Preface

In the hallowed halls of academia, scholars often engage in contentious debates concerning the interpretation of a particular historical period or event. The stakes are generally personal and professional ones--a new historiography developed, a career made, and years of research validated and applauded by one’s supporters or argued vociferously by one’s detractors.

* Team members Melissa Bokovoy and Nebojša Vladisavljević contributed substantial portions of the text. The current draft also benefited considerably from comment and criticism from members of Research Teams 1 and 8: Kosovo under Milošević, most notably participants in two satellite meetings held on 15-16 October 2004 hosted by Ohio State University’s Center for Slavic & East European Studies in Columbus, Ohio (Melissa Bokovoy, Thomas Emmert, Bernd Fischer, Charles Ingrao, Momčilo Pavlović, Besnik Pula, Jason Vuić, and Frances Trix) and on 16-17 December at the Center for Interethnic Tolerance & Refugees, Skopje, Macedonia (Ferit and Valentina Duka, Ylber Hysa, Charles Ingrao, Dušan Janjić, Linda Karadaku-Ndou, Leon Malazogu, Momčilo Pavlović, Jason Vuić).
Seldom does one contemplate the real world consequences of embracing a particular interpretation or historiography. Yet in the case of all the studies undertaken by the scholars in this dialogue, there are real life consequences. Our topic, “Kosovo Serbs under Autonomy, 1974-1990,” and the studies already generated in the 1980s and 1990s, are examples of how scholarly, journalistic, and historical accounts presented “truths” about the Serbian experience in Kosovo and advanced different political agendas in post-Tito Yugoslavia, whether local, regional, national or international. Our intent in this report is to present a number of the controversies surrounding the experiences of Kosovo Serbs and the appropriation of these experiences by politicians, intellectuals, artists, and others. The term ‘Kosovo Serbs’ is consistently used in this text, which is overwhelmingly accepted by both Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo when issues at stake are Serb-Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo.¹ There has been no difference whatsoever in attitudes or political action of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins throughout the 20th century (the 1980s, 1990s, the Kosovo War and its aftermath included).

At Sarajevo in Summer 2002, this group began with a discussion concerning the title of their team. They were not comfortable with the idea of the first working title of this team, “Fate of the Serbs, 1974-1990.” A lively discussion ensued about the limited time focus of the proposed controversy. Because this group, like others, sees the importance of historical context, it provides some of that historical context in the first part of its study. Early discussion noted that the issues being discussed and the relationships between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo are rooted in the history of the twentieth century, especially in the period right after 1945. In broader discussions, it was acknowledged that this is a bit of a slippery slope. If you decide to go back to 1945, why not go back to the Balkan Wars?
During the same discussion, some members believed that the title of the controversy itself should reflect the concern that the problems discussed are much older than a fifteen year time frame and one which did not include the period of time after the Serbian Assembly in summer 1990, without approval by the Yugoslav Federal Parliament, adopted a new Serbian Constitution. This constitution stripped Kosovo and Vojvodina of their autonomous status within Serbia, and Belgrade assumed direct rule in Kosovo and Vojvodina.

The result of the discussion was to change the title of the group -- which eventually evolved into “Kosovo under Autonomy, 1974-1990” -- and to justify the intellectual integrity of this enterprise as a necessity, given that much of the popular literature about the Yugoslav tragedy suggests that it all began in Kosovo. Moreover, the Serbs’ perceptions about Kosovo as their historical core and their concern about the alleged discrimination against Serbs in Kosovo continue to be subjects clouded in myth and distortion. It may very well be that some colleagues assume that Serb scholars cannot be objective about the subject of “Kosovo Serbs”, but confronting differing analyses and biases are at the very heart of what we are trying to do in the Scholars’ Initiative.

Throughout this project, the team has recognized the need to dialogue with Albanian scholars and others. In this spirit, our team leaders, Melissa Bokovoy and Momcilo Pavlovic met with scholars from Team 8 which is examining “Kosovo under Milosevic, 1989-1999,” at Ohio State University in mid-October 2004 to discuss the two Kosovo-related controversies; two months later, Serbian and Albanian scholars from both teams met again in Skopje, Macedonia at the Center for Interethnic Tolerance & Refugees to analyze and critique this report; and in January 2004, Team 1 worked to incorporate additional criticism and scholarship into the text.
We hope that this report will provide a basis for dialogue among all scholars involved in the project.

These three steps were implemented in order to guarantee balance, since the other Kosovo-related controversy is somewhat more Albanocentric, both in team composition and the material it covers. The discussions, research, and suggestions from these three steps have been incorporated into this report. The team has adopted a multidisciplinary approach, employing research and analytical models in history, demography, sociology, political science, and other disciplines. Some of the participants examined domestic and foreign documents, several conducted interviews with Kosovo Serbs and culled published interviews and oral histories, while others analyzed domestic and international media.
Introduction

Ethnic relations are the crucial issue in Kosovo, especially between the Albanians and the Serbs. To date, both groups have not yet managed to find a suitable and long lasting political solution to administering Kosovo together. Since the territory of Kosovo became a part of Serbia and then of Yugoslavia in the early decades of the twentieth century, the Kosovo problem can be described as a problem of continual “status reversal.” Whenever the Serbs administered Kosovo as they did in the interwar period and from the end of WWII to the late 1960s (although it occurred in a broader political context, concerning the security of the state), Kosovo Albanians were discriminated against in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres as well as being forced or intimidated into leaving. On the other hand, when Albanians were in a position to dominate, usually with the help of foreign troops -- Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, German, Bulgarian, and NATO -- the Serbs suffered discrimination and had to flee from Kosovo (such was the case in both World Wars, as well as today). This idea of status reversal must however be examined carefully. Throughout the twentieth century, the period of Albanian ascendancy in Kosovo is very short. Veljko Vujacic observed in 1999,

"The turbulent twentieth century has witnessed many reversals of ethnic fortune in the Balkans, with power shifting from one to another group, not the least between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. On both sides, painful historical memories were reinforced by a constant process of power and status-reversal and conflict over a shared territory. This never-ending cycle of status-reversal can be briefly summarized as follows: Moslem (not Catholic or Orthodox) Albanians were the privileged group under the Ottoman empire (at least relative to Orthodox Serbs); Serbs "came out on top" after the Balkan wars (1912-1913) and the
formation of Yugoslavia (1918); the status/power relationship changed in World War Two when a large part of Kosovo became a part of "greater Albania" under the sponsorship of Mussolini’s Italy; in 1945, the Serbs "took over," albeit under the auspices of communist Yugoslavia and in the name of "brotherhood and unity;" after Kosovo became a fully autonomous province (1974), high Albanian birth rates and the gradual "Albanianization" of the local Communist party once more raised the painful specter of status-reversal (for Serbs); with the advent of Milosevic to power, Serbs emerged as the dominant status group for the third time in this century. In each of these cases, the process of status-reversal was accompanied by a revival of unpleasant memories as well as actual instances of persecution which further reinforced them.

The real problem with such an interpretation is that the Kosovo Albanians never held sole state power nor did Albanians ever have the monopoly of violence.

It has been proven over the course of the last 150 years that Kosovo has meant symbolically different things to Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. It is not a matter that these groups did not “want to live together” for there is evidence of peaceful coexistence, but that the adjoining nation-states of Albania and Serbia sought expansion into this province in their efforts to create a larger, i.e. "greater" Albania and Serbia. (While much has been made about goals and aims of a "greater" Albania or Serbia, the historical origin of the "greater" designation begins in the early nineteenth century when nationalist leaders from countries throughout Europe sought to maximize state borders to include all members of their nation or territories allegedly theirs.) Such nationalist ideologies and platforms often destabilized relationships because of the threat of armed conflict, either by guerilla, police, or military action.
Each nationalist group, Serbs and Albanians, based their claims on very controversial arguments and policies. Some Serbs argued that the continuing Albanian drive for an independent Kosovo, more or less intensive at different times, was evident by their disloyalty to the state: rebellions, demonstrations, robbery, attacks on the Serbs and their property. At the same time, Albanians continuously tried to present their problem as an international one, i.e. to make the international community believe them to be an oppressed minority in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Albanians were quick to point out that in periods of Serb domination the authorities put evident pressure on the Albanians by arresting and harassing them, by making plans for the colonization of Kosovo after WWI and of changing its ethnic structure to the benefit of the Serbs.

