Facing Myriad Enemies:
Core Elements of Israeli Nuclear Deterrence

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The study of war reveals both continuities and discontinuities. Today, such study instructs that the most starkly apparent discontinuities can be discovered in our steadily enhanced powers of physical destruction, most notably nuclear weapons technologies. As for continuities, the most obvious are those unchanging general principles that concern offense versus defense and, as a corollary, the inevitable primacy of intellectual power. What follows is a timely examination of these war-related principles within the particular and potentially time-urgent context of Israeli nuclear deterrence.

Throughout history, at the end of any military conflict, the winning side will have succeeded somehow in accomplishing the triumph of “mind over mind.” Since the ancient times of Greek and Macedonian warfare, derivative considerations of “mind over matter” have been relegated to a reflective or merely epiphenomenal importance. The reason for this is that the critically core battlefield, as ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu had already observed, must always be located in a reality-setting contest of human intellect. It follows that, for any modern state, fashioning an appropriate strategic theory or dialectic is necessarily prior to achieving any operational success on the battlefield.

Theory is a net. Only those who cast can catch. In the absence of a theoretically informed strategic doctrine, all moves on an actual battlefield will lack any sense of coherence or totality. Such moves, in fact, would likely be utterly ad hoc, more or less random, or even disjointed. Nonetheless, this does not sug-
gest that all antecedent theory is necessarily sound or even purposeful. History abounds with examples of poorly conceived war theory leading to disastrous military outcomes. An obvious example, of course, would be the incontestable misapplication of U.S. containment doctrine to Vietnam.

Ultimately, for all threatened states, the genuine core questions of survival must concern the underlying intellectual integrity of any proposed system of national security. This means a system that is founded upon an appropriately scientific (inductive-deductive) system of theory.

In world politics, endangered states—or at least states that should feel endangered by military attack—must be able to credibly threaten pertinent enemy states. In order for such protective threats to be carried out successfully—to prevent or diminish any contemplated enemy aggression—the would-be aggressor must always be made to expect unacceptably damaging military reprisals. This basic plan for national security is called deterrence. Significantly, all strategies of deterrence, whatever the particular nuances of difference between them, require enemy rationality. In such matters, rationality refers to a preference ordering in which national survival is always valued more highly than any other single preference or combination of preferences. It follows that non-rational decision-makers may still maintain a consistent and transitive hierarchy of preferences but national survival would not be at the top of this critical hierarchy.

Usually this requirement for enemy rationality is easily met. After all, since the beginning of the state system in the seventeenth century, the self-preservation of nation-states has been widely assumed to be the most important goal of deterrence. Today, however, given the eccentric nature of leaders in both North Korea and Iran, we have begun to understand that there could be stunningly consequential historical exceptions. In reversing rudimentary assumptions held since the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, the concept of deterrence could face certain substantial forms of redefinition and recalculation.

In Tehran or Pyongyang, for example, unstable leaders may no longer be assumed to meet the usual and traditionally necessary expectations of decisional rationality. What exactly would this mean for the ability of imperiled states to prevent enemy aggressions? The meaning of rational behavior in matters of deterrence must first be defined as the same whether pertinent weapons are nuclear or conventional. As indicated above, a rational state is always one that values its own physical survival more highly than any other preference or combination of preferences.

Wherever there might exist a different hierarchy of preferences—a rank ordering in which an enemy state would value certain preferences more highly
than national self-preservation—deterrence could fail. Additionally, in circumstances that would involve nuclear deterrence, the results of any such failure could be both unprecedented and existential in imperiling a state’s existence.

“Do you know what it means to find yourselves face to face with a madman?” asks Italian playwright Luigi Pirandello in Henry IV. “Madmen, lucky folk, construct without logic, or rather with a logic that flies like a feather.” What is true for individuals is sometimes also true for states. In the unpredictable theatre of modern world politics, decisions that rest upon logic, can readily crumble in the face of madness.

Consider the case of Iran. Because not a single responsible member of the international community has demonstrated a willingness to undertake appropriately preemptive action (“anticipatory self-defense” in the formal language of law), Israel may soon come face to face with what has been an expressly genocidal nuclear adversary. Today, of course, following recent and more or less conciliatory U.S. talks with Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, Iranian recalcitrance might diminish, and Israel too might find a conspicuous diplomatic opening for improved discussions with the regime in Tehran. Yet at some point Iran’s current leadership, and possibly even a successor reformist government in Tehran, could choose to value Israel’s destruction more highly than its own physical survival. Should such a non-rational preference ordering ever be expressed in actual policy, the play could end badly for all actors.

