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The Dissolution of Yugoslavia:

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Yugoslavism began as an idea – a dream championed by Count Janko Drašković (1770—1856), Ljudevit Gaj (1809—72), and Ivan Cankar (1876—1918), as well as other activists and intellectuals in the nineteenth century. The idea was that Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks were kindred peoples, that they could do well to live in a common state, and that, if they did not already have a common historical narrative, they could develop one, which is to say, to develop a narrative in which some common aspirations would be identified. The notion of a ‘historical narrative’ is not new. Quite the contrary, it can be dated back more than 3,000 years (as the example of the Jews indicates). A

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shared historical narrative, involving shared myths, shared heroes, shared challenges, shared experiences, and shared resentments, is what ties a community together. It is, moreover, a precondition for nationhood. Thus, when a community fails to foster a common historical narrative in its schools, its novels, its films, an important precondition of its unity is sacrificed.

Yugoslavia collapsed and descended into war for a number of reasons. Human agency must be stressed at the outset, but there were also factors which made it simpler for ambitious nationalists to attribute the country's problems to one or another 'out-group' and to promise to raise the given nation (i.e., Serbs or Croats, in this case) to new heights of rapture. Among those factors, one may mention (1) economic decay, (2) the political illegitimacy of the communist system, (3) structural factors (in particular, the dysfunctional federal system), (4) differing levels of pluralistic political culture across Yugoslavia's constituent federal units,¹ and (5) the failure to develop a common historical narrative, which had the result that the diverse peoples of Yugoslavia had different understandings of some important aspects of their past history, both in the remote and the more proximate past. In the following chapter, I propose to focus at length on the divergent historical narratives before summarizing briefly those factors which drove the Yugoslav community toward its violent demise. My argument, which also reflects the consensus of those colleagues who graciously agreed to serve on the 'dissolution team', a kind of latter-day writers' collective, is that while the violent

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¹ . Danica Fink-Hafner, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia", in *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 37, Nos. 3—4 (September—October 1995), p. 339.

breakup of Yugoslavia was not inevitable, it was nonetheless overdetermined,² so that it would have taken wise leadership, committed to the Yugoslav community as such and acting in good time, to pull the country back from the brink. After the Slovenian and Croatian elections in spring 1990, the prospects for any such ‘deus ex machina’ were considerably reduced. Ante Marković’s economic reforms, especially the convertibility of the dinar, could be considered to be economically sound steps, but they were not sufficient to solve the increasingly complex problems which the country faced.³ But Marković’s vision may be beside the point, since,⁴ by the time he became prime minister, republican governments were in place which were determined, for various reasons of their own, to undermine any effort coming from the Federal Executive Council.

The inclusion of historical narratives should *not* be taken as an endorsement of one or another version of historical determinism. All of us connected with the dissolution collective are convinced that, as Jean Paul Sartre argued in his later work, although people operate within concrete historical contexts, with given resources, opportunities, and challenges – and, we would add, in the presence of widely (though not universally) accepted historical narratives – they remain free agents, responsible for their actions; the proof of this, in the Yugoslav context, is that not all Serbs supported Milošević, not all Croats supported Tudjman,¹ not all Bosniaks supported Izetbegović. Indeed, the agenda of historical determinists may be suspect, as Daniele Conversi warns us. “Historical determinists,” he writes, “are often nationalists themselves, and presented to explain the current conflict as a *longue durée* epic battle, rooted in age-old enmities,” or patterns of

². There were, of course, also factors for integration. On this point, see Steven L. Burg and Michael L. Berbaum, “Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia”, in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 535—554.

behavior formed long in the past. Indeed, “once it is conceded,” Conversi continues, “that each nation cannot escape its historical mission of conquest and subjugation, no nation can act as a fair, dispassionate arbiter, or as [a] neutral, detached ‘third party’.”⁵ To put it more simply, historical determinism is insulting both to the intelligence of individuals and to the integrity of states.

The argument to be presented here is that the Yugoslav meltdown involved three factors or sets of factors: first, the various underlying problems such as economic deterioration, political illegitimacy, and structural factors which drove the system toward crisis; second, the lack of a sense of common interest and the presence and persistence of irreconcilable national historical narratives in which Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples cast each other as ‘the Enemy’ (usually across the Serb—non-Serb cleavage, but with Montenegrins and Macedonians sometimes taking the Serbian side); and third, the emergence, in Serbia, of a national ‘revitalization movement’ led by Slobodan Milošević, nurturing grandiose territorial fantasies. I shall also argue that understanding the Serb national awakening of the late 1980s as a ‘revitalization movement’ helps to understand the nature of what happened in Serbia, in particular how Serb nationalists could construe their *initiatives* as *responses* to some perceived threat coming from outside the community of Serbs,⁶ the phases in the development of that movement, and its role in impelling socialist Yugoslavia toward breakup and meltdown. Thus, although the

³ . See Matjaž Klemenčič and Mitja Žagar, *The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2004), p. 289.

⁴ . The remainder of this sentence was penned by Eric Gordy.

⁵ . Daniele Conversi, “Resisting primordialism and other *isms*: In lieu of conclusions”, in Daniele Conversi (ed.), *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 276.

⁶ . For further discussion, see Sabrina P. Ramet, “Under the Holy Lime Tree: The Inculcation of Neurotic & Psychotic Symptoms as a Serbian Wartime Strategy, 1986—1995”, in Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeteran

narratives and the theory about revitalization are presented sequentially, they should be understood as two component parts of an organic whole.

Before turning to the theory about ‘revitalization’, I shall summarize the Serbian, Croatian, Kosovar-Albanian, Slovenian, and Bosniak narratives, as well as cosmopolitan and ‘private’ (i.e., paranoid) narratives, drawing upon history textbooks used in local elementary and secondary schools, speeches by political figures, local newspaper accounts, and other appropriate primary and secondary sources. The Macedonian, Vojvodinan, and Montenegrin historical accounts are not included, since these federal units were not major players in the lead-up to either the War of Yugoslav Succession (1991—95) or the War for Kosovo (1998—99).

RIVAL NARRATIVES TO 1992

As Dunja Melčić noted a decade ago, “the nation is a product of communication and collective self-interpretation.”⁷ When the nation has a clear dominant historical narrative, providing a certain amount of consensus about the meaning of the past (which could be summarized as ‘1066 and all that’ for the English, ‘1776 and all that’ for the Americans, and ‘1389 and all that’ for the Serbs), then we may say that collective self-interpretation could be expected to have certain consequences for political behavior, consequences which will depend on whether the nationalism which accompanies such a narrative is traumatic or heroic or messianic or whatever. Since school textbooks are the most significant vehicles for conveying the historical narrative, state supervision of

Pavlaković (eds.), *The Dysfunctional State: Serbian Society and Politics since 1989* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, forthcoming in 2005).

