-planned workshops until the situation in the country had stabilized.

Faced with this set of circumstances, the project management team concluded that as a pilot project that IPPP had achieved its goal of identifying both the shortcomings and lessons learned that could be derived from undertaking a violence prevention project in a highly-volatile environment. Exit plans were made in order to shut down the IPPP project. The IPPP terminated operations in Guinea-Bissau in September 2009.

## Shortcomings

The IPPP experience is not without shortcomings. At least five major shortcomings have been identified:

- *The Challenges of Collaboration*

The IPPP places great value on collaborative activities which requires institutional readiness. Considering the amount of time and energy that effective collaboration requires, it is tempting to fall into an operational mode of being non-collaborative. In order to collaborate effectively, one needs to be prepared to take time to develop and nurture relationships. Nurturing relationships involves earning trust and following through on promises.

The IPPP learned from the beginning that maintaining transparency and not “over-promising” were effective ways to build new relationships. While the IPPP tried to be as collaborative as possible, there were times when unilateral action was needed because of a pressing issue that demanded immediate attention. Maintaining a culture of collaboration among key actors posed challenges.

- *Giving Up Control*

The IPPP model places a great deal of emphasis on being dynamic rather than prescriptive, responding to ongoing analysis, and taking direction from and supporting local leadership. Acting in this manner involves giving up various aspects of control. This stance makes sudden alterations to the project a possibility, while the risk of not achieving project outcomes on time also exists. A flexible project culture can also alienate certain individuals and donors who are uncomfortable with not being in control and having deadlines met. Credible local partners and good working relationships built on trust help overcome this difficulty.

- *Blending Short-Term Actions with Long-Term Engagement*

It is difficult to blend short-term actions with a plan for long-term engagement. This is especially true when dealing with threats when immediate crisis-management actions may take precedence over achieving other long-term peacebuilding goals. With IPPP in Guinea-Bissau, the original concept of conducting research and carrying out multi-

stakeholder joint diagnostics was quickly replaced with short-term measures directed at stabilizing the country. When the proper opportunity arose for a multi-stakeholder peace and prosperity action planning session, local participants were assisted in quickly moving through diagnostics to identify short, intermediate, and long-term actions. The IPPP placed less value on extensive research and more on action planning partly to reflect the fact that what was wrong was adequately known and partly to reinforce the idea that concrete actions focused on short-term goals build hope and momentum. Retaining a long-term perspective, however, remained a challenge.

- *Donor Reluctance*

The IPPP has a strong advocacy function, a risk factor for alienating donors by drawing attention to their actions or failure to act. Furthermore, by being flexible, responsive, and acting as a catalyst, the IPPP may not produce “tangible” results that can clearly be credited to the project. Moreover, when results are achieved they may not necessarily correspond to the goals and structures of conventional donor programs.

- *Perceived as Being Maverick – the “Peace Guerrilla”*

Because of the fluid and fast-acting nature of the project, other NGOs and UN agencies which do not understand the philosophy that guided the IPPP, it may wrongly be misinterpreted as being too “maverick.” IPPP also runs the risk of being seen as too reactive and undisciplined. Nevertheless, strategically-informed, quickly-executed actions that mobilize needed resources to achieve stability and to build the basis for locally owned long-term violence prevention programming are absolutely necessary in potentially volatile situations. Antidotes to being misperceived, misused, or mistreated are necessary. Ultimately, both local actors – whether government officials, the military, or civil society as well as other providers or peacebuilding services – should trust organizations such as IPPP.

## Lessons Learned

The IPPP identified 12 key lessons learned from its work in Guinea-Bissau, which are as follows:

1. **Scouting trip.** Early in the project, a multi-disciplinary team was dispatched to the country to conduct a holistic analysis of needs and opportunities. This was a key to confirming whether an intervention should be undertaken and how it should proceed. This was a good time to begin to build working relationships with those already on the ground and to explore possible areas of collaboration.
2. **A solid/flexible approach.** The IPPP found it helpful to have an approach which is solidly-based but flexible. Helpful and harmful events can happen spontaneously. It is vital to leave room for this in the “approach” so as to adjust to changing conditions quickly and flexibly, capitalize on helpful events and slow down or neutralize harmful



events. Being able to respond quickly to ever-changing events on the ground also required institutional readiness and because the IPPP was housed in a small NGO it wasn't faced with operating in an overly-bureaucratic environment. This meant people and funds could be mobilized quickly and efficiently.