For the foreseeable future, Israel’s ultimate source of national security must lie in sustained nuclear deterrence, not in inherently problematic peace schemes created in Washington and Jerusalem. In regard to Israeli nuclear deterrence, although still implicit or ambiguous, the Israeli bomb in the basement could sometime “crumble before madness.” In certain rather easily imaginable instances, the results of failed Israeli retaliatory threats could lead to the disappearance of Israel as a nation.

The logic of deterrence has always rested upon an assumption of rationality. History, however, reveals the persistent fragility of any such assumption. We know too well that nations can sometimes behave in ways that are consciously and even conspicuously self-destructive. Sometimes, mirroring the infrequent but decisively unpredictable behavior of individual human beings, national leaders can choose to assign the very highest value to preferences other than collective self-preservation or even their own deliberate self-destruction. This...
was most apparent in the behavior of national leaders in Germany and Japan during World War II.

For the moment, no single Arab or Iranian adversary of Israel would appear to be predictably irrational. No current adversary appears ready to launch a major first strike against Israel using weapons of mass destruction given their understanding that it would thereby elicit a devastating reprisal. There have been no explicit comments or otherwise tangible evidence—such as deployments of certain weapon systems—to indicate prospective irrationality. Of course, miscalculations, mechanical or computer accidents, and errors in information could still lead a perfectly rational enemy state to strike first. But this decision by definition would not be the outcome of irrationality or madness. In strategic thinking, it should be recalled that judgments of rationality and irrationality are always based upon prior intent.

Certain enemy states, most likely Iran, could one day decide that excising the “Jewish cancer,” or more generally the “enemies of Allah,” from the Middle East would be worth even the most staggering human and material costs. In principle, at least, Israel could avoid this expressly genocidal prospect using selected hard target preemptions. Increasingly, however, any such reasonable expressions of anticipatory self-defense are now difficult or even impossible to imagine. Operationally, to be sure, preemption is almost incontestably too late.

All Iranian nuclear assets have been deeply hardened, widely dispersed, and substantially multiplied. For Israel there would also be considerable political costs associated with any preemption. We may see therefore that any preemption, even one that becomes an operational failure, would elicit overwhelming public and diplomatic condemnation.

It is plausible that certain alternative forms of preemption—including accelerated assassinations of nuclear scientists, cyberdefense, or cyberwarfare—could be purposefully undertaken by Israel. But it is unlikely that any such alternatives could permanently obviate more traditionally expedient resorts to military force.

A “bolt-from-the-blue” CBN (chemical, biological, or even nuclear) attack upon Israel launched with the expectation of city-busting reprisals might not necessarily exhibit madness. Within such an attacking state’s particular ordering of preferences, any presumed religious obligation to annihilate the “Zionist Entity” could represent the overriding value. From the standpoint of the prospective attacker’s decisional calculus, the expected benefits of producing such a blessed annihilation would exceed the expected costs of any expected Israeli reprisal.

Judged from this utterly critical standpoint, a seemingly crazy attack decision could still be logical. Any enemy state with such explicit exterminatory
orientations could represent the individual suicide bomber in macrocosm. It is a meaningful and powerful representation. Just as individual Jihadists are now plainly willing to achieve martyrdom, so too might Jihadist states become willing to sacrifice themselves collectively. Moreover, from a purely strategic standpoint, the fact that any such suicidal willingness would lack democratic origins would be irrelevant.

Any Iranian, Islamist, or Arab leaders making the decision to strike Israel would likely be willing to make martyrs of their own peoples but not of themselves. In this not-so-inconceivable decisional scenario, it would be judged acceptable by these particular leaders to sacrifice more or less huge portions of their respective populations but only if they, and presumably their own families, would be able to flee expeditiously to a probably predetermined, albeit still earth-bound, safe haven.

What is Israel to do? It cannot rely forever on even the most creative forms of preemption or anticipatory self-defense. It cannot very well choose to live, indefinitely, with enemies who might not always be reliably deterred by the more traditional threats of retaliation and who are already armed with assorted weapons of mass destruction.