Although living on the same territory, in the same towns and villages, the Kosovo Serbs and Albanians lived in a sort of “apartheid”. Notwithstanding some better moments of their relations, and examples of cooperation (above all, in the sphere of economy), there was no incentive to create a multiethnic society with stable and lasting institutions. However, in the period under review from 1974 to 1990, there was evidence that relations between Serbs and Albanians between 1974-1981 were tolerably improving as far as it was possible, supported by communist ideology, policies of the League of Communists, the personal authority of Tito until his death in 1980, the state’s monopoly of violence, the international position of Yugoslavia, a broad autonomy granted to Kosovo by the 1974 Constitution, and the improving socio-economic and cultural conditions of the ethnic Albanian population. Events at the beginning of the 1980s, Tito’s death, Yugoslavia’s economic malaise and crisis, the riots in Kosovo province in 1981, and questioning of the changes from the 1974 Constitution caused setbacks and rollbacks for Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the largest number of political prisoners in
the SFRY were Kosovo Albanians. However, the fact that Serbs and Albanians had lived in Kosovo through the centuries side by side, albeit at some cultural and religious distance, suggests that it would be wrong to evaluate their relations as a never-ceasing conflict.

The focus of this research centers on the policies of the Serbs in Kosovo, on the *personae dramatis*, goals, methods and results of that policy. These policies were, clear enough, part of the general processes in the Yugoslav federation after Tito’s death in 1980. By the end of the 1980s, the disintegration processes accelerated even further, influenced by the events in international politics, especially in the Eastern Europe. The stress shall be put on the political processes in Serbia, which have always had a direct impact on the Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo, especially on the Kosovo Serbs, and on the degree of Kosovo Serb influence on the policies emanating from Belgrade. An effort has been made to distinguish the facts from the interpretation and propaganda, and to give different opinions on the same events. At last, several major controversies concerning Serb-Albanian relations have been discussed. The reconstruction of the events and the analysis of the given period (1974-1990), is presented roughly, only in general features, in order to delineate and distinguish various problems and phenomena.

Four controversies will be explored in this report:

1) The dramatic demographic changes in Kosovo between 1961-1981 and the reasons for an increase in the Albanian population from 67,08 % of the population in 1961 to 77,4 % of the population in 1981.

2) The demands of the Kosovo Albanians for political and economic equality in the SFRY, the LCY's response -- greater autonomy, constitutional changes, but denial of republican status -- and a specific Serbian response based upon what many perceived to be an ever escalating scale -- a separate republic, secession, and unification with Albania.
3) The reasons and causes of Serbian migration from Kosovo, ranging from economic and familial reasons to escalating violence and intimidation of Serbs by Albanians.

4) The relationship between Kosovo Serbs and Serb nationalist intellectuals and officials of the Milosevic regime. What role did grass roots efforts by Kosovo Serbs, rooted in their discontent with the changing ethnic composition of Kosovo and the post-1966 twist in inter-ethnic politics, play in the political struggles in late socialist Yugoslavia?

Two other controversies may be included in the study before final publication:

1) The influence of the Kosovo myth and its prominence in the nationalist mobilization of the Serbs in both Kosovo and Serbia proper and the racializing of Albanians.

2) Narratives of Albanian sexual violence against Serbs and the politics of masculinity and nationalism.

**Controversy 1**

**Kosovo 1974-1981: Demographic Changes**

The territory of Kosovo comprised 4.26% of the whole territory of Yugoslavia, in which lived 7% of the Yugoslav population in 1981. In the early 1970s there were 916,168 ethnic Albanians, 228,264 Serbs, 31,555 Montenegrins, and 12,244 ethnic Turks in Kosovo. The Albanians made up 73.7% of the population of the region, the Serbs 18.4%, the Montenegrins 2.5%, and the Turks 1%. From 1945 to 1961, the proportion of Serbs in the province remained about ¼ of the population. Beginning in 1961, the proportion of Serbs in the province fell. During the decades 1961-1971 and 1971-1981 the proportion fell at the same rate of about 5%.
Demographic development in Kosovo is one of the most topical and at the same time one of the most delicate questions which researchers are currently facing. The problem is in the lack of real information about population. As a matter of fact, the Albanians boycotted the last population census in Serbia of 31 March 1991. Because of that, their number is based on statistical estimates. The previous two censuses in Kosovo (1971 and 1981) are suspect. (Federal Secretariat of Information, 1998). According to the newly analyses, the last census, implemented under the supervision of federal and republic bodies, which may be considered

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1948 / %</th>
<th>1953 / %</th>
<th>1961 / %</th>
<th>1971 / %</th>
<th>1981 / %</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>727,820</td>
<td>808,141</td>
<td>963,988</td>
<td>1,243,693</td>
<td>1,584,441</td>
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<td>Albanians</td>
<td>498,242 / 68.5</td>
<td>524,559 / 64.9</td>
<td>646,805 / 67.2</td>
<td>916,168 / 73.7</td>
<td>1,226,736 / 77.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>171,911 / 23.6</td>
<td>189,869 / 23.5</td>
<td>227,016 / 23.6</td>
<td>228,264 / 18.4</td>
<td>209,498 / 13.2</td>
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<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>28,050 / 3.9</td>
<td>31,343 / 3.9</td>
<td>37,588 / 3.9</td>
<td>31,555 / 2.5</td>
<td>27,028 / 1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moslems</td>
<td>9,679 / 1.3</td>
<td>6,241 / .8</td>
<td>8,026 / .8</td>
<td>26,357 / 2.1</td>
<td>58,562 / 3.7</td>
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<td>Romanies</td>
<td>11,230 / 1.5</td>
<td>11,904 / 1.5</td>
<td>3,202 / .3</td>
<td>14,593 / 1.2</td>
<td>34,126 / 2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>1,315 / .2</td>
<td>34,583 / 4.3</td>
<td>25,784 / 2.7</td>
<td>12,244 / 1</td>
<td>12,513 / .8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>5,290 / .7</td>
<td>6,203 / .8</td>
<td>7,251 / .8</td>
<td>8,264 / .7</td>
<td>8,717 / .6</td>
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<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>...</td>
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<td>5,206 / .5</td>
<td>920 / .1</td>
<td>2,676 / .2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2,103 / .3</td>
<td>3,541 / .3</td>
<td>3,110 / .2</td>
<td>5,328 / .3</td>
<td>4,584 / .2</td>
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objective, is the one of 1961. This census registered 646,605 Albanians (Table 1) and Serbs registered 227,016.

The censuses of 1971 and 1981 were implemented under the supervision of the Kosmet authorities. In the 1981 census, the cooperation of the republic organs was explicitly rejected, with the excuse that the statistical organs of the Republic were not competent for the implementation of the census in Kosovo: separatist demonstrations took place during the census.

Why the fall in the proportion of Serbs in Kosovo? There have been numerous reasons ascribed to this decrease. Two of the most prevalent are: the birthrate of the Albanian community of Kosovo, at 35 per 1,000 and the migration of the Serbs from the region. As Table 1 demonstrated there has been a numerical decrease as well as proportional decrease between 1971 and 1981. According to this data, some 85,000 Serbs had left the province from 1961 to 1981. Some have put this number as high as 100,000. Controversies arose over the increase in Albanian birth rates and "cultural" norms ascribed to these increases as well as the causes and reasons why Serb left Kosovo. We will first turn our attention to the Albanian community's birth rates and treat the reasons for Serbian migration in another section below.

In 1979, Kosovo had the highest birth rate in Yugoslavia and in Europe, 26.1 per 1,00 population, compared to 8.6 for the National Yugoslav average. During the 1980s, the discourse in the newspapers and media in Serbia surrounding the birth rates among Albanian women took on racialized overtones. As Julie Mertus and others have noted, the study of the higher Albanian birthrates has often been presented as a conscious decision on the part of Albanians to reproduce rapidly in order to change the demographic picture of Kosovo. In this regard, Albanian women are portrayed as baby factories. In fact, the difference can be ascribed to patterns of rural and urban communities, cultural and societal norms and expectations. It must be noted that
Albanians are a larger percentage of the rural population in Kosovo. Mertus points out that urban Albanian women and those of other urban women in Yugoslavia had nearly identical birthrates.⁷