3. **Focus on violence.** IPPP's focus was on "violence" not "conflict." Violence prevention planning, action, and success-measurement are strongly facilitated by focusing on overt and structural violence, not conflict resolution. Building the capacity of volunteers to manage conflict nonviolently became a key focus of the approach.
4. **Security.** It was critical to address the security challenge directly. The goal of preventing violence required that all those factors that destabilize a country – including dissatisfied armed forces, the actions of politicians, and other specific threats to peace and security such as the presence of drug traffickers – must be addressed within the violence prevention effort. National military forces in particular can be a source of support for prevention, and should not necessarily be regarded as a "spoiler." Encouraging the military to be removed from politics and support civil government can be vital.
5. **Building trust and meeting local needs.** Building trusting relationships with local people is vitally important to understanding the history, sources, and dynamics of violence throughout the country, and also to gaining access to local volunteers. Real needs must be met if the potential for violence is to be reduced. The project must remain responsive to local needs throughout.
6. **Local project leadership.** Engaging local leaders in the project direction was essential to IPPP's efforts. The performance of local leaders in Guinea-Bissau is consistent with the belief that reliable, capable people can be found in virtually any country and with the right mix of access to resources and technical support, they can be empowered to do amazing things.
7. **Involvement.** To prevent violence, the efforts of many actors and institutions are needed. It is helpful when all receive credit for whatever success is achieved. It can be very difficult in practice, however, to effectively coordinate efforts for the goal of preventing violent conflict.
8. **Integrated efforts.** Bringing interested parties together in integrated efforts helps ensure good results. These parties should be drawn from key sectors and supported to work together collaboratively.
9. **The catalyst.** The project team served as a "catalyst," working across key sectors – and also vertically within sectors – to mobilize resources and initiate actions. This helped encourage complementarity of effort among those with particular service mandates.
10. **Project leadership.** A talented, experienced, and dedicated project leader does not need much organizational support to be effective. A multi-disciplinary team can share the

project direction to ensure effective decision-making, communication, and coordination. A local office may or may not be needed – sometimes it may even be counterproductive.

11. **Small grants.** Relatively small amounts of money disbursed quickly as a strategically-identified need arises can accomplish a great deal.
12. **Timing.** IPPP found that the timing of all activities – and at all levels – is crucial for success.

### **The Emergence of the Purdue Peace Project (PPP)**

The IPPP ended operations in Guinea-Bissau in September 2009 and the lessons learned from it helped to inform the BEFORE project – a partnership between Swisspeace and the Alliance for Peacebuilding. The mission of the BEFORE project is:

Unlike any other conflict prevention work, BEFORE links political early warning signs with a quick, independent, flexible, and holistic response. Built upon and focused on partnerships, we connect local stakeholders and international or transnational organizations with the purpose of looking at potential wars from every angle. As a bridge between northern and southern actors, we catalyze stalled action to prevent potential violent conflict. BEFORE reframes the way we all think about war by offering each one of us the chance to stop it – before it's too late.

In the context of these locally led actions in several locations, the Purdue Peace Project (PPP) was initiated in January 2012. Moving forward from the RVPAG, the IPPP, and the BEFORE project, the PPP embraces the successes of local leaders in preventing violence in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, as well as the effectiveness of local leaders in Kenya and elsewhere.

The PPP encourages and assists local leaders to take action to prevent violence in conflict-prone regions of the world. Another key objective of the PPP is to develop new knowledge about how best to prevent violence in fragile states and to disseminate that knowledge to the peacebuilding community.

PPP's first operations are in West Africa. Selection of regions to focus on is based on the seriousness of the threat of impending violence and PPP's appraisal of the likelihood that it will be able to provide meaningful assistance. PPP will document what it and local leaders do, assess its effectiveness, and evaluate the results.

For more information about PPPP, please contact Dr. Stacey Connaughton, Associate Professor and Project Director, The Brian Lamb School of Communication, Purdue University, Beering Hall Room 2114, 100 N. University Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA; Email: [sconnaug@purdue.edu](mailto:sconnaug@purdue.edu); Ph: 765.494.9107.

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### Appendix A: Summary and Project Timeline of IPPP Activities