⁷ . Dunja Melčić, “Communication and National Identity: Croatian and Serbian Patterns”, in *Praxis International*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (January 1994), p. 359.

textbooks affords a direct way for the state to shape and maintain its preferred historical narrative.

Historical narratives are nurtured and maintained not only via schools and cultural artifacts, but also by the press. More than 150 years ago, in his classic work on representative government, John Stuart Mill warned that when members of different nationality groups in a multiethnic state read different newspapers and books and, in other ways, maintain alternative sources of information, democracy becomes difficult to establish or maintain.⁸ In the case of socialist Yugoslavia, the educational system itself was federalized, with the curricula within each republic set by the authorities within that republic.⁹ This had the consequence that the history textbooks used in the schools grew steadily more distinct over time, while, in Kosovo, local authorities imported Albanian-language textbooks from neighboring Albania during the 1970s.¹⁰ In addition, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and others tended to watch their own local television, to read local novelists, and to read local newspapers. Of course, where the Slovenes, Macedonians, and Albanians are concerned, language differences made such readership patterns natural. In the case of ethnically divided Bosnia, research conducted in 1989 found that Bosnian Serbs tended to read the Belgrade daily *Politika*, rather than the local press (though *Politika* was also read by members of other nationalities until it adopted a nationalist format in the late 1980s); Bosnian Croats tended to read either *Vjesnik* or *Večernji list* – both Zagreb dailies – and only Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) preferred to read Sarajevo's

⁸ . John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), in J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy*, ed. by Geraint Williams (London: Everyman [New ed.], 1993), p. 392.

⁹ . See Uwe Bach, *Bildungspolitik in Jugoslawien: 1945–1974* (Berlin/Wiesbaden: Osteuropa-Institut/Harrassowitz, 1977). At the same time, it should be noted that the 'history of the Yugoslav peoples' was taught right up to 1990/91.

own *Oslobodjenje*¹¹; hence, when coverage and treatment of events differed from the press or broadcast media in one republic to that in another, ethnic polarization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for that matter across Yugoslavia as a whole, deepened.

This is *not* to suggest that, in a multiethnic state, the narratives of the component nationalities need be harmonized to the point where they become virtually identical. Rather, for a multiethnic state to be stable over the long term, it is necessary that the historical narratives of the constituent peoples be purged of mutual resentment, mutual recrimination, and mutual blame, so that the constituent peoples do not subscribe to narratives in which they define each other as ‘the Enemy’. The success of France and Germany in accomplishing precisely that, under what appeared to be daunting conditions, suggests that this task might be accomplished – dare I say it? – anywhere.

In outlining five alternative historical narratives, I have no wish to suggest that all members of any given people will agree with the given narrative as I describe it, only to suggest that these narratives represent the views typical among the most vocal exponents of policy during the late 1980s and into the 1990s. Nor do I wish to suggest that the contents of any of these narratives should be seen as necessarily true or necessary false; the truth value of the narratives is not the point. Nor, finally, is there any intention on my part to suggest that the presence of historical narratives is some uniquely Balkan phenomenon. Quite the contrary, there is no nation which has not had its dominant narrative (though there may sometimes be rival narratives).

¹⁰ . For documentation, see *Politika* (Belgrade), 2 June 1981, p. 5; and *Christian Science Monitor* (2 September 1981), p. 7.

¹¹ . *Borba* (Belgrade), 2 October 1989, p. 7, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 23 October 1989, pp. 59—60.

The Serbian (nationalist) historical narrative. A nation's historical narrative is not static; nor does it change from week to week. Rather, it is refined gradually, in response to dramatic (or traumatic) events and as a result also of changes in school curricula, editorial policies, and other factors; when events exercise a particularly strong influence upon a nation's thinking, the historical narrative may be revised more abruptly. Indeed, new myths can be invented and developed which can supplement or even replace existing myths, thereby changing the dominant narrative. As Todor Kuljić has pointed out, the regimes of Slobodan Milošević (in Serbia) and Franjo Tuđman (in Croatia) were particularly interested in discrediting the anti-nationalism propounded by the socialist regime and therefore quickly set about demonizing Tito as a “totalitarian bolshevik”. The point, Kuljić notes, was “to create a new structure of recollection, in which nationalism would be rehabilitated and anti-fascism called into question.”¹² Accordingly, Serbian schoolbooks in Milošević's time began to equate the Partisans and the collaborationist Chetniks as equally “anti-fascist”, while Croatian schoolbooks portrayed the Croatian collaborators as “heroes and defenders of national capitalism,” representing the NDH as a “victim” and demonizing the Partisans.¹³

Where the Serbs are concerned, they tended to view themselves, in the 1980s – as opinion polls bore out – as the selfless architects of united Yugoslavia, unappreciated and even abused by the other nations that comprised Yugoslavia; later many Serbs would also become convinced that they, as a nation, were being unfairly demonized – not only in the Western press but also closer to home.¹⁴

¹² . Todor Kuljić, “Tito u novom srpskom poretku sećanja” (Filozofski fakultet, Beograd, 2004).

¹³ . *Ibid.*

¹⁴ . See Emil Vlajki, *Demonizacija Srba. Zapadni imperijalizam, njegovi zločini, sluge i laži* (Belgrade: Nikola Pašić, 2001).

According to the Serbian historical narrative, Serbian history is one of suffering. Some writers have compared the Serbian nation to the Jewish nation or to Job or even to the crucified Christ.¹⁵ Milorad Ekmečić famously gave vent to this view of Serbian history in a speech delivered in Sarajevo. “In the history of the world,” Ekmečić claimed, only the Jews have paid a higher price for their freedom than the Serbs. Because of their losses in the war, and because of massacres, the most numerous people in Yugoslavia, the Serbs, have, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fallen to second place, and today our policy and our general behaviour carry within themselves the invisible stamp of a struggle for biological survival.¹⁶

In their schoolbooks, Serbs read how Tsar Lazar perished on the field of battle in 1389, when his forces met the Ottoman army on Kosovo polje. Indeed, the battle has been so mythologized as to have acquired a weight which it did not have in history, and cast as a showdown between the Christian Serbs and the Muslim Turks, allowing contemporary Muslim Albanians to be conflated with the fourteenth-century Turks in some speeches.¹⁷ As Serbian schoolbooks told it even in 1997, this fourteenth century battle was the watershed marking the end of glory and the beginning of “slavery under the Turks.”¹⁸ Serb schoolchildren read further how Albanians pushed into Kosovo already after Arsenije III Črnjević, Patriarch of Peć, led a large number of Serbs out of Kosovo in

¹⁵ . Such comparisons were made in *Književne novine*, for example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

¹⁶ . Quoted in Christopher Hitchens, “Appointment in Sarajevo: Why Bosnia Matters”, in Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschutz (eds.), *Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan Wars* (Stoney Creek, Conn.: Pamphleteer’s Press, 1993), p. 9.