Effectively Israel cannot now decide to preempt against selected Iranian and/or other threatening military targets. This is because the operational prospects of success would now be very remote, and because the global outcry, including the disapproval that would emanate from Washington, would be deafening. It cannot place more than partial faith in any antitactical ballistic missile defenses or Israel’s Arrow missile defense program, because Arrow would require a near 100 percent reliability of intercept to be purposeful in any soft-point protection of cities. This refers to protection of civilian populations as distinguished from protection of industrial and military sites.

Not even the oft-tested and brilliantly engineered Arrow can do this. The same leakage problems apply to the shorter-range protections of the Iron Dome. Israel’s recent Operation Pillar of Defense was not a dress rehearsal for Iran. This is because Israel faced only short-range and low-yield weapons during Pillar of Defense, not the more advanced weapons that could be fired by Iran.

The strategic options still available to Israel now appear very limited. The corollary consequences of any significant failure could include national extinction. If Israel’s enemies were all presumed to be rational in the ordinary sense of valuing physical survival more highly than any other preference or combination of preferences, Jerusalem could begin to productively exploit the strategic benefits of pretended irrationality. Recognizing that, in certain strategic situations,
it can be rational to feign irrationality, Israel could then work to create more cautionary behavior among its relevant adversaries. In such cases, for example, the threat of an Israeli resort to a Samson Option, or the last-resort usage of nuclear weapons, might be enough to successfully dissuade an enemy first strike.

Recalling Sun-Tzu, any more forthright Israeli hints of a Samson strategy could indicate a useful grasp of the ancient Chinese strategist’s core advice: diminish reliance on defense and instead “seize the unorthodox.” If, however, its relevant adversaries were presumably irrational in the ordinary sense, Israel would likely obtain no real benefit from expressing postures of pretended irrationality. This is the case because the more probable threat of any massive Israeli nuclear counterstrike, associated in enemy calculations with irrationality, would be no more compelling to Iran or to any other enemy state than if it were being confronted by a presumably rational state of Israel. This is because Israel would have signaled its relevant adversaries that it might not value its own continued physical survival most highly.

The threat of pretended irrationality could have no determinable effect on an enemy that was itself willing to value certain preferences more highly than its national survival. The threat of pretended irrationality—that is, of being willing to risk one’s own national survival—could have no determinable effect on an enemy that was itself willing to value certain preferences more highly than its national survival. Such an irrational enemy decision-maker might inquire, “Why would I care most whether or not my enemy were willing to take chances that could pose greater existential risks to my country? After all,” one might continue, “these chances would not be directed toward any curtailment or destruction of what we value more highly than our physical continuance.”

Nuance is everything. Israel could benefit from a greater understanding of the “rationality of pretended irrationality,” but only in particular reference to expectedly rational enemy states. As explained above, there would be no point in pretending irrationality in confrontations with irrational enemy leaders because these particular leaders would not, by definition, be more likely to be persuaded by more plausible threats of existential harms. In those residual circumstances where such enemy states are thought to be irrational, something else would be needed—something other than nuclear deterrence, preemption, or ballistic missile defense.

Although many commentators and scholars still believe the answer to this quandary lies in fashioning certain far-reaching political settlements, this is a
belief born largely of frustration, exhaustion, and stubbornly naïve self-delusion. To be sure, it is not the evident product of any deliberate or informed strategic calculation.

No meaningful political settlements can ever be worked out with enemies who openly seek Israel’s liquidation, a word that is still used commonly and unambiguously in many Arab and Iranian newspapers, websites, and texts. During the very first Arab aggression against Israel in the 1948–1949 war, the Mufti, who had personally traveled to Berlin during World War II to collaborate with the Nazis, made a habit of urging precisely such disposition for the Jews.

Let us return to viable policies of deterrence. To begin, Israel must fully understand that irrationality need not mean craziness or madness. Even an irrational state leadership may have a consistent and transitive hierarchy of wants. The first task for Israel therefore must be to identify this operative hierarchy among its several state enemies. Although these states might not be deterred from intended aggressions by even the plausibly persuasive threat of massive Israeli retaliations, they might still be deterred by certain threats aimed at what they do hold to be most important. Such threats are at least in principle ascertainable.

What specifically might be most important to Israel’s prospective irrational enemies, potentially even more important than their own physical survival as states? One possible answer is the avoidance of certain forms of shame and humiliation. Another would be avoidance of the potentially unendurable charge that they had somehow defiled their most sacred religious obligations. Still another would be leaders’ avoidance of their own personal violent deaths at the hands of Israel, deaths that they acknowledge could be attributable to refined Israeli strategies of targeted killing and regime-targeting.

