// Political Science
Office Information - on leave Fall 2019
Political Violence and Human Security
Kyle Haynes specializes in international security and US foreign policy. His research falls into three major categories. The first uses game theoretic models to examine the dynamics of interstate signaling and bargaining, especially in a context of shifting relative power. The second qualitatively explores the causes and consequences of great power retrenchment. The third uses statistical analysis to flesh out the domestic determinants of international conflict behavior. His teaching interests center on international security, IR theory, and US foreign policy.
Lame Ducks and Coercive Diplomacy: Do Executive Term Limits Reduce the Effectiveness of Democratic Threats. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012.http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002712445739
Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment. International Studies Quarterly, 2015https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/59/3/490/1810845
Diversity and Diversion: How Ethnic Composition Affects Diversionary Conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 2016https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/60/2/258/1750381
Diversionary Conflict: Demonizing Enemies or Demonstrating Competence. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2017http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894215593723