¹⁷ . In fact, the fourteenth-century ancestors of today’s Albanians, Christians at the time, fought shoulder to shoulder with the Serbs against the Turks.

¹⁸ . Boško Blahović and Bogoljub Mihajlović, *Priroda i društvo, za 3. razred osnovne škole* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1997), p. 50.

1690,¹⁹ and again at the end of the nineteenth century, grabbing Serbs' land, plundering their churches, and driving some 150,000 Serbs to take flight between 1877 and 1912.²⁰ They have been taught to remember how the Central Powers combined forces to drive their army to flight in World War One, occupying the country, and how some 275,000 Serbs died as a result of combat action, with wartime diseases claiming another 800,000 Serb lives; these losses accounted for about a quarter of the Serbian population.²¹ And, at the end of the war, they felt, as Fred Singleton has put it, that “[b]y their victories in the Balkan wars and their sacrifices during the First World War they had paid with their own blood for the right to lead the Yugoslav people to freedom.”²² A history textbook for the eighth grade, published in 1998, represents the passage of the Vidovdan constitution (28 June 1921) as a democratic act, saying nothing about Croatian opposition to the document; according to that schoolbook, the constitution established a parliamentary monarchy, but could not resolve problems arising from the fact that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were nationally distinct.²³ Serbs also remember that it was they, the Serbs, who gave the interwar kingdom its dynasty, its capital city, even its constitution – only to see

¹⁹ . Konrad Clewing, “Mythen und Fakten zur Ethnostruktur in Kosovo – Ein geschichtlicher Überblick”, in Jens Reuter and Konrad Clewing (eds.), *Der Kosovo Konflikt. Ursachen, Verlauf, Perspektiven* (Klagenfurt & Wien: Wieser Verlag, 2000), p. 21. Noel Malcolm says that the number of Serbs involved in this trek was 30–40,000, though traditionally there have been higher estimates. See Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A short history* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 161.

²⁰ . Bohumil Hrabak, “Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija from the League of Prizren to 1918”, in *Kosovo: Past and Present* (Belgrade: Review of International Affairs, 1989), pp. 57, 61–62.

²¹ . Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 101. See also Latinka Perović, “Serbien bis 1918”, trans. from Serbian by Robert Hammel, in Dunja Melčić (ed.), *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg. Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen* (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), pp. 107–108. Svein Mønnesland says that Serb civilian losses in World War One came to 500,000. See his *Før Jugoslavia og etter*, 4th ed. (Oslo: Syppress Forlag, 1999).

²² . Fred Singleton, *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 141.

²³ . Nikola Gaćeša, Ljiljana Mladenović-Maksimović, and Dušan Živković, *Istorija, za 8. razred osnovne škole* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 1998), pp. 84–85.

the widely loved²⁴ King Aleksandar gunned down by a Macedonian extremist in 1934. According to the Serb historical narrative, interwar Croatian politician Stjepan Radić was an irresponsible ‘wild man’,²⁵ who did not respect elementary rules of etiquette, while his successor as head of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladko Maček, was a schemer who nurtured separatist sentiments. In textbooks used in the Republika Srpska in the late 1990s, Serb pupils learned that Gavrilo Princip, the young man whose assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary ignited World War One, was “a hero and a poet,” and that the interwar kingdom was “an open, tolerant democracy.”²⁶ As David Bruce MacDonald has noted,

Serbs claim that the first Yugoslavia was undermined from within by the Croatian desire for separation, and the machinations of the Vatican, even though the Serbs extended the hand of friendship and bent over backwards, as they view it, to accommodate the Croats. Serbs feel that they saved the Croats and Slovenes, and liberated them by making them part of a common South Slavic state. Otherwise, the Italians might well have annexed portions of Croatian and Slovenian territory.²⁷

That said, Croatian complaints and resistance during the interwar kingdom have been construed, by Serbs, as reflecting a lack of gratitude. When it comes to the famous Cvetković-Maček *sporazum* (agreement) of August 1939, which established an

²⁴ . Many Croats wept when the king’s death was announced.

²⁵ . See Alex N. Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia: Search for a viable political system* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). Still useful for an understanding of the interwar kingdom are: Branislav Gligorijević, *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji, 1919—1929* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1979); and Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918—1998*, Vol. 1: *Kraljevina Jugoslavije 1914—1941* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988).

²⁶ . *Dallas Morning News* (28 November 1997), p. 57A, on *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe*: this article, written by Chris Hedges, was reprinted from the *New York Times*.

autonomous ‘Banovina’ of Croatia, granting the Croats responsibility in the spheres of internal affairs, education, judiciary, industry and trade, and finances within their banovina, the Serb historical narrative records how leading figures in the Radical Party and the (Serbian) Democratic Party denounced the agreement; indeed, former prime minister Milan Stojadinović joined some 80 deputies and 20 senators in forming a new party, as a vehicle to express their opposition to the new arrangement.²⁸ Indeed, as Serb schoolchildren learn, the *sporazum* made it “clear that the Serbian national question in Yugoslavia needed to be resolved.”²⁹

Serbs also remember, not without genuine pride, their opposition to Prince Paul’s signing the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 March 1941, thereby aligning the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with the Third Reich. The next day, angry Serbs took to the streets in Belgrade, shouting “Bolje grob nego rob, bolje rat nego pakt!” [Better to lie in your grave than to be a slave, better to go to war than to sign the pact!] It was a day which truly inspired all those who were fighting, or suffering under, the Axis. Then, at 2:15 a.m. on 27 March 1941, General Dušan Simović led a group of army officers in overthrowing the government; they removed the regent (Prince Paul) from power, declared the underage King Peter to be “of age”, and assembled a new governmental team. The coup inspired the Serbs, gratified Whitehall, and enraged Berlin.

According to the Serbian historical narrative, the Yugoslav front of World War Two – where fighting began in April 1941 and ended only in July 1945 – should be

²⁷ . From email correspondence with the Scholars’ Initiative project, quoted here by permission of David Bruce MacDonald.