The discussion about birthrates is often framed within a larger discussion about the region's economic position vis-à-vis the other regions of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is the poorest and least developed region in Yugoslavia. The more developed republics of Yugoslavia and the region of Vojvodina gave 3% of their income for the development of the underdeveloped republics of Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the region of Kosovo. In 1971, Kosovo secured a special status through a mechanism by which its share was increased in the so-called “Federation fund for inducing a faster development of the underdeveloped republics and region of Kosovo”. Kosovo had a share of 33.25% of this fund from 1971-1975; 37.1% from 1976-1980, and 43.5% from 1981-1985. The rest went to the other underdeveloped republics. The Republic of Serbia not only contributed to this federation fund, but also provided other extra means for inducing the faster development of Kosovo. Within the parties of Yugoslavia and Serbia, Kosovo was seen as a development problem. There were also important security considerations ever since the end of WWII and, especially, since 1981. Of course, the Yugoslav leadership preferred not to talk openly about this aspect of their policy towards Kosovo. According to Michael Palairet, "the development gap between Kosovo and Yugoslav average has widened persistently and significantly. In 1952, Kosovo's per capita social product was 44% of that of Yugoslavia, but by 1988 it was down to 27%."⁸ This decline is partly due to the high birth rates which meant that absolute increase in the province's income still translated into per capita declines. Palairet noted that much of the early investment in Kosovo went to extracting Kosovo's mineral resources and ignoring investment in manufacturing and other
sectors of the economy. After 1966, the Federal government began to pour in resources for job creation in industry. Palairet noted that the return on the investment noted above was "abnormally low." "The official statistics indicate that between 1971 and 1988 each unit of investment generated only 65% of the incremental income achieved in Yugoslavia as a whole. Frustration reigned as the money disappeared or appeared in large building projects. Slovenia went so far as to announce, well before it declared itself independent, that it was cutting its contribution by half." ⁹ Understanding Kosovo's poor economic performance is one facet of the reasons why Serbs chose to migrate to other parts of Yugoslavia.

This poor economic performance translated into high rates of unemployment, 29.1%, two and half times higher than official rates in the rest of Yugoslavia. 70 percent of the unemployed were young people between the ages of 20 and 25. The ratio of Albanians to Serbians employed reflects their proportion of the population. Between 1970 and 1982, the percentage of unemployed Kosovo Albanians rose from 76% to 77.6%, while Kosovo Serbs fell from 17.6% to 15.1%.

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The fact that Kosovo Albanians had gained greater political clout in Kosovo under the 1974 Constitution did not necessarily translate into advantage in employment in state-run enterprises. Indeed, Serbs and Montenegrins held 30% of the jobs in this sector.¹⁰
Controversy 2

Issues Surrounding the Constitutional Status of Kosovo

During the Communist period, Albanians and Serbs made contact through politics, i.e. through Communist Party and its affiliated organizations, such as the Youth Association, Syndicate organizations, or Socialist Association of the Working People, Union of the Combatant Associations, etc. The slogan “brotherhood and unity” allowed politicians an unlimited space for action and suppression of any sign of nationalism. The statement, which was written into the Kosovo Constitution, said that all nations and ethnic groups in Yugoslavia fought against the fascists and formed an inseparable "brotherhood and unity” during the war. Although historically not true, the fictive idea of "brotherhood and unity" was the unifying principle of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. However, since there were more Serbs and Montenegrins both among communists before 1941 and resistance fighters afterward, Kosovo Albanians sometimes equated Communist Party domination with the domination of Serbian communist officials and Serbian policy. On the other hand, the position of Albanians in Kosovo and in Yugoslavia was compared with neighboring Enver Hoxha’s Albania, with which Yugoslavia, after very close cooperation, discontinued all contact after 1948.

The period between 1948 to the mid-1960s can be characterized as the period when the Serbian minority in Kosovo dominated the province, symbolized by Alexander Rankovic's security police's vigorous and at times brutal suppression of Albanian nationalism or ascendancy. During these years, there were a substantial number of Albanians who left the province. According to Nurcan Özgür Baklaci ıu, “after 1958 the migrations of Albanians between Kosovo and Macedonia were the most significant amongst all other migrations occurring inside
ex-Yugoslavia. The difference in minority policies and their applications, and as well as the
different economic and political conjecture prevailing in Macedonia and Kosovo after 1946
causd continuous Albanian movement between these two territories.\textsuperscript{11}

Yet shifting political alliances, together with demographic and social factors, altered this
landscape by the end of the 1960s. Shifts in the political status within Communist Yugoslavia
began in the 1940s and, over the course of the next thirty years, the “Autonomous Kosovo–Metohija Region” (1947), became the “Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija” (1963), and then the "Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo” (1969).

Beginning in 1966, Tito and the League of Communists removed Rankovic, limited the
Serb-dominated UDBa and its anti-Albanian policies in the province, and sanctioned
decentralization by granting more decision-making powers to the republics. What followed was
Tito's and the LCY's attempts to reverse severe restrictions on Albanian political, social, and
economic ascendancy in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the LCY eventually discovered that the
Albanians, especially students and intellectuals, were not satisfied with the limited gains, and
wanted to push for greater autonomy, i.e., an Albanian language university and recognition by
the LCY that Albanians in Communist Yugoslavia should have the same political status as the
South Slavs. As we will see, for some this meant the creation of a seventh republic in Kosovo.
Ensuing crises in Kosovo, especially in 1968 and 1981, were the result of the LCY's "inability or
unwillingness to grant the Albanian population symbolic equality with the Slav nationalities,"\textsuperscript{12}
i.e. republic status.

During both crises, Kosovo was moving closer to becoming a specific polity as a result of
changes to the Constitution of 1963 and then the adoption of a new constitution in 1974 which
granted both Kosovo and Vojvodina status as an “autonomous provinces” of Serbia. What this
meant was the ability of the provincial elites to forge direct links with federal authorities and bypass republican authorities. In effect, the federal constitution of 1974 gave Kosovo *de facto* republican status, but not *de jure* status. As Albanian political leader Azem Vllasi observed, "Kosovo functioned as a republic in the federal state of Yugoslavia and we were not [a republic] only by name."13 This de facto equality increased the desire of ethnic Albanians to fight for all forms of political, economic, social and culture equality in Kosovo.

Immediately after 1974, relations between Kosovo’s Serbs and Albanians seemed stable, at least on the surface. Only the vivid social and cultural contrasts between the rich and the poor, between tradition and modernity, between new trends and the way of life from the previous century, were evident. Party institutions dominated political discourse, full of slogans and ideology. In reality, these ethnic communities lived apart but, apart from some minor incidents, in peace. The "parallel" life of the Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo, which had lasted for centuries, continued during the communist period as a result of the LCY’s policy of creating and maintaining separate institutions on the basis of ethnicity due to fears that one group, i.e., the Serbs, would dominate. For instance, the lectures at the University were held separately in Serbian and in Albanian.

Controversy arises over whether or not the desired goal of the Kosovo Albanians was in fact republican status or secession. Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade believed that despite these concessions when Kosovo Albanians enjoyed the best minority status of their existence in SFRY, they still sought greater and greater concessions. Many argued that, after 1968, the Albanian minority was not only striving for some significant improvement of the status, but also for secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia.
Vladimir Matić in a December 2003 report for the Public International Law and Policy Group, "Unbreakable Bond: Serbs and Kosovo" provides a more nuanced approach to Kosovo Albanian intentions during the 1970s and 1980s. He noted the development of a unified and well connected Albanian elite as a result of the establishment of the University of Pristina. This elite pushed for republican status for Kosovo, "part of which was the right to secede. [This desire was portrayed] as separatist in Belgrade and was met by a re-awakening of Serbian nationalism."

The Constitution of 1974 and Some Political Results

The process of reorganizing the Yugoslav federation, which started in the late 1960s, reached its climax in the 1974 Constitution. For the first time, republics and even the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo had their own constitutions. Many authors believe that the 1974 Constitution gave to the republics and provinces prerogatives of the state, which endangered the federal state. Some even want to trace the destruction of the country and the savage civil war to the crises which resulted from the constitutional changes. In the 1974 Constitution there are no articles concerning autonomous provinces per se (save Art.1 and 4), but nevertheless the position of a province had always been treated in practice as equal to the republics. By this constitution, provinces did in fact become independent of Serbia, while the republic of Serbia was, at the same time, dependent on its provinces. So, Serbia was a kind of a “federation within federation”.

Thus the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (SAP Kosovo), until 1968 known as “Kosovo and Metohija,” obtained a constitution in 1974 for the first time, according to which it had a right to regulate independently its social and economic affairs and its political bodies. According to the Constitution, the Kosovo Assembly was defined as the highest institution of ‘self-management’ and the highest authority of the province. The assembly was constituted by
the ‘Council of Associated Labor’ (90 delegates), ‘Council of Municipalities’ (50 delegates), and
the ‘Socio-political Council’ (50 delegates).

According to the Constitution, the Assembly of SAP Kosovo had the power to change the
Constitution of SAP Kosovo, had a vote in the event of changes to the federal Constitution or to
the Constitution of Serbia, and the power to decide on other crucial questions regarding the
political, social and cultural development of the region. Also, it had the power to issue laws and
budgets, to appoint and recall the president and the members of the Executive Council of the
SAP Kosovo Assembly, the judges of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, the judges of the
Supreme Court of Kosovo, Secretaries of the Region, and other officials in Kosovo institutions.
It had also the power to control the Executive Council and other administration bodies of the
province.

