Kyle Haynes

Kyle Haynes

Assistant Professor // Political Science

Office Information - on leave Fall 2019

Office: BRNG 2234
Office Phone: (765) 494-8336
Office Fax: (765) 448-0833



International Relations
Political Violence and Human Security


Kyle Haynes specializes in international security and US foreign policy. His research falls into three major categories. The first uses game theoretic models to examine the dynamics of interstate signaling and bargaining, especially in a context of shifting relative power. The second qualitatively explores the causes and consequences of great power retrenchment. The third uses statistical analysis to flesh out the domestic determinants of international conflict behavior. His teaching interests center on international security, IR theory, and US foreign policy.

Selected Publications

Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy: Do Executive Term Limits Reduce the Effectiveness of Democratic Threats. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012.

Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment. International Studies Quarterly, 2015

Diversity and Diversion: How Ethnic Composition Affects Diversionary Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 2016

Diversionary Conflict: Demonizing Enemies or Demonstrating Competence. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2017

Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907 (765) 494-4600

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