²⁸ . Ferdo Čulinović, *Jugoslavija između dva rata*, Vol. 2 (Zagreb: Historijski Institut Jugoslavenske Akademije Znanosti i Umjetnosti u Zagrebu, 1961), pp. 168—169; and Hrvoje Matković, *Povijest Hrvatske seljačke stranke* (Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić, 1999), p. 405. Cvetković was later refused burial by the Serbian Orthodox Church (in France) because of his alleged ‘betrayal’ of the Serbian nation.

²⁹ . Gaćeša et al., *Istorija, za 8. razred*, p. 85.

understood as a three-way contest among the brutal Croatian fascist state (the *Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, or NDH), led by Croat Ante Pavelić, the communist-dominated Partisan movement led by Croat (actually half-Slovene³⁰) Josip Broz Tito and aiming at the denationalization of Yugoslavia's peoples, and the Chetnik resistance, led by Serb Draža Mihailović, which was loyal to the king and fought on the side of the Allies. The sufferings of the Serbs during World War Two were terrible, by any account, and more Serbs died than members of any other Yugoslav nationality, but the claim made by some Serbs³¹ that 700,000 Serbs died at the Jasenovac camp has not been considered a reasonable estimate by either Serb or non-Serb historians; but for all that, it has continued to be cited and was presented to schoolchildren as an established fact in a Milošević-era schoolbook.³² In fact, according to more scholarly calculations, some 530,000 Serbs died in World War Two, both at Jasenovac and elsewhere³³ – a terrible tragedy to be sure, but fewer than died in World War One and fewer than Serb nationalists have claimed.³⁴

There are two variants on the theme that “the Serbs” were on the side of the Allies in World War Two. In the first variant, the emphasis is placed on the allegedly pro-

³⁰ . Serb nationalist propaganda has generally preferred to cast Tito as a Croat, pure and simple.

³¹ . The figure of 700,000 Serbs killed at Jasenovac was provided by Vladimir Dedijer in his *Prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* and repeatedly cited after that. The highest estimate ever given for the number of Serbs to die at the Jasenovac concentration camp was 1,110,929, as given in Radimir Bulatović, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, s posebnim osvrtom na Donju Gradinu* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990).

³² . Blahović and Mihajlović, *Priroda i društvo*, p. 57.

³³ . Vladimir Žerjavić, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu* (Zagreb: Jugoslavensko Viktimološko Društvo, 1989), pp. 61—66. Also useful for an analysis of wartime losses are: Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941—1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), chap. 17; and Meho Visočak and Bejdo Sobica, *Jasenovac. Žrtve rata prema podacima statističkog zavoda Jugoslavije* (Zürich/Sarajevo: Bošnjački institut, 1998). The latter volume was reviewed by Dunja Melčić in *Südost-Forschungen*, Vol. 58 (1999).

³⁴ . Nenad Antonijević reports that many Serbs were killed in Italian-occupied Kosovo, during the war years, or deported to camps in Albania. Some of the worst atrocities said, by Antonijević, to have been committed by the Albanians against the Serbs reportedly took place in and around Peć in the final months of 1943. See N. Antonijević, “Arhivska gradja o ljudskim gubicima na Kosovu i Metohiji u Drugome svetskom ratu”, in Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (eds.), *Dijalog povjesničara—istoričara 5* (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich-Naumann, 2002), pp. 470—472.

Allied orientation of the Chetniks, with emphasis on Tito's having been a Croat³⁵; in the second variant, an emphasis is placed on the fact that Serbs constituted the bulk of recruits to Tito's Partisan movement in the first years of the resistance. The second variant allowed those subscribing to it "...to believe that their nation alone had resisted the Axis occupiers while other Yugoslav nations had collaborated. This fed the Serbian self-image of a martyred nation surrounded by treacherous neighbors."³⁶ Where the quisling regime in Belgrade, headed by Gen. Milan Nedić, is concerned, Serb historians have, of course, provided serious analyses of that chapter in Serbian history³⁷ -- but there is little if any mention of either Nedić or, for that matter, Serbian fascist Dimitrije Ljotić in the Serb historical narrative as popularized in the press or promoted by Serb politicians in interviews with the Western press. Instead, World War Two is remembered as the Golgotha of the Serbian nation.³⁸ Consistent with this pattern, a new history text, published in Serbia in 2002,

glorifies the Chetniks, Serb nationalists, generals, and wars, plays down culture, demeans women, treats Vojvodinan Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Catholics as Serbs, and defends Nedić, leading its young readers

³⁵ . Indeed, the Nedić regime tried to portray the Partisan movement as a Croatian and anti-Serbian movement.

³⁶ . Marko Attila Hoare, "Whose is the Partisan Movement? Serbs, Croats and the Legacy of a Shared Resistance", in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 2002), p. 32.

³⁷ . See, for example: Venčeslav Glišić, "Concentration Camps in Serbia (1941—1944)", in *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933—1945* (Belgrade: Institute for Contemporary History & Narodna knjiga, 1977); Branko Petranović, *Srbija u drugom svetkom ratu 1939—1945* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992); and Perica M. Višnjić, "Nemački okupacioni sistem u Srbiji 1941 godine", in *Istorijski glasnik* (Belgrade), Vol. 9, No. 314 (1956), pp. 84—92. See also Milan Ristović, "General M. Nedić – Diktatur, Kollaboration und die patriarchalische Gesellschaft Serbiens 1941—1944", in Erwin Oberländer (ed.), *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1919—1944* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001).

³⁸ . The exclusive emphasis on Serb wartime sufferings can be found, for example, in *Martyrdom of the Serbs: Persecutions of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Massacre of the Serbian People*, Prepared and issued by the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada (Chicago: Palendech's Press, 1943).

in the direction of “rejecting cultural pluralism...[and the] rehabilitation of nationalism.”³⁹

Following this general pattern, Serb pupils in the Republika Srpska have recently learned about the atrocities committed by Croatian and Muslim fascists during World War Two, but nothing about atrocities committed by the Chetniks, let alone about the Chetniks’ collaboration with the Axis.