**\*Adapted from grant activity timeline as provided in Woodrow & Murphy (2008)**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Results</b>
<i>2001</i>	Conceived violence reduction idea	Convened groups for deliberation; sponsored competition, prize for violence reduction papers. The competition was held at Columbia University. There were 85 submissions, out of which, the eight most appropriate were selected; however only one contained specific actions.
<i>2003</i>	Convened another group on violence reduction to brainstorm tangible strategies	Formed Reducing Political Violence Action Group (RPVAG).  The International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP) was conceived
<i>Oct 2004</i>	1 <sup>st</sup> Scouting trip involved site verification	Confirmed selection of Guinea-Bissau for IPPP pilot project
<i>Jan 2005</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> trip to form collaborations, coalitions, to meet whom to convene as a group	Conducted "diagnostic" and initiated relationships with WANEP and Macaria Barai
<i>Feb</i>	IPPP concept paper on reconciliation	N/A
<i>Apr</i>	Grant to assist in formation of Citizens Good Will Task Force (CGWTF).  3 <sup>rd</sup> IPPP Trip	Conducted meeting on reconciliation and stabilization with representatives of civil society, UN, and military; CGWTF founded and started planning for June-July 2005 presidential elections
<i>May</i>	Grant to support "Peace Soldiers" and "Women's Reconciliation Meetings"	N/A
<i>Jun</i>	Military barracks support; 4 <sup>th</sup> IPPP Trip (Participants included Hoffman, Lund, Mapendere, Hayes, and Lauenstein)	IPPP met with Gen. Tagmé and provided an initial grant to refurbish barracks (Gen. Tagmé did not subsequently request the balance of the \$10,000 grant

Date	Activity	Results
		originally offered by IPPP)
<i>Jul</i>	Grant to support electoral code of conduct to encourage an issue-based and peaceful presidential campaign	CGWTF wrote Election Code of Conduct, distributed copies, and acquired the signature of 2 of the 3 candidates; sponsored media events and advertising; distributed T-shirts and banners to educate voters and encourage participation; organized "Peace Brigades" on election day
<i>Jul</i>	IPPP grant for food, transportation, and lodging for journalists during run-off presidential election	Journalists and observers judged that IPPP funding enabled journalists to conduct independent reporting
<i>January 2006</i>	Political leader assassinated	General Tagmé accepts funds for military reconciliation commission
<i>Feb</i>	Convened National Action Plan (NAP) Conference with political, military, and civil society leaders (co-organized by ECOWAS); IPPP consultants traveled to Bissau to plan and facilitate the NAP	IPPP selected PLACON (Platform for the Coordination of NGOs) to coordinate the implementation of the NAP
<i>Mar</i>	Funded National Youth Conference	400 participants from across the country met to discuss youth challenges in Guinea-Bissau
<i>Apr-Dec</i>	IPPP provided funding for administrative support and coordination for the NAP; Josué Almeida named implementation	IPPP funds channeled through PLACON for NAP implementation activities
<i>Jun</i>	Supported production of National Security Strategy Paper prior to Nov 2006 Donor Conference	Paid for photocopying and per diem for participating government employees
<i>Jul</i>	IPPP funded national dialogue process	Estados Gerais held meetings with constituencies across the country to solicit feedback on the topic of stabilizing the state
<i>Jul</i>	1 <sup>st</sup> Journalists' Conflict Reporting Workshop	Members of SINJOTECs noted that the training assisted journalists with coverage of student protests in 2007
<i>Oct</i>	Lauenstein convenes meeting in Canada to respond to early	Plan developed for ground work in response to threat

<b>Date</b>	<b>Activity</b>	<b>Results</b>
	warnings of violence	
<i>Dec</i>	Cashew Conference focused on boosting production	N/A
<i>Feb 2007</i>	Funded transportation and accommodation for Military Reconciliation Commission	Military representatives traveled around the country to assure citizens that the military was united and would not interfere in politics
<i>Mar</i>	IPPP partially funded "Road to Reconciliation" dialogue convened by ECOWAS (participation by military, political, and religious representatives)	Assisted in initiating the National Reconciliation Commission
<i>Mar</i>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Journalists' Conflict Reporting Workshop	N/A
<i>Jun</i>	Anti-drug trafficking strategy session	Grant provided for new commission
<i>Jun</i>	IPPP and ECOWAS hold 2 <sup>nd</sup> meeting to discuss Terms of Reference for the National Reconciliation Committee	N/A
<i>September</i>	CGWTF revived under new leadership of Barai	CGWTF did not implement any activity at this point because Hoffman became engaged with other activities
<i>Nov</i>	1 <sup>st</sup> Investigative Journalism Training	Representatives from SINJOTECS affirmed that journalists benefited from the training and some participants later conducted investigative research on energy issues, rice prices, and counterfeit medications
<i>Jan 2008</i>	National reconciliation process design session occurs	Philippe travels to Guinea-Bissau to meet UN
<i>Feb</i>	Dr. Hoffman visits New York to meet stakeholders	Funds granted for 1 day follow up to investigative journalism workshop
<i>March</i>	Evan Hoffman provides letter to CGWTF regarding challenges of upcoming elections	IPPP pledges their continued support of CGWTF efforts
<i>Apr</i>	Journalists Conference	Follow up to November 2007 workshop.