The Presidency of SAP Kosovo was another important institution of the region, which
was also constituted in 1974. It had nine members. The presidency was a representative of the
province, and it had ‘a right and obligation to initiate a debate on the important questions for
social and political life of the province’ in the SAP Kosovo Assembly and in other institutions.
These important questions included, above all, those related to the ‘equality of the nations and
national groups’. The presidency had to perform special tasks in the sphere of ‘national defence’,
and in the event of war, it had to lead the “people’s resistance” in the region. Other institutions
of the region (Executive Council of the SAP Kosovo Assembly, and administration of the
province, Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and other judicial bodies) basically performed the
same functions as their counterparts in Serbia and Yugoslav federation.

The autonomous provinces had a special status in the Republic of Serbia. They had the
right to independently issue laws and constitutions within their jurisdiction, provided they were
not in opposition to the federal Constitution and federal laws. On the other hand, the Republic of Serbia could only issue a constitution with the approval of provincial assemblies, and laws which could be valid only for the territory of Serbia outside the provinces. This territory was not defined either by the Constitution or by the laws, although the term itself has been used ever since the WWII. The provinces were represented in the federal institutions as equals, their representatives often voting differently from those of the Republic of Serbia. Besides, it often happened that the representatives of Slovenia and Croatia seconded the position of their colleagues from the autonomous provinces. However, whenever the votes of the provinces were in accordance with those of Serbia, other republics objected to Serbia having three votes in federal institutions. Some politicians from Serbia responded by stressing that they had nothing against other republics forming autonomous provinces on their territory in order to obtain more votes. These endless futile debates were detrimental to the efficiency of the federal institutions. Therefore, Kosovo had, from 1974 onwards, almost all the prerogatives of other federal units; the federation controlled the country’s monetary, defense, and foreign policies.

Until the 1990s, the Kosovo Albanians participated in the institutions of the federation and the Republic of Serbia. With the 1974 Constitution, they twice held the post of a vice president and president of the SFRJ Presidency (Fadilj Hoxha, vice president in 1979, Sinan Hasani vice president in 1985 and president in 1986). From 1978 until 1988 they held, as representatives of SAP Kosovo, the following posts in federal institutions:

1978  Sinan Hasani, vicepresident of the SFRJ Assembly
1979  Fadilj Hoxha, vicepresident of the Presidency of the SFRJ
1983  Aslan Fazlija, president of the Federal Council of the SFRJ Assembly
1984  Ali Shukrija, president of the CK SKJ Presidency
1985  Ilijaz Kurteshi, president of the SFRJ Assembly
1985  Sinan Hasani, vicepresident of the SFRJ Presidency
1986  Sinan Hasani, president of the SFRJ Presidency
1986  Hashim Redxepi, president of the Presidency of the Union of Yugoslav socialist youth
1988  Kazazi Abaz, president of the Council of republics and provinces of the SFRJ Assembly

At the time, ethnic Albanians have, as ambassadors, represented Yugoslavia in 15 countries. Three of them held the post of the assistant federal secretary for foreign affairs, three of them were general consuls, one of them was a director of a Culture-information center, and seven of them were heads of administration bodies and counselors in the Federal foreign office. At the same time, they held important posts in defense: four of them were generals of the Yugoslav Army, one of them was assistant federal secretary for defense, and two of them were commanders of the ‘territorial defense’ of SAP Kosovo. They were accordingly represented in the institutions of Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, whereas in Kosovo they held the majority of the posts, account being taken of the representation of the Serbs and the Montenegrins.

From 1974 to 1988, ethnic Albanians held many positions in the institutions of federation, other federal units and SAP Kosovo:

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<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Serbia</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Montenegro</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP Kosovo</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the two decades after the war, the communists of Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic origin prevailed in party leadership and other institutions, in large measure because they had fought for the Communist Resistance. This, however, could not contribute to ethnic equality and mutual confidence. By the middle 1960es the tide had turned to the benefit of the Albanians. The trend continued, but this time in the opposite direction. Ethnic Albanians, already predominant in numbers, also became predominant in politics and social life. They held all the most influential posts in the state. Of the total of 47,791 communists in Kosovo in 1973, 29,507 (61.7%) were ethnic Albanians, while 12,515 (26.2%) were Serbs and 3,824 (8.0%) Montenegrins. Ethnic Albanians still felt that they were being unequally treated, since their representation in the League of Communist had not yet reached the percentage of Albanians in the total of Kosovo population (73% in the 1971 census), while the Serbs constituted 26.2% of the League of Communists despite being only 18.3% of the total population.

By the logic of Yugoslavia’s ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity,” higher rates of Albanian participation in the political institutions of the 1970s federation prove that ethnic Albanians accepted the political system and the state of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and that they were equal in their rights with other nations and national groups of Yugoslavia. This statement however ignores not only multiple factors like equality of employment, economic status, cultural institutions, but a crucial political factor: the political will of the Albanians to form a republic of their own, a republic that might/should include the Albanian regions of Montenegro and Macedonia. The Federal government had neither the will nor the means to begin a dialogue for this eventuality. The Serbian communist party stepped into this pregnant pause and suggested an alternative to the 1974 de facto status of Kosovo.
An Attempt to Change the Constitutional Position of Serbia in 1977

In less than a year since the Constitution was issued, on 16 January 1975, the Presidency of Serbia demanded its revision, explaining that it had brought disunity to the Republic of Serbia, and that it was Serbia alone, among all other federal units, that had not obtained its ‘historic right to the national state within the Yugoslav federation’. This demand was aimed at recovering and reinforcing Serbia’s power over its autonomous provinces. It was formulated by a group of legal experts, who were engaged for this task by the Presidency of Serbia. Two years later, these experts published their analysis in a so called “blue book”, a top-secret document on the malfunction of relations between Serbia and its provinces (appointment of officials, defense, planning, administration of justice, security etc). This publication caused a clash within the state and party leaderships of Serbia. The party leadership thought it unacceptable and censured it as “a centralist document”. The conflict was solved by the supreme arbiter, Tito, at a meeting with the representatives of the Central Committee of Serbia (T.Vlaškalić), Regional Committee of Vojvodina (D. Alimpić), and Regional Committee of Kosovo (M. Bakali), held on 27 July 1977. Tito insisted on keeping the Constitution intact regarding the position of the provinces, thus being consistent with his principle of ethnic balance and suppressing the power of the largest federal unit and its supposed aspiration for centralism and unitarism. Tito’s influence ended this dispute, but the problem, for both the Albanians and the Serbs, remained unsolved.

1981 Demonstrations in Kosovo

A little less than a year after Tito’s death in 1980, demonstrations broke out in Kosovo in March 1981. These demonstrations came as a surprise to the political leadership and to the public in general. Later, party and federal authorities blamed the Albanian leadership for not being strict enough in fighting nationalism and, then, for covering it up. They were also blamed
for letting the protesters in 1968 and in 1981 bear no consequences, as well as for not realizing the true causes of the problem. After 1981 Yugoslav – especially Serbian -- politicians and public opinion after 1981 always pointed out the continuity of “Albanian counterrevolution”. At the time, terms such as ‘counterrevolution’ and ‘irredentism’ were in common use. By branding them counter-revolutionaries, the Yugoslav leadership was in denial about the real problems facing Kosovo, i.e. its unequal political status and socio-economic crises that resulted in deeply divided national communities and the nationalist sentiments that grew out of the events of 1981.

Disagreements and controversies surround the intentions and motivations of the demonstrators. The initial riot began in the cafeteria at the University of Priština whose students were expressing frustration at and concern over a number of issues of immediate concern to them: unemployment and the inability of the federal state to recognize the demographic boom in higher education in Kosovo. These dissatisfactions were symbolized by inedible food, squalid living conditions at the overcrowded and underfunded University. Kosovo’s ratio of students was 274.7 per 1,000 inhabitants, the highest in the SFRY, compared to the national average, 194.9. Initially, Serbian students at the University joined in the protests. Extrapolating from their experiences, these youthful protesters fixed on the broader theme of the inequities for all students and for Albanians in the province. The demonstrations grew into mass protests all across Kosovo and the main goal appeared to be creation of a republic and not secession or unification with Albania, even though a few examples of the latter can be found.