At war’s end, Zagreb’s Catholic archbishop, Alojzije Stepinac, was arrested and put on trial on charges of collaboration with the NDH. According to the Serb historical narrative, the communist prosecutors who went after Stepinac got it right. Among the key claims brought against Stepinac were that he had allegedly condoned the forced conversions of Serbs to Catholicism and the participation of local clergy, especially Franciscans, in *Ustaša* butchery.⁴⁰ In fact, the charges of collaboration were and are threadbare, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, and, as will be documented below, Stepinac specifically *condemned* the use of any form of coercion in connection with conversions. But for many Serbs well into the 1990s, Stepinac’s guilt became a matter of faith – and the ultimate ‘proof’ of the treachery of Croats. The trial of Stepinac also served to construct the Vatican as an enemy of Serbs, long before the role of the Collegio

³⁹ . Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: The Dual Challenge of State-Building and Legitimation among the Yugoslavs, 1918—2004* (Bloomington, Ind. & Washington D.C.: Indiana University Press & The Wilson Center Press, 2006p. 533, quoting from Dubravka Stojanović, “The new history text books”, in *Bosnia Report*, New series No. 32—34 (December 2002—July 2003), p. 40. See also *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), 17 September 2001, at www.vjesnik.hr.

⁴⁰ . Jakov Blažević, *Mać a ne mir. Za pravnu sigurnost gradjana* [Vol. 3 of *Memoari*, 4 vols.] (Zagreb/Belgrade/Sarajevo: Mladost/Prosveta/Svjetlost, 1980), pp. 237—238, 210—211. Serbs critical of Stepinac might well agree with the point of view expressed in Ivan Cvitković’s *Ko je bio Alojzije Stepinac*, 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Oslobodjenje, 1986).

di San Girolamo degli Illirici (in Rome) in arranging for the escape to South America of scores of *Ustaša* personnel became widely known.⁴¹

When it comes to the communist era, one may note that those Serb settlers who had come to Kosovo during the interwar era but who had been expelled from the region during World War Two were, in a concession to local Albanians, not allowed to return there after the war.⁴² But this was only one of many frustrations experienced by Serbs; in cataloguing those frustrations which most exercised Serbs, the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art (SANU)⁴³ may serve as a guide. It certainly captures the deep frustration and resentment felt by some Serb intellectuals and shared by an increasing number of Serbs in the late 1980s (thanks, in part, to the attention given to the memorandum and to the weekly meetings of the Serbian Writers' Union in the Belgrade weekly magazine, *NIN*, among other Serbian periodicals). Resentment centered on the federal system, which the authors of the memorandum claimed had been devised to strip Serbia of its legitimate jurisdiction over Montenegro and much of Bosnia-Herzegovina; there was also resentment in connection with the autonomous province of Kosovo (originally set up, by the communists, as an autonomous region), which most Serbs felt should never have been given any kind of separate or autonomous status. The memorandum also gave voice to complaints that the Albanians of Kosovo were carrying out a genocide against Serbs and alleged that the national existence of Serbs in (pre-Tudjman) Croatia was "endangered" as it had been in the wartime NDH.

⁴¹ . On this point, see John L. Allen, Jr., "Croatian connection remains most debated aspect of Vatican's World War II legacy", in *National Catholic Reporter* (4 December 1998), at natcath.org/ORG_Online/archives.

⁴² . Judah, *The Serbs*, p. 150.

⁴³ . Extracted and discussed in Dennison Rusinow, "The Yugoslav Peoples", in Peter Sugar (ed.), *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington D.C.: American University Press, 1995), pp. 305—411.

As Serb nationalists would have it, the ‘Croatian Spring’ of 1967—71, when Croats sought to expand their political, economic, and cultural autonomy, was an era of Croatian secessionism, in which Ustaša-type ideas were revived. Nor was the liberal Serb leadership of that time – headed by Latinka Perović and Marko Nikezić – remembered particularly fondly! Serbian discontent with the 1974 constitution can be dated back to the time the constitution was passed (indeed, even earlier, to the time when it was being drafted), with Serbs being particularly incensed about that constitution’s introduction of the concept of “federal units” – a concept which embraced both the six constituent republics and the two autonomous provinces and which, thus, gave the provinces a *federal* status. Indeed, the provinces were granted powers which put them on more or less equal footing with the republics – at Serbia’s expense. Moreover, as Branko Mamula records in his memoirs, the expansion of Kosovo’s autonomy under the 1974 constitution stirred fears among local Serbs and Montenegrins, who feared that the Albanians wanted to pressure them to leave the province, which they started to do in large numbers in the 1980s.⁴⁴ From the Serbian viewpoint, the problem with the 1974 constitution was that it gave the republics (and autonomous provinces) too much autonomy; thus, the Slovenian-Croatian initiative in October 1990 to promote the outright confederalization of the system was completely unwelcome among Serbs, perhaps especially among the Serbs of Croatia.

In the years 1968—81, when the Albanians of Kosovo were given better representation in the provincial apparatus and generally experienced an improvement in

⁴⁴ . Regarding the fears stirred by the 1974 constitution, see Branko Mamula, *Slučaj Jugoslavija* (Podgorica: CID, 2000), p. 38. Regarding the out-migration of Serbs and Montenegrins in the 1980s, see: Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija: Results of the Survey Conducted in 1985—1986* (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and

their status, Kosovar Serbs resented the change in their relative status. In addition, reports circulated alleging that Albanians had set fire to Serbian ecclesiastical facilities, raping Serbian women, attacking Serbian farm animals, grazing their cattle on Serb-owned pastures, and generally making life miserable for local Serbs.⁴⁵ In the mid-1980s, two prominent Serbian social scientists conducted extensive interviews with Serbs who had fled Kosovo. A consistent pattern of terror emerged from these stories.⁴⁶ The so-called ‘Martinović affair’ of 1986, involving a Serbian man with a broken bottle inserted into his posterior, came to symbolize Serb suffering; the incident even came to be called “Jasenovac for one man” in the Serbian press.⁴⁷ As Serbs streamed out of Kosovo, selling their houses to Albanians and seeking new employment in the Serbian heartland, local Serbs staged several dramatic protest marches on Belgrade and Serbian television and press, perhaps especially the weekly magazines *Duga* and *Intervju*, played on Serb sensitivities and fears concerning the Albanians. There were also concerns raised about the high Albanian birthrate, and some Serbian politicians even talked of taking measures to discourage Albanian births while simultaneously stimulating more Serbian births. Then there were the underground Albanian opposition groups; indeed, “[b]y July 1983, some fifty-five illegal [Albanian] groups had been uncovered by the authorities.”⁴⁸ By 1989, the atmosphere in Belgrade was thick with the fog of nationalism, and fears about

Arts, 1992); and Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).

⁴⁵ . Frances Trix and Ron Wixman, both of whom have spent a lot of time in Kosovo/a, are convinced that these accusations are completely false. So too is Viktor Meier. See V. Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise*, trans. from German by Sabrina Ramet (London & New York: Routledge, 1999).