This last suggestion may be problematic to the extent that theologically being killed by Jews for the sake of Allah could conceivably be regarded as a distinct decisional positive. In this connection, Israel must always recall that there is never any greater form of power in world politics than power over death. Dying for the sake of Allah could be regarded in certain contexts as a clerically blessed passport to immortality.

These tentative answers are only a beginning. Strategic problems are fundamentally intellectual problems. What is needed now is a sustained and competent intellectual effort to answer such critical questions in appropriately great depth and breadth. In the future, Israel will need to deal with both rational and irrational adversaries. These enemies in turn will be both state and substate actors. On occasion, Israel’s leaders will also have to deal with various complex and nuanced combinations of rational and irrational enemies, sometimes even
simultaneously.

Israel must self-consciously prepare to deal however residually with nuclear madmen, both as terrorists and national leaders. At the same time, it must fashion a suitable plan for dealing with nuclear adversaries who are neither mad nor irrational. With such a complex imperative, Israel must now do everything possible to enhance its deterrence, preemption, defense, and war-fighting capabilities. This means enhanced and explicit preparations for certain last resort or Samson operations.

Concerning any prospective contributions to Israeli nuclear deterrence, recognizable preparations for a Samson Option could serve to convince certain would-be attackers that their anticipated aggression, whatever it might be, would not be gainful. This is especially true if such Israeli preparations were combined with certain levels of disclosure—that is, if Israel’s Samson weapons were made to appear sufficiently invulnerable to enemy first-strikes, and if these weapons were identifiably countervalue (countercity) in mission function. These weapons would be explicitly targeted on enemy populations on the presumption that such targeting would reduce rather than increase the chances of any nuclear exchange.

The Samson Option by definition would be executed with countervalue-targeted nuclear weapons—weapons targeted upon enemy cities and industrial infrastructures. It is likely that any such last resort operations would come into play only after all Israeli counterforce options had been exhausted. Counterforce options pertain to the primary targeting of enemy strategic weapons and weapons-related infrastructures. Although at first glance such options might appear more humane than countervalue policies, they would be less effective deterrents and could thus actually increase the likelihood of a nuclear war.

Concerning the previously mentioned “rationality of pretended irrationality,” Samson could enhance Israeli nuclear deterrence by demonstrating a national willingness to take certain existential risks but this would hold true only if Israeli last resort options were plainly directed against rational adversaries. Concerning prospective contributions to preemption options, preparations for a Samson Option could convince Israeli leaders that their own defensive first strikes would be undertaken with diminished expectations of unacceptably destructive enemy retaliations. This sort of convincing would depend at least in part upon antecedent Israeli government decisions on disclosure (that is, a properly sequenced end to nuclear ambiguity); on Israeli perceptions of the effects of disclosure on enemy retaliatory prospects; on Israeli judgments about enemy perceptions of Samson weapons’ vulnerability; and on an enemy awareness of Samson’s countervalue force posture. In almost any event, the optimal time to
end Israel’s bomb in the basement policy, and thereby replace deliberate ambiguity with appropriately incremental forms of disclosure, will soon be at hand.

Similar to Samson’s plausible impact on Israeli nuclear deterrence, recognizable last resort preparations could enhance Israeli preemption options by displaying a clear and verifiable willingness to accept certain existential risks. In this scenario, however, Israeli leaders must always bear in mind that pretended irrationality could become a double-edged sword. Brandished tooflagrantly, and without sufficient nuance, any Israeli preparations for a Samson Option could actually impair rather than reinforce Israel’s nuclear war fighting options.

Concerning prospective contributions to Israel’s nuclear war fighting options, preparations for a Samson Option could convince enemy states that any clear victory over Israel would be impossible. With such reasoning, it would be important for Israel to communicate to potential aggressors the following very precise understanding: Israel’s countervalue-targeted Samson weapons are additional to its counterforce-targeted war fighting weapons. Without such a vital communication, any preparations for a Samson Option could substantially impair rather than reinforce Israel’s nuclear war fighting options.