After the 1981 demonstrations the Kosovo question became the country’s critical political problem. Everyone agreed that the whole country should exert itself in searching for a solution. Many protesters were arrested. Mahmut Bakalli was recalled from the post of president of the Provincial Committee of Kosovo, and Veli Deva was appointed in his place (who was
previously himself recalled by Bakali in 1971). The rector of Priština University was also recalled.

It is important to point out that the Kosovo question was treated until 1990 on the federal level, with significant differences of opinion. The most important tasks were undertaken by federal institutions, not by Serbian ones. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia agreed on 17 November 1981 on a document, entitled: “Political platform for action of the Yugoslav League of Communists in the development of socialist self-management, brotherhood and unity and spirit of community”. In this document demonstrations were called “aggressive, ruthless, brutal and devastating actions with the scope of forming the Republic of Kosovo, which would secede from Serbia and Yugoslavia.”

What is interesting is how the Yugoslav central authorities, as well as the international community (which also wanted nothing to do with the complex national issues being raised with the 1981 events), reacted to the events. Lacking any hard evidence of outsider agitators, the LCY turned to the Kosovo Albanian leadership who were accused of not waging an effective campaign against “greater Albanian nationalism and irredentism.” The term *irredenta* in the hands of LCY officials meant “not only organized anti-Yugoslav activities for the purpose of uniting Kosovo with Albania, but almost any kind of Albanian national feelings or popular resentment.” The LCY really feared the rise of a mass-based separatist movement, which would constitute a major threat to the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The vagaries of the causes of the demonstrations and their organizers did not prevent the LCY from pursuing the arrest, prosecution and imprisonment of 226 workers for “organized activity” as well as “verbal crimes.” From this point forward, Kosovo Albanians made up the highest percentage of
political prisoners in the SFRY. Amnesty International and others noted that by the mid-1980s, plainclothesmen and military checkpoints proliferated across the province.  

Despite the delusions of the party leadership, most of the organizations advocating some type of Albanian nationalism were formed after the riots, and that according to Aleksandar Tijani, “it is impossible that ‘militant chauvinists and separatists have branches in every little village, enterprise, school, or sports association where inter-ethnic incidents are occurring.”  Analyzing the incidents, Tijanic argues that Yugoslavia’s central authorities “grossly underestimated to what extent the idea of a Kosovo republic seems natural to most Albanians.” He urges his readers to understand what was happening in Kosovo in the early 1980s within the context of the nationalist movements of the south Slavs in the nineteenth century. 

Despite Tijani’s appeal for understanding the demonstrations as part of a larger historical example of ethnicity and nationalism in the Balkans, the events of 1981 provoked the Federal authorities to brand them counterrevolutionary and for the Serbian party leadership to brand them as an ethnic threat that gave rise to a Serbian nationalist reaction. Serbian migration from Kosovo became the symbol of Serbian victimization by Kosovo Albanians.

**Controversy 3**

**Reasons and Causes of Serbian Migration from Kosovo**

Serbian migration was a permanent process since the early 1960s. The reasons for migrations were manifold, but the public opinion believed them to be the result of fear, pressure, inequality, and the failure of legislation to protect people and their possessions. This public opinion was shaped by Yugoslav and, more importantly, Serbian press reports about harassment of, violence (especially rape) against, and general mistreatment of Kosovo’s Serbs. The press
reported violations against private and state property, such as sabotage, fires, disturbances of rail communications, explosions, and attacks on police and provincial authorities.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, the Serbian population in Kosovo, especially after the political changes in the 1960s, considered themselves to be discriminated against in the labor market and before the provincial courts and police. While little investigation was ever done to verify many of these reports,\textsuperscript{23} nevertheless, a controversy broke out over the reasons why there was a continuous emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. The 1981 Yugoslav census listed around 110,000 Serbs from Kosovo living in other parts of Yugoslavia, 85,000 of whom had left the province between 1961 and 1981. Emigration continued into the 1980s. As a result, nearly a third of Kosovo Serbs had moved out of the autonomous province since 1961.\textsuperscript{24}

The mix of the politics of Kosovo in the 1960s, demographic decline and steady migration out of Kosovo resulted in mounting grievances among Kosovo Serbs. The idea that Serbian emigration from Kosovo was a “problem” was brought out for the first time by Dobrica. Čosić in 1968, but this was censured by the communist authorities. In the early 1970s a number of Kosovo Serb officials raised the issue in Kosovo’s party organs of the province’s growing Albanization and the problems this posed for the non-Albanian population. Miloš Sekulović and Jovo Šotra pointed to growing pressure on Serbs, especially those living in the countryside, to emigrate from the province as well as their inadequate protection by the law enforcement agencies, their problems in education and obstacles to finding employment.\textsuperscript{25} Kadri Reufi, an ethnic Turk, demanded that the leadership investigate the causes of deteriorating position of this minority and claimed that the number of Turks in Kosovo was significantly reduced in the 1971 census because they were labelled Albanians. All three were removed from the Provincial Committee and public life, the effect of which was to silence other non-Albanian politicians. The
appeals of party members and ordinary people to local authorities and the provincial leadership were either ignored or rejected and the appellants harassed.

The major consequence of the 1981 events in Kosovo was the aggravation of already fragile ethnic relations. During the early 1980s, the majority of Yugoslav citizens who were arrested under Article 136 of the federal criminal code for "association for purposes of hostile activity" were Albanians. Modest improvements in Albanian access to state jobs and managerial positions during the 1970s and the outbreak of the demonstrations in 1981 led to complaints by Serbs in the region that "Albanization." Despite the perceived reversal of fortunes, Serbs still held 52% of managerial positions and 20% of jobs in state positions. But perceptions are believed to have played a role in intensifying the migration of the Serbs and the Montenegrins from Kosovo.

Although the migration of the Serbs from Kosovo had been fairly constant since the end of WWII, it was only after 1981 that it was spoken about in public. Beginning in 1985 Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo organized protests in the form of petitions and visits to party and state officials in Belgrade. The leadership was driven to action by public opinion. The problem was discussed at the 11th conference of the Central Committee of the Yugoslave League of Communists, held on 20 December 1983.

The diminishing percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo is evident from these data:

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>727,820</td>
<td>963,988</td>
<td>1,243,693</td>
<td>1,584,558</td>
<td>1,956,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians %</td>
<td>68,4%</td>
<td>67,1%</td>
<td>73,7%</td>
<td>77,4%</td>
<td>81,59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srba %</td>
<td>23,6%</td>
<td>23,6%</td>
<td>18,3%</td>
<td>13,2%</td>
<td>10,97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to some other data, in the total of the population of Kosovo there were

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Serbs and Monten.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>64.91%</td>
<td>26.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>27.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>73.67%</td>
<td>20.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>77.42%</td>
<td>14.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81.59%</td>
<td>10.97%</td>
</tr>
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As seen from above, at the times of the greatest ‘self-realization’ of the ethnic Albanians and their broadest autonomy in Yugoslavia, the greatest changes in the ethnic structure of Kosovo occurred.

Many of these sentiments are expressed in the findings of the survey conducted in 1985-1986 among Serbs who had left Kosovo entitled, "The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985-86." This study was commissioned by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences and conducted by Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević in the highly politicized enviroment of the 1980s. The author’s findings indicate that more than three quarters of the emigration originated from non-economic factors, mainly verbal pressure, damage to property or seizure of crops and land, violence (assaults, fights, stoning, attacks on children and women, serious injury, attempted and committed rape), trouble at work, and inequities in the public sector. What also emerged from the survey was that there was a clear territorial pattern of emigration largely resulting from the level of pressure and inequalities. The
latter was inversely related to the proportion of Serbs in a settlement, and the critical point for a major increase in the pressure was if their numbers dropped below 20-30%. This finding was compatible with evidence from the official census that there was a strong trend towards emigration of Serbs from settlements where they accounted for less than 30% of the population.\(^{26}\) Therefore, the decreasing proportion of Serbs in a settlement led to a sharp increase in pressure and inequities, which in turn resulted in emigration.

Petrović and Blagojević analyzed the migrations based on two different interpretations of why the migrations occurred. The first thesis was that the Serbian migrations are "normal migrations" motivated by "economic reasons" and that other ethnic groups in Kosovo migrated out as well during the same period. The migrations was ascribed to the process of "overall economic growth" and the "relative lag in economic development." The second interpretation was that the Kosovo Serbs were being driven out by Albanian separatists and by the policies of the Albanian authorities who ruled Kosovo when it achieved de facto republic status. Petrović and Blagojević concluded that the "pull factors" for migration were "mostly of a non-economic nature, not the kind of contemporary migrations prompted by the desire to improve one's economic and social position."