⁴⁶ . See, for example, Petrović and Blagojević, *The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins*, p. 119.

⁴⁷ . Mertus, *Kosovo: how myths and truths*, pp. 98—101.

⁴⁸ . Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), p. 315.

losing Kosovo were being stoked by the Serbian Writers' Association, by the weekly magazine *NIN*, and by the regime itself.⁴⁹

It was in this context, after Milošević had consolidated his position, that he repudiated the figure of Tito and joined in the rising chorus of Serb nationalist demonization of the deceased Yugoslav president. The escalating attacks on Tito in Serbia were, moreover, closely associated with a renunciation by the Belgrade regime and its nationalist supporters, of the Titoist concept of 'brotherhood and unity' and a disavowal of its corollaries, above all of the corollary principle that no one should criticize in public any nation or any republic other than his own.⁵⁰ The attacks on Tito also laid the groundwork for the repeal of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo – a repeal which broke with the 1974 SFRY constitution and which ignored the preferences of locals.

In accounting for the collapse of the federation and the outbreak of war, the Serb historical narrative, to which at least some Serbs subscribe, blames Croatian President Tudjman for having allegedly rehabilitated the NDH,⁵¹ for having dismissed Serbs from their jobs only because they were Serbs, and for having allegedly revived the checkerboard coat of arms which Serbs associated with the NDH. According to the narrative, Serbs had a right to remain in Yugoslavia if they so wished and only organized their paramilitary units for reasons of self-defense. On this view, if the Croats had a right to secede from Yugoslavia, then the Serbs living in Croatia had a right to secede from

⁴⁹ . For a comprehensive discussion of Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav developments, 1986—2003, see Renéo Lukić, *L'Agonie Yougoslave (1986—2003). Le Etats-Unis et l'Europe face aux guerres balkaniques* (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2003).

⁵⁰ . On the repudiation of Tito, see Todor Kuljić, "Tito u novom srpskom poretku sećanja", Unpublished paper (Belgrade, 2004).

⁵¹ . See, for example, Petar Džadžić, *Nova ustaška država? od Ante Starčevića do Pavelića i Tudjmana*, 3rd expanded ed. (Belgrade: Politika, 1991).

Croatia. As for Bosnia, the Serb narrative emphasizes that under the constitution valid in 1990, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were recognized as ‘state-forming peoples’ of that republic, with the understanding that the system would operate according to a principle of ethnic condominium (consensus). While it would be a stretch to suggest that socialist-era Bosnia was an example of consociationalism,⁵² the system established certain expectations which Serbs felt were betrayed when, in early 1992, Bosnian President Izetbegović called for a referendum on independence. Those Bosnian Serbs who rallied to Radovan Karadžić’s SDS – and not all local Serbs did so – felt justified in organizing their own autonomous zones and setting up paramilitary units to defend themselves against what they feared was intended to become an ‘Islamic state’. To demonstrate that their fears were realistic, Serbs often pointed to the ‘Islamic Declaration’ penned by Izetbegović earlier in his life, for which he had been sent to prison in 1983.⁵³

Finally, because of the significant involvement in combat on the part of Serbs who had been living in Croatia, in many cases representing the latest generation in families which had lived in Croatia for centuries, Serbs have tended – though not without some exceptions, especially among scholars – to view the War of Yugoslav Succession as a civil war, which is to say, as an internal war. Ironically, in view of Serb nationalists’ characterization of Tito, during the Milošević era as an anti-Serb Croat, in an opinion poll conducted among 617 Serbian citizens, across Serbia and Vojvodina between 23 February and 4 March 2004, in which respondents were asked who had contributed the most to Serbia’s prestige in the last 200 years, Tito garnered the largest share of the votes

⁵² . See Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, in *World Politics*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (January 1969), pp. 207—225.

⁵³ . Significantly, Izetbegović’s Islamic declaration was published in Belgrade during the war years. See Alija Izetbegović, *Islamska deklaracija: jedan program islamizacije Muslimana i muslimanskih naroda*

(18.1%) with Nikola Tesla ranking second (14.2%). No one else attracted more than 9% of the vote, although Milošević, whom 2.4% supported for the title of having contributed the most to building up Serbia's prestige, was characterized by 53.6% of respondents as the person who had done the most in the past 200 years to hurt Serbia's prestige.⁵⁴

The Croatian (nationalist) historical narrative. I stressed above that “at least some Serbs” have believed (and continue to believe) the Serb historical narrative; the equivalent qualification applies where the Croatian (nationalist) historical narrative is concerned. Some elements in this narrative may apply to all or nearly all Croats; other elements may apply only to more nationalist-oriented Croats. There are variations on the Croatian narrative, just as there are in the case of the other narratives outlined here, with more nationalist and more moderate variants. But be that as it may, I have endeavored herein to outline the dominant narrative among Croats at the dawn of the Tudjman era and during the Tudjman years. Starting with self-image, Croats, owing to their long association with the Habsburg Empire, see themselves as Central European, not Balkan, and see themselves as having been unfairly subordinated – earlier to the Hungarians and later to the Serbs.

There are a number of differences between Serb recollections of the past and Croat recollections. For example, according to Vjekoslav Perica, the great migration of Serbs in 1690, which Serbs view as simultaneously a national tragedy (in abandoning Kosovo) and a kind of early-modern ‘Dunkirk’ (recalling the Allied escape from German-occupied France in World War Two), is viewed by Croats as “an invasion of

(Belgrade: s.n., 1993 [?]); and Alija Izetbegović, *Sjećanja. Autobiografski zapisi* (Sarajevo: TKD Šahinpašić, 2001).

Croatian [i.e., not Hungarian!] territory,” noting that the newly arrived Serb Orthodox prelates immediately undertook the attempted “re-conversion of Uniate communities in northwestern Croatia.”⁵⁵ A textbook used in elementary schools among Bosnian Croats in the late 1990s portrayed Gavrilo Princip as an “assassin trained and instructed by the Serbs to commit this act of terrorism” and said that the interwar kingdom was a “dictatorship” which the Croats bravely resisted.⁵⁶ A textbook in use in Croatia about the same time adopted a more neutral tone, noting that the assassination was carried out by members of the secret organization ‘Young Bosnia’, who resorted to terrorist methods to advance their program.⁵⁷ They are apt to remember that their induction into the interwar kingdom was executed precipitously, with the Croatian delegation ignoring its mandate to negotiate for a federal arrangement.⁵⁸ Indeed, the bloody events of 1 December 1918 in Zagreb are part of this narrative. Croatian schoolchildren are taught that, as a result of the Versailles peace conference, portions of Croatia were assigned to Italian control and that the Croatian Republican Peasant Party showed its opposition to the centralistic Vidovdan constitution by boycotting the session of parliament at which the vote on the document was to be taken.⁵⁹ Whereas the aforementioned Serbian schoolbooks portrayed the interwar kingdom as a constitutional monarchy, saying nothing about regime-sponsored terrorism, a Croatian textbook for the eighth grade highlights the terroristic activities of ORJUNA as one symptom of the lawlessness of the interwar system.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ . This poll was reported in *Vjesnik* (9 March 2004), at www.vjesnik.hr.