As was concluded with Project Daniel more than ten years ago, Israel should scrupulously avoid nuclear war fighting whenever possible. But just as undeniably, there are some identifiable circumstances in which such exchanges could become unavoidable. However unwittingly, some form of nuclear warfighting could ensue so long as an enemy state’s first-strike launched against Israel does not destroy Israel’s second-strike nuclear capability, enemy state retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption do not destroy Israel’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability, conventional Israeli preemptive strikes do not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capability, and Israeli retaliations for enemy state conventional first strikes do not destroy enemy state nuclear counter-retaliatory capability. From the standpoint of protecting its overall existential security, this means that Israel must take appropriate steps to ensure the plausibility of the first two conditions above and also the implausibility of the latter two.

“Do you know what it means to find yourself face to face with a madman?” This opening question from Luigi Pirandello’s Henry IV does have considerable and immediate relevance to Israel’s existential dilemma. At the same time, the mounting strategic challenge to Israel will come primarily from enemy decision-makers who are not mad at all but are in fact altogether rational.
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Israel will need to promptly fashion a comprehensive and suitably calibrated strategic doctrine from which various specific policies and operations could readily be extrapolated. This focused framework would identify and correlate all available strategic options—deterrence, preemption, active defense, strategic targeting, nuclear war fighting—with evident and indisputable survival goals. It would also take close account of the possible interactions between these strategic options and the determinable synergies between all conceivable enemy actions directed against Israel.

Calculating these particular interactions and synergies will represent a computational task on the very highest order of intellectual difficulty. Nonetheless, it is a task that cannot simply be pushed aside, ignored, or subordinated. Today, for Israel nuclear strategy is a game that sane and rational decision-makers can and must play. But to compete effectively, a would-be winner will always first need to assess the expected rationality of each critical opponent and the probable costs and benefits of pretending irrationality for oneself. These are undoubtedly complex, intersecting, and glaringly uncertain forms of assessment. However, they also constitute an utterly indispensable foundation for Israel’s long-term security.

In the end, of course, Israel’s refined nuclear strategy will have to be suitably complemented by corollary weapons and tactics. Israel will require low-yield nuclear weapons for precisely focused military operations and recognizably higher-yield nuclear weapons for maintaining its core threats of deterrence. Otherwise, strategic plans notwithstanding, Israel will have prepared once again only to fight the last war.

There is already a pertinent history of such backward ordinance, when, beginning with the 1982 Lebanon War, the Israeli Defense Forces ascribed almost mystical importance to the Merkava, the country’s new main battle tank. No doubt “God’s chariot” turned out to be an extraordinary tank, but the key national survival issues had already shifted to other arenas. By then they were no longer determinable simply by quantum advances in armor. Israel must now prepare to fight the next war. This more or less inevitable conflict will assuredly not be waged on any traditional battlefields. For the future, in fact, good ground in the Middle East may actually be in space. Here, assorted cyberadvances could ultimately prove decisive to any meaningfully tangible measures of victory and defeat.

In the best of all possible worlds, Israel, heeding Sun-Tzu, would be able to “subjugate the enemy’s army without fighting”—what the ancient Chinese
military strategist had called the “true pinnacle of excellence”—but such a world has yet to arise. Still, to some significant extent at least, the resurgent idea of war as an extension of Islamic religious faith—an alteration of traditional Clausewitzian emphasis on political faith—is already impacting the efficacy of all forms of military power, including even prospective resorts to nuclear weapons. For example, when vast portions of the world’s Islamic community blamed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat for his so-called traitorous agreement with “the Jews,” Sadat openly reassured them that the new treaty was merely a tactical expedient to buy time until Egypt could return to fight another day against the “Zionist Entity.” This was articulated, when he stated that the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty “was founded on Islamic rules, because it arises from a position of strength, after the holy war and victory Egypt achieved on 10th Ramadan 1393 (October 1973).”

Facing Jihadist enemies who are most palpably impacted by the incomparable promise of power over death, Israel will have to wage its future wars at civilizational as well as operational levels. In essence this means learning how best to counter the recognizably irresistible incentives of promised immortality. By definition the answers in any such critical process of education will have less to do with threatened powers of ordinary or extraordinary military destruction than with successful and far-reaching transformations of rote religious indoctrination. To be sure, such transformations will require antecedent and possibly even unprecedented intellectual breakthroughs.

Nonetheless, for Israel war preparedness must still be all-important and must hinge on maximally correct assessments of future conflict. In 1973, following the remarkable battlefield successes of 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces had unwittingly prepared for the wrong war. Only after barely recovering from the Yom Kippur attacks did the General Staff begin to appreciate the vital differences between a war that begins on Israel’s own terms and one that is imposed without choice or warning.