Their conclusion was that, while some left for economic reasons, most emigrated out of the Kosovo province due to non-economic reasons, such as threats to personal safety or property, ethnic discrimination, institutionalized discrimination by Albanian authorities, and a policy of "ethnic homogenization" by Albanian nationalists-separatists. According to some experts, "this study must be treated with some caution, not only because the Serbian Academy was at the forefront of national mobilization at the time, but also because of the survey's timing."

Analyzing the results, Budding-Helfant notes that about two-fifths of the 500 families
interviewed had done so before 1975. Given the time lag, the intensity of news reports about intimidation and violence in Kosovo, and heightened Serb-Albanian tensions at the time of the survey, there may well have been some retrospective bias among the respondents. Nevertheless, interethnic tensions, especially among those Serbs whose presence in a community dropped below 30%, played a role in many emigration decisions.

Declining economic opportunities also prompted a large number of Kosovo Albanians to migrate to other parts of Yugoslavia and to western Europe, with 45,000 Albanians leaving the province between 1971 and 1981.

**Controversy 4**

**Kosovo Serbs, Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals, and Officials of the Milosevic Regime**

After the Albanian demonstrations of 1981, the mobilization of Kosovo Serbs emerged and developed largely in response to changes in the political context and within a political environment that was not totally unfavorable to the action of grass roots groups from this ethnonational group. This mobilization of the Kosovo Serbs played an important part in the political struggles in late socialist Yugoslavia. The controversy and debate revolve around the contention by many specialists that throughout the 1980s Kosovo Serbs were little more than the passive recipients of the actions and attitudes of elites and counter elites. The specialists claim that the mobilization of various groups within this community was inspired, organized and coordinated by the officials of Milosevic's regime or Serb nationalist intellectuals, or both. In fact, this was a grass roots mobilization.
The mobilization of Kosovo Serbs, rooted in their discontent with changing ethnic composition of Kosovo and the post-1966 twist in the politics of inter-ethnic inequality, was initiated and spread principally by various grass roots groups within this community. The grievances of Kosovo Serbs could not translate into collective action in a political system that opposed any reference to their concerns, but accumulated over time and eventually resulted in the high level of politicization of Kosovo’s Serbs. As a local observer put it, “in the southern socialist autonomous province each and every head of a Serb household who takes himself seriously keeps a library of petitions, appeals, pamphlets and newspaper clips.”

The political change ultimately opened space for the collective action of various groups of Kosovo Serbs. In 1981 protests of Kosovo Albanians swept the autonomous province. A student protest over socio-economic issues turned into large-scale demonstrations with a demand for a republic of Kosovo, even union with Albania. The government declared the state of emergency, deployed tanks and security forces, closed schools and factories, and suppressed demonstrations. The scale of protests apparently surprised the federal leadership and raised fears of the rise of a major separatist movement. High officials now increasingly acknowledged inequalities facing the non-Albanian population in terms of the use of language, access to jobs in the state-controlled part of the economy, allocation of public housing and inadequate protection of their rights and property by the courts and law enforcement agencies. Kosovo’s high officials came under much closer scrutiny by the federal leadership and Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo ceased to be in their exclusive domain. The prevention of Serb emigration and redress of their other concerns now became part of the party’s policy.

The political change raised the expectations of Kosovo Serbs that the authorities would fully address their grievances. Soon however many from the community felt that the new policy
was only partly put into practice and the emigration continued. Some believed that high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia were not aware of the full scale of the problem and thus arranged a number of private meetings, at times involving large delegations, with the officials and other people they thought to be influential. They met Nikola Ljubičić, President of Serbia’s state Presidency (1982-1984), high party officials in Montenegro, Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, a retired member of Tito’s old guard, Branko Pešić, a Belgrade mayor, among others. In most cases the delegations were given a sympathetic hearing and assurances that the party’s policies, including initiatives aimed at halting the emigration of Serbs, would be implemented.

Simultaneously, a growing number of ordinary people, mainly in predominantly Serb settlements, attended local meetings of the official political organisations, mostly those of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP, formerly the People’s Front), to raise their concerns. In Kosovo Polje, a suburb of Priština with a dominant Serb population, roughly thirty political outsiders regularly debated various issues and forwarded the meetings’ minutes to high officials at all levels, from Priština and Kosovo to Serbia and the federation. Although remaining within the boundaries of the officially permitted dissent, they increasingly laid blame for inequalities on Kosovo’s officials, both Albanians and Serbs. Early on the core of this group, namely Kosta Bulatović, Boško Budimirović and Miroslav Šolević, jointly prepared the meetings and gradually shifted the agenda from local problems to the issues of broader political significance. Parallel developments unfolded in other predominantly Serb settlements.

Although Priština’s and Kosovo’s officials periodically attended the meetings in Kosovo Polje, the debaters felt that the authorities would not take their problems seriously unless they gained broader support among Kosovo’s Serbs. Bulatović, Budimirović and Šolević therefore extended their activities beyond the official organizations and started mobilizing support at the
grass roots. In 1985 they extended the core group to include informal advisors Zoran Grujić, a university professor, and Dušan Ristić, a former high Kosovo official. They agreed that the post-1981 party’s policy aimed at ending the politics of inequality and emigration of Serbs was adequate and that they should only press the authorities to implement the policy. In late October 1985 the Kosovo Polje group sent a petition to high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia. They protested against discrimination against Kosovo Serbs, asked for the protection of their rights and the establishment of law and order. They pointed out that Kosovo was getting increasingly “ethnically clean” of Serbs, accused Kosovo’s officials of the tacit approval of forced migration of Serbs out of the region and demanded that Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s authorities bring that trend to a halt. About 2,000 people signed the petition within ten days and by April 1986 the number of signatories multiplied several times.

In 1986 prominent activists initiated several highly visible protests and a series of small-scale local protest events. They sent three large delegations to the capital to meet high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia, namely in late February, early April and early November. The protest events also included a highly visible protest march of several hundred people, which unfolded under the label of collective emigration just before the party Congress in May, and a number of large public meetings in Kosovo Polje, including one before the Serbia’s party leader Ivan Stambolić. There were also a series of small-scale protests across the autonomous province, mostly in the form of public meetings or outdoor public gatherings, organised in response to specific cases of nationalist-related violence. As people became aware of the advantages of non-institutional action, they started petitioning local authorities, and sometimes managers of large state enterprises, to protest against discrimination at work.
The main consequence of various post-1981 initiatives were the incipient and unconnected networks of activists and supporters in towns and villages inhabited by Serbs. Throughout 1986 the Kosovo Polje group, including the newly arrived Bogdan Kecman, worked to link up the emerging local networks into a more powerful political force. Each of them took responsibility for a specific area of Kosovo and worked to strengthen links between the existing activists in the area, recruit new ones and inform potential supporters about their initiatives. Before long the Kosovo Polje group could mobilise small groups of activists for protest events in and outside Kosovo within a few hours.  

The activists’ demands, initially focused on the lack of protection by the law enforcement agencies and courts and inequalities in the public sector, gradually evolved towards constitutional issues. The protesters asserted that if the provincial officials were unable to guarantee protection to Serbs then Kosovo should be brought back under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities.  

High officials tolerated the mobilization for several reasons. Firstly, the highly decentralised political structure of socialist Yugoslavia, based partly on national rights and identities, encouraged groups to mobilize along national lines. After 1981 high officials had already acknowledged the grievances of Kosovo Serbs and put emphasis on forestalling their emigration. Unlike Kosovo Albanian protesters in 1981 who had aimed at important constitutional change, Kosovo Serbs demanded little more than implementation of the existing party policy, which was much less likely to trigger repression. Serbs, though a minority group in Kosovo, constituted a majority in Serbia as a whole and a plurality in Yugoslavia, which rendered their concerns more urgent for Yugoslavia’s political class. Other political changes also mattered. The change of political generations in the first half of the 1980s brought younger politicians into the highest regional offices and many of them felt that repression against ordinary
people would go against the values of their generation. Growing elite disunity, rooted in the
decentralised political structure and intensified during leadership succession, had already
resulted in the deadlock at the federal level and now thwarted attempts to reach a common
position on the grass roots protest.

Secondly, the small scale of mobilization and its limited potential for expansion, which
sharply distinguished it from the 1981 mobilization of Kosovo Albanians, were also important.
The movement of a minority group in a peripheral region hardly posed a threat to the regime.
High officials were mainly concerned about the potential implications for political stability at the
centre, since protesters’ demands were potentially highly resonant with Serbs outside Kosovo.
Major protests of Kosovo Serbs that centred on the capital, as in the case of the May 1986 march,
were therefore prevented. High officials often issued public threats to prominent activists,
especially since the October 1985 petition, and Bulatović was briefly jailed in early April 1986.
Thirdly, activists opted for moderate protest strategies and repeatedly stressed that their protest
was not anti-systemic. The protests often unfolded under the auspices of the SAWP partly
because high officials rarely tolerated openly non-institutional initiatives and partly because the
minority constituency of the movement ruled out large-scale discontent. The highly decentralised
political structure of socialist Yugoslavia, including complex relationships between organs of
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo, a high level of local autonomy and a large number of official
organisations, provided space for the activists to organise, recruit new supporters and appeal for
support.