⁵⁵ . Vjekoslav Perica, “The Catholic Church and the Making of the Croatian Nation, 1970—84”, in *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall 2000), p. 557.

⁵⁶ . *Dallas Morning News* [note 20].

⁵⁷ . Damir Agičić, *Povijest 7, Udžbenik za VII. razred osnovne škole* (Zagreb: Profil, 1998), p. 146.

⁵⁸ . See Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias* [note 39], chap. 2.

⁵⁹ . Vesna Djurić, *Povijest 8, Udžbenik povijesti za osmi razred osnovne škole* (Zagreb: Profil, 2000), pp. 22—24, 31—32.

⁶⁰ . *Ibid.*, p. 35; see also pp. 67—68.

Croats are also apt to remember Stjepan Radić and Vladko Maček as great men; indeed, in a recent opinion poll conducted among a representative sample of 7,779 Croats, Radić was ranked among the 20 most respected Croats.⁶¹ In the Croatian view, it was Nikola Pašić, in the first place, and King Aleksandar and Interior Minister Svetozar Pribićević, in the second place, who were most responsible for the problems which developed in interwar Yugoslavia⁶² – problems which included, according to Croatian-American historian Ivo Banac, unequal systems of taxation during the first decade of the kingdom’s life, discriminatory treatment of Croatian veterans from the Austro-Hungarian army, and the imposition of a centralized system to which the Croats never gave their assent,⁶³ not to mention also the suppression of the Croatian *Sabor* and the removal of Croatian officials from their positions only because they were not Serbs.⁶⁴ Indeed, the interwar years are recalled by Croats as years of exploitation and repression. The Croats remember that Radić was gunned down by a Montenegrin parliamentary deputy in 1928, and, according to the Croatian historical narrative, King Aleksandar may have been privy to the planning of the assassination.⁶⁵ Where Serbian children are taught to regard the Cvetković-Maček *sporazum* as an anti-Serb act, Croatian schoolchildren are taught that “[w]ith the creation of the Banovina of Croatia, the centralist arrangement of the state

⁶¹ . Croats were asked to identify the greatest Croat of all time. Radić placed 18th, with 101 votes, just 5 votes behind 16th-place Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, but 1,954 votes behind 1st-place Josip Broz Tito. See “Rezultati nacionalove ankete: Tito najveći Hrvat u povijesti”, in *Nacional* (Zagreb), no. 425 (6 January 2004), pp. 46—49.

⁶² . Snježana Koren, *Povijest 8, udžbenik za osmi razred osnovne škole* (Zagreb: Profil, 2000), p. 50.

⁶³ . See Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).

⁶⁴ . James J. Sadkovich, “Il regime di Alessandro in Iugoslavia: 1929—1934. Un’interpretazione”, in *Storea Contemporanea*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 1984), pp. 5—37.

⁶⁵ . On the face of it, the assassination did not look anything but spontaneous, except, of course, for the rather significant fact that Puniša Račić, the assassin, brought a pistol along to the Assembly on that fateful day. See Zvonimir Kulundžić, *Atentat na Stjepana Radića* (Zagreb: Biblioteka Vremeplov, 1967). This point is also argued in James J. Sadkovich, *Italian Support for Croatian Separatism, 1927—1937* (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1987).

was terminated, and with it the hegemony of Serbs in the state.”⁶⁶ As a result of the *sporazum*, readers of a textbook for senior year in high school learn, Maček’s prestige grew among Croats, “who believed that he would continue to advocate for Croatian national interests.”⁶⁷ The life of the new system was cut short by the famous putsch of 27 March, however, the motivations for which have long been questioned by Croats. “The *putsch* of 27 March 1941,” Viktor Meier writes, “undertaken by Serbian officers without any consultation with Croats, was, in Croatian eyes, irresponsible in view of the international situation, and indirectly also aimed at the *Sporazum*.”⁶⁸ Besides, in spite of all the hoopla about standing up to the Axis, the Simović government lost little time in reassuring Berlin of its intention to respect the terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as Croatian students learn at school.⁶⁹

According to the Croatian historical narrative, Croatian opposition to the fascistic *Ustaša* regime should not be underestimated⁷⁰; nor should the widespread support given by Serbs to the Serbian quisling, Milan Nedić, whom some Croatian writers have portrayed as a Serbian counterpart to Pavelić.⁷¹ The Croatian narrative in general views the emergence of the *Ustaše* as a reaction to Serbian repression over the preceding two decades, but as in the Serbian case, the Croatian historical narrative has two variants when it comes to World War Two. Franjo Tuđman (Croatian president, 1990—99) and

⁶⁶ . Djurić, *Povijest* 8, p. 75.

⁶⁷ . Ivo Perić, *Povijest za IV. razred gimnazije* (Zagreb: Alfa, 2003), p. 133. Concerning reactions to the *Sporazum*, see also Franjo Tuđman, *Hrvatska u monarhističkoj Jugoslaviji 1918.—1941.* (Zagreb: Hrvatska Sveučilišna Naklada, 1993), vol. 2, pp. 271—282.

⁶⁸ . Meier, *Yugoslavia* [note 38], p. 132.

⁶⁹ . Djurić, *Povijest* 8, p. 90.

⁷⁰ . See the section “Otpor antifašističke Hrvatske”, in Hrvoje Matković and Franko Mirošević, *Povijest 4. udžbenik za 4. razred gimnazije*, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2003), pp. 169—174; and the section by the same title in Koren, *Povijest* 8, pp. 143—148.