In 1967, Israel chose to preempt; jurisprudentially, therefore, it opted for a posture of anticipatory self-defense. In 1973, choosing not to preempt, it was the Arabs who struck first—for a time, at least, with unassailably devastating operational effects.

Shall Israel choose to preempt again? Will the next war, whatever the selected battlefields, begin with Israeli defensive first strikes or instead with enemy aggressions? This primary decision and development could prove absolutely vital to ultimate military outcomes.

“Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths
Today, this advice may be even more correct than it was in ancient China, but with certain critical nuances. For one such nuance, Israel’s Arrow and related ballistic missile defense infrastructures could prove critical to the credibility of Israel’s nuclear deterrent and to any planned Israeli offensive moves of war. The interactive effects of these ballistic missile defenses could be upgraded and enhanced by any prior Israeli moves to end the country’s posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. This is because such steps could reduce the likelihood of enemy first strikes and/or the need for an Israeli preemption, whether conventional or nuclear.

For a state as small as Israel, any nuclear aggression, whatever the enemy intentions may be, would be suffered more or less as a countervalue or countercity attack; that is, as an attack upon its civilian populations. At the same time, should Israel ever decide to strike first with its nuclear weapons—a strike that would likely be in retaliation for certain massive non-nuclear enemy aggressions—a differentiation of countervalue from counterforce attack could still be meaningful. This precise significance would depend primarily upon the geographic size of the particular enemy state target and could allow Israeli decision-makers, in contrast with enemy first-strikers, to purposefully limit attack harms to any enemy’s noncombatant populations.

There are no foreseeable circumstances in which Israel should agree to re-nounce its nuclear weapons, whether still ambiguous or disclosed, in exchange for an allegedly comprehensive peace plan and/or entry into a nuclear-weapon free zone. Rather, more or less visibly, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv must continuously upgrade Israel Air Force long-range strike and strike-support capabilities, a challenging process that should remain part of a much broader and recognizably sustainable nuclear TRIAD—that is, U.S.-style land-based, sea-based, and bomber-based nuclear forces.

For Israel, nuclear strategy is a game that sane and rational leaders must play whether or not enemy leadership elites are themselves considered to be sane and rational. Examining the current Middle Eastern landscape after the Arab Spring, the struggle between Jihadists and secular military authorities is still very much in flux in Egypt and Libya and could still end in a post-al-Assad Syria with more or less decisive Jihadist victories. Among the substate beneficiaries of any expanding Jihadist influence in the region would be al-Qaeda and assorted sister terror organizations. Historically, Islam has sought to establish a world public order based on sacred legislation, and enforced by Jihad. Jihad is the Islamic Just War...
(bellum justum), and represents the very core of Islam's doctrinal relationship to the nations.\textsuperscript{20}

For Israel, nuclear strategy is a game that sane and rational leaders must play whether or not enemy leadership elites are themselves considered to be sane and rational. On occasion, within the often-intersecting parameters of this uniquely complex game, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv will need to decide whether their own feigned irrationality could sometimes be gainful and also whether certain incremental forms of nuclear disclosure should include detectable Israeli preparations for a Samson Option. Finally, understanding that even the most meticulously thoughtful military preparations could fail, especially amid regional enemies guided by distinctly Jihadist orientations to war, Israel will need to look at much more long-term and hard-to-imagine transformations of enemy religious motivation. Somehow these changes will need to focus creatively upon ways of detaching enemy associations of holy war from the always-compelling promise of immortality. Without a doubt, for Israel this very last strategic imperative will be both the most problematic and the most important.\textsuperscript{20}

**Notes**

2. Luigi Pirandello, *Henry IV*.
6. This assertion is based on the recent history of martyrdom operations in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and also the Palestinian territories. In all of these locales, no major religious or political leader has willingly accepted personal death as a sought-after road to martyrdom. At the same time, Jihadist leaders in all of these places, including even Osama Bin Laden, were quick to memorialize the martyrdom of others. See: Louis René Beres, “Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption,


11. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972), 307–10. On November 21, 1941, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin met in Berlin with Adolph Hitler. Also see: Joan Peters, From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (Chicago: JKAP Publications, 1984), 436–37. The purpose of this meeting, which followed Haj Amin’s organization of S.S. troops in Bosnia, was to ensure cooperation on “The Jewish Question.” Peters translates Mufti’s diary, stating that he was “resolved to find a solution for the Jewish Problem.”


14. Ibid.