From the early 1980s various groups of Kosovo Serbs sought contacts with influential
people. Activists kept in touch with some earlier Kosovo Serb migrants, such as the managers of
state enterprises and middle-rank officials in the capital, and reporters of Belgrade media based
in the province. The confidants helped by identifying targets for appeal outside Kosovo, since the activists knew little about institutional structure and informal political alliances, and commented on protest strategies. Activists also established contact with dissident intellectuals, including Dobrica Ćosić, a well-known dissident novelist who had been purged from the party over the policy on Kosovo in 1968. Ćosić supported their cause and suggested that they make use of all legal options of appeal. Others contacts from the Belgrade dissident circles urged radical action early on and claimed that protests of Kosovo Serbs in the capital would trigger demonstrations of hundreds of thousands. Ćosić claims that he initiated the October 1985 petition at the meeting with a number of Kosovo Serbs, but that a Belgrade journalist, an earlier Serb migrant from Kosovo, actually wrote the first draft. This is probably true. Although Kosta Bulatović claimed that he initiated and drafted the petition, other prominent activists suspected that this journalist, a friend of Bulatović, wrote the text.

In January 1986 around 200 Belgrade-based intellectuals signed a petition supporting the cause of Kosovo Serbs, while the writers union subsequently held a number of protest meetings. A number of dissident intellectuals had already initiated a debate on Kosovo a year before, partly from the perspective of the revisionist history of Serb-Albanian relations and partly focusing on the current grievances of Kosovo Serbs. Without doubt dissident intellectuals’ action alerted the general public in central Serbia to the concerns of Kosovo Serbs and made a strong impression on high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia. However, this was only a part of the intellectuals’ sweeping critique of the Communist regime and had little to do with either the creation or consolidation of the local protest networks. There was little difference between a few meetings of activists with Ćosić and their contacts with other potential allies, as the activists initiated nearly all of them. The significance of the October 1985 petition, drafted by the
intellectuals, did not lie in its content, since the same demands had featured prominently in the activists’ discussions in the official organisations. The Kosovo Polje group had even drafted a similar petition two years before but collected only around 70 signatures. The 1985 petition became important because around 2,000 Kosovo Serbs signed the text within 10 days and thus demonstrated strong commitment to their cause despite a widespread fear of the job loss or imprisonment.

Nor were the dissident intellectuals the only group that helped publicise the cause of the emerging movement, since Kosovo Serb war veterans occasionally supported some activists’ demands and demanded resignations of various Kosovo’s officials, both Albanians and Serbs. Before initiating any major protest event, prominent activists tested their ideas before at least some of the above confidants to find out whether the chosen targets and timing were appropriate. While seeking contact with, and advice from, various quarters, the protest organisers made decisions on protest strategies on their own. They firmly believed that people at the grass roots understood their problems best and could make appropriate decisions. More importantly, they were painfully aware that they would have to suffer the consequences of wrong moves and not their confidants.

Before 1988 political alliances in Kosovo’s leadership had rarely followed ethnonational cleavage and the views of most Albanian and Serb high officials shifted over time with the changes in the party’s policy. This was reflected in the demands of Kosovo Serb activists for the resignations of some Albanian and Serb officials and their occasional support for other officials, both Serbs and Albanians. The activists had generally been cautious about Serbs in Kosovo’s political establishment feeling that their loyalty lay with the party’s policy of the day. After 1981 a number of Serb high officials originally from Kosovo, who had occupied posts in federal
organs, was sent back to influential positions in Kosovo’s leadership. The so-called weekend or travelling politicians, whose families stayed in Belgrade, had little connection with Kosovo Serb realities and were generally despised by ordinary people. The activists therefore continually sought allies among the leadership of Serbia, but with little success.

24 April 1987, the date of Milosevic’s visit to Kosovo, is considered by many authors to be the moment when the Kosovo Serbs started to follow his policy. His visit to Kosovo Polje was not originally planned. Kosovo’s officials designed Milošević’s itinerary in such a way that he would not visit predominantly Serb settlements and thus would not have to face protesters. The Kosovo Polje group then staged a protest over a fake incident to attract the attention of Serbia’s leadership. On 17 April the activists spread a word that Zoran Grujić, the university professor and co-conspirator, decided to emigrate from Kosovo. Apparently Grujić had been repeatedly interrogated by the police because of his links with the Kosovo Polje group and claimed to have experienced problems at University of Priština because of his Serb background. Within hours around three hundred people gathered outside his house in protest. Of course, Grujić did not leave the province, but the activists exploited the case to invite Milošević to drop by on his Kosovo tour. Three days later Milošević, accompanied by Azem Vllasi, Kosovo’s party leader, came to deliver a speech before three thousand Kosovo Serbs outside the local primary school. At the end, the activists insisted that he come again, this time not just to talk, but also to listen to their complaints. Milošević accepted the invitation and approved their plea to choose their own representatives for the meeting.

Milošević and Vllasi arrived in Kosovo Polje for this meeting in the afternoon of 24 April. When cars with politicians approached the building, a crowd of several thousand protesters had already been waiting. They passionately chanted: ‘We want freedom, we want
freedom!’ Police literally carried Milošević into the building, while the protesters struggled to enter as well. It turned out that local party officials had drafted their own list of speakers and, when the police tried to stop others from entering the building, the chaos began. The police responded by beating protesters with truncheons while they threw stones at policemen and the building. Milošević was then asked to speak to protesters and try to calm them down. Milošević asked the protesters to choose their own representatives, ordered the police not to beat people and asked protesters to maintain order themselves. The latter accepted this with ovations and the meeting continued until early morning. The representatives, in most cases farmers, skilled workers and teachers, spoke emotionally about inequalities and the lack of protection for Serbs by Kosovo’s authorities. At the end, Milošević delivered a speech, in most part a typical speech of a high official, but his position was clear, namely his public disapproval of the use of force by the police.45

Several members of Serbia’s party Presidium told us that Milošević subsequently pulled all strings to call a session of the Central Committee of Yugoslavia and demanded that specific targets be set for the performance of party and state organs in relation to the Kosovo problem. Milošević also demanded that a number of former Kosovo’s high officials, including Fadil Hoxha, a retired member of Tito’s old guard and an undisputed authority among Kosovo Albanians, be held accountable before the party for their alleged tacit approval of the so-called counter-revolution. Hoxha had already retired and his removal from the party would not have important immediate consequences for the personal composition and policies of Kosovo’s leadership. However, by calling into question Hoxha’s credibility Milošević implicitly questioned the policy of federal leadership from the late 1960s and Kosovo’s highly autonomous status, which had been achieved under Hoxha’s leadership. As the intervention of Milošević
related largely to the implementation of previously jointly approved policies and remained firmly on the Titoist course, Milošević gained support from high officials from other republics without difficulty. However, the developments initiated clashes in the leadership of Serbia. Minor disagreements over policy details on Kosovo were exaggerated in the heat of the power struggle between the factions based on personal networks of Milošević and his former protector Ivan Stambolić, which unfolded according to the rules of the game in socialist party-states, with little influence from society. 46

Since the 1967-1974 constitutional reforms, the main concern of high officials from Serbia was the fragmented political structure of Serbia. 47 In the aftermath of the 1981 protests of Kosovo Albanians, Draža Marković and Petar Stambolić claimed that the eruption of protests resulted from the unconstitutional extension of the autonomy of Serbia’s provinces, but had little success in persuading high officials from other republics to help strengthen Serbia’s central organs. Following the change of political generations, Ivan Stambolić reaffirmed the need for greater coordination between the central government of Serbia and its autonomous provinces and put emphasis on economic issues and the concerns of Kosovo Serbs. The rise of Milošević in 1987 changed little in this respect and he reiterated the demands cast by his predecessors. The change in the leadership however turned the fortunes of the growing social movement. While Stambolić had kept pressure on Kosovo’s officials to address the problems of Kosovo Serbs and ignored protest networks, Milošević aimed to establish control over the mobilization by co-opting prominent activists. The change partly originated from the spread of mobilization so that it now had to be dealt with either through suppression or co-optation. Also, Milošević exploited the mobilization for his own ends and often provoked activists to publicly denounce his opponents. The latter did not object, as they now felt a degree of protection from the federal and
provincial officials and their protests achieved greater visibility. Prominent activists were in turn under strong pressure to channel their initiatives towards the official organisations and employ their influence over the local networks to halt non-institutional action.48

The growing influence of Milošević on prominent activists often failed to transform into action on the ground partly because they intended to proceed with protests until their demands had been fully addressed and partly because of a highly decentralised character of their protest networks. Although influential, the Kosovo Polje group by no means presided over the networks and other activists at times fully ignored its advice. Around thirty-to-forty prominent activists from various parts of Kosovo, who gathered occasionally, commanded sufficient influence to prevent any initiatives they disapproved of or to start new ones. In the summer of 1988 the activists formed a protest Committee, which quickly became another important decision-making centre. Neither of the three main circles of power within the social movement however could control a group of radical activists, who at times would not listen to anybody’s advice and proceeded with action, often getting support from a hundred or two supporters. The local networks therefore proceeded with protests across Kosovo. To placate Milošević they now wrapped up all protests, even large outdoor gatherings, in the form of meetings of the official organisations. There was growing number of cases in which local and Kosovo’s officials who attended the meetings were booed at, prevented from speaking or in which audience left the meetings altogether.

In the spring of 1988 prominent activists became increasingly sceptical about the claims of Milošević that a constitutional change, aimed at empowering the central government of Serbia, would occur in the near future. Convinced that the pressure from the grass roots was essential to political change, they launched a petition in May 1988, before the federal party
Conference, the so-called small party Congress, and soon presented it to high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia with nearly 50,600 signatures. The reason that nearly a quarter of Kosovo Serbs found themselves as signatories of the petition was that many activists signed up their whole families. Despite this wild exaggeration, the petition did have elements of a plebiscite of Kosovo Serbs. The petitioners now demanded from the federal organs to temporarily establish a direct rule in the province in order to establish security for the Serbs or, alternatively, to recognise their right to self-defence. They also threatened that they might collectively emigrate from the province in the last resort. Aware of the limits to the protest groups’ organisational resources, high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia were nonetheless concerned that any activities under the label of collective emigration might trigger public unrest on a large scale and Milošević resolutely demanded a halt to such activities.

Having to drop an important protest strategy and fearing a decline in participation by dispirited supporters, prominent activists found an alternative target, a protest in Novi Sad, the largest city in Vojvodina. After the unexpected success of the protest, the protest organisers and their non-elite allies outside Kosovo launched a series of protests in Vojvodina and Montenegro during the summer. The protests coincided with a spiralling conflict between elites of republics and provinces over the amendments to the constitutions of Yugoslavia and Serbia, partly regarding the relations between Serbia’s central government and its autonomous provinces. In September the protests of Kosovo Serbs unfolded all over the province. The activists now engaged in co-operation with the Kosovo Serb intellectuals, as they needed well-educated people to deliver speeches at a growing number of protests. While the local Serb intellectuals had timidly signalled their discontent with the position of Serbs in Kosovo, few of them took part in the protest activities prior to the late summer of 1988.
The consolidation of support for the social movement among Kosovo Serbs and the efforts of Milošević to break the resistance of Kosovo’s officials to the constitutional reform gradually affected political alliances in the provincial leadership, which had rarely followed ethnonational cleavage. The first signs of the rising tensions occurred in early 1988 when several Serb officials from the Priština Committee openly supported prominent activists. The September protest campaign coincided with the break between Kosovo Albanian and Serb members of the Provincial Committee. Serbs now supported the demand of Milošević for the resignation of high Kosovo’s officials for their alleged obstruction of the party’s policy; Albanians defended their leaders and objected to the significant constitutional changes. In the aftermath of the purges of Kosovo Albanian officials and the reduction of the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989, Milošević filled key political and public sector positions with low-ranking Kosovo Serb officials, mainly those who had little connection with the grass roots mobilisation. As the constitutional changes and greater involvement of the government of Serbia in the affairs of Kosovo met important demands of Kosovo Serbs, the movement swiftly disintegrated.

Conclusion

Without doubt, support of dissident intellectuals and Milošević boosted the Kosovo Serb activists’ prospects of success, in terms of publicising their cause and bringing urgency to their demands for high officials. The support nonetheless mattered little in the creation and consolidation of the local protest networks. While activists engaged in contacts with a range of influential people and opted for specific protest strategies with an eye on the broader political context, they remained an autonomous political factor and largely took decisions on their own. The mobilization originated from their discontent with the post-1966 twist in the politics of inequality and a demographic decline of Kosovo Serbs, part of which resulted from their steady
migration out of Kosovo. The changing political context strongly shaped the timing, forms and
dynamics of the mobilization. The changes in the party’s policy on Kosovo after 1981 resulted in
the softer approach of high officials of Yugoslavia and Serbia to Kosovo Serbs and their
informal exclusion from the authority of Kosovo’s leadership. These developments opened space
for various groups to lobby high officials outside the province and to initiate debates about their
concerns in the official organisations at the local level.

The slow response of the authorities to growing complaints shifted efforts of some of the
debaters to non-institutional action and building up of the local protest networks. The relatively
small scale and grass roots character of protest and moderate protest strategies, including
mobilization partly within the official organisations, shielded activists from repression. Despite
cooperation with Milošević, who put their demands firmly on the party’s agenda, Kosovo Serb
activists proceeded with non-institutional action. The reduction of Kosovo’s autonomy, which
met an important demand of Kosovo Serbs, and the purge of Kosovo’s leadership by Milošević
and their replacement by the Kosovo Serb party apparatchiks, effectively closed space for
autonomous political efforts of Kosovo Serbs. The timing and dynamics of the mobilization of
Kosovo Serbs differed little from the patterns of mobilization of other groups in socialist
Yugoslavia, especially protests of Kosovo Albanians in 1968 and 1981, since all unfolded in the
aftermath of growing expectations and the relaxation of repression centred on those groups. The
case of mobilization of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s reveals that an exclusive focus on elites and
high politics in the literature on conflicts surrounding the disintegration of Yugoslavia is
misleading. Due to the gradual relaxation of repressive policies and practices, non-elite actors
played an important political role even in the unlikely context of a socialist party-state.
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After WWII, the Yugoslav communist leaders made most important decisions on Kosovo, not just Serbs in the leadership. The pressures on Kosovo Albanians after 1948 had a lot to do with security considerations – the reaction of Yugoslav leadership to the support of their counterparts from Albania for Stalin and the Soviet bloc – and were not simply a result of an attempt of Serbs in the leadership to discriminate against Albanians. This is not to deny that the result was to disadvantage members of this community and that Serbs within this period had an upper hand over Albanians in Kosovo. However, much of the security situation in Kosovo during the 1950s and early 1960s was designed and implemented by the Serbian head of Yugoslav security services (UDBa), Alexander Ranković.

Between 1967-1971, constitutional amendments were introduced that began to alter the relationship of Vojvodina and Kosovo vis-à-vis Serbia and began to have a decisive impact on Serb-Albanian relations. Secondly, major political change in Kosovo occurred after 1966, following the demise of Ranković and the centralist faction in the Yugoslav leadership. The power shift led swiftly to changes in ethnonational composition of the political elite in Kosovo.

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4 Statisticki Bilten, no. 727, 1972, p.11. Cited in Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and
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7 Julie Mertus, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley, 1999), 8.

9 Ibid., 899
16 For a more extensive discussion see Julie Mertus.
17 There was in fact a considerable difference of opinions on the policy towards Kosovo. Serbia’s leadership, often supported by high officials of Montenegro and Macedonia, often came into conflict with high officials of other republics as well as those of Vojvodina and Kosovo. This was especially the case in the 1980s. These disagreements, even conflicts, however, occurred in the narrow leadership circle, masked by a united front that regional leaderships presented to society. This is hardly surprising having in mind an authoritarian nature of the regime.
22 Nin, 2.11.1986, p. 23. Cited in Magnusson, 8.


27 This section is based on Nebojsa Vladisavljevic’s research and articles on the mobilization of the Kosovo Serbs, especially, Nebojša Vladisavljević, 'Institutional Power and the Rise of Milošević', Nationalities Papers, 32, 1, (2004), pp. 183-205.


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31 Boško Budimirović and Miroslav Šolević, interviews with N. Vladisavljevic (Belgrade, 15 and 17 July 2001, respectively).

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34 For details see Vladisavljević, 'Nationalism, Social Movement Theory and the Grass Roots Movement of Kosovo Serbs', pp. 772-73.

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