⁷¹ . For accounts of Nedić’s government written from a critical perspective, see: Philip J. Cohen, *Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1996); and Milan Borković, *Milan Nedić* (Zagreb: Centar za Informacije i Publicitet, 1985).

the HDZ wanted to reincorporate the NDH into Croatian history; the spread of ‘U’ graffiti across Croatia and the renaming of cafés for the NDH or for Pavelić suggest that, for a number of Croatian nationalists, such ‘reincorporation’ signified *rehabilitation*. For others, however, the NDH was represented as a “flawed” Croatian state.⁷² This apologist tendency reached its ‘natural’ culmination in the adoption for Croatian elementary schools of history textbooks in which the NDH was represented as “a state of high culture” and in which the word “genocide” did not even appear.⁷³ On the other hand, adherents of the leftist variant of the narrative have preferred to emphasize the allegedly Croatian character of the Partisan movement. Indeed, after the German crushing of the short-lived Užice republic, the Partisan resistance movement grew in the first place in the area of the Croatian quisling state – a point given stress by the more ‘leftist’ Croatian nationalists.⁷⁴ Tudjman himself, though increasingly inclined to want to view the *Ustaše* as torchbearers of the Croatian national program in the 1940s, nonetheless conceded in his *Wastelands of Historical Reality* (1990) that “It is a historical fact that the *Ustasha* regime of the Independent State of Croatia, in carrying out its plans of reducing the ‘enemy Serbian-Orthodox population in Croatian lands’, committed a great genocidal crime against the Serbs, and a proportionally even greater one against the Gypsies and the Jews, in carrying out the Nazi racial policy.”⁷⁵

⁷² . Since the operation of concentration camps in the NDH was a salient feature of the NDH, it seems to me curious to represent that state as merely “flawed”.

⁷³ . Slavica Lukić, “Strugarovi udžbenici laži”, in *Globus* (Zagreb), no. 627 (13 December 2002), pp. 50—53, 55—57.

⁷⁴ . Hoare, “Whose is the Partisan Movement?”, p. 33.

⁷⁵ . Franjo Tudjman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti*, 3rd ed. (Zagreb: Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1990), p. 465, as quoted in Reneo Lukić and Allen Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (Oxford & New York: Oxford Univeresity Press/SIPRI, 1996), p. 71.

Croatian schoolchildren learn that Draža Mihailović's Chetniks were aspiring to create a purely Serbian state – an aspiration which required the annihilation or expulsion of Croats and other non-Serbs.⁷⁶ Croatian historian Fikreta Jelić-Butić has documented the intermittent collaboration of Chetnik forces with forces of the NDH in joint operations against the Partisans.⁷⁷ But the more nuanced picture which emerges from her research has not penetrated into the Croatian historical narrative.

On the one hand, the Croatian historical narrative places less emphasis on the wartime sufferings of Croats than on rejecting the claims made by Serbs concerning their sufferings (suggesting that this element in the Croatian narrative emerged as a reaction to the dominant Serbian narrative). Franjo Tuđman, for example, who by the early 1960s was director of Zagreb's Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement, insisted that no more than 60,000 Serbs had lost their lives at "all the camps and prisons" of the NDH.⁷⁸ A history textbook for Croatian high schools published in 2003 gives 80,000 as the number of people (Serbs and non-Serbs alike) who lost their lives at Jasenovac alone – rather than the 700,000 Serbs alone estimated by some Serbs.⁷⁹ On the other hand, there has been a greater stress among Croats on the massacres of Croats (alongside Slovenes and Chetnik-affiliated Serbs) at Bleiburg and Kočevje by Tito's Partisans at the end of the war.⁸⁰ And, for that matter, Croats have not been oblivious to their own remembered sufferings both before and after those massacres. According to Jakov

⁷⁶ . Djurić, *Povijest* 8, p. 113. This has been amply documented by various historians.

⁷⁷ . Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Četnici u Hrvatskoj 1941–1945*. (Zagreb: Globus, 1986), pp. 108–119.

⁷⁸ . Franjo Tuđman, *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), p. 163. See also "What Was Jasenovac?", *Jasenovac Research Institute*, at www.jasenovac.org/libraries/printdocument.asp?SectionID=4 [accessed 17 February 2004].

⁷⁹ . Matković and Mirošević, *Povijest* 4, p. 159.

⁸⁰ . Ante Beljo, *Yu-genocide: Bleiburg, death marches, UDBA (Yugoslav secret police)*, trans. from Croatian by N. Sladojević-Šola (Toronto & Zagreb: Northern Tribune Publishing, 1995). The best known

Gumzej, some 10,000 Croats were killed and 400,000 persecuted in the years 1918—41, 205,000 Croats were killed and 61,000 persecuted in the years 1941—48, 15,000 were killed and 900,000 persecuted during the years 1948—71, and 10,000 Croats were killed and 850,000 persecuted during the years 1971—90.⁸¹

In considering the wartime role of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, many Croats have preferred to downplay any complicity on his part with the regime and to emphasize, rather, his private and public protests against *Ustaša* atrocities against the Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies.⁸² Again, for most Croats, Stepinac should be remembered for having rejected the use of force in obtaining conversions and for having endeavored to keep conversions under the exclusive jurisdiction of Church authorities.⁸³ Indeed, a Croatian schoolbook comments that the untenability of accusations that Stepinac collaborated with the *Ustaša* regime is shown in “the fact that the *Ustaša* regime called him ‘the red bishop’ and suspected him of cooperating with the communists.”⁸⁴ Only as pressure mounted from Serbs to be allowed to try to save their lives through pro forma conversions, did Stepinac issue a circular letter on 2 March 1942, accepting “...that other motives [i.e., other than conviction], as long as they were honorable, should not prevent the people from being received into the Catholic Church. He stressed that the converts

treatment of Bleiburg and Kočevje in English is Nikolai Tolstoy’s highly controversial work, *The Minister and the Massacres* (London: Century Hutchinson, 1986). See also Koren, *Povijest* 8, pp. 171—172.

⁸¹ . Jakov Gumzej, *Žrtve rata u Hrvatskoj i BiH*, as cited in Josip Grbelja, *Cenzura u Hrvatskom novinstvu 1945.—1990.* (Zagreb: Naklada Jurčić, 2998), p. 98.

⁸² . Croatian historian Jure Krišto may be taken as representative of this current. See, for example, his *Sukob simbola. Politika vjere i ideologije u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb: Globus, 2001).

⁸³ . Jure Krišto, “Crkva i država. Slučaj vjerskih prijelaza u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj”, in Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (eds.), *Dijalog povjesničara—istoričara 1* (Zagreb: Zaklada Friedrich-Naumann, 2000), pp. 191, 198; and Richard Pattee, *The Case of Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 384—387.

⁸⁴ . Djurić, *Povijest* 8, p. 136. See also Koren, *Povijest* 8, p. 141.

could return to their own faith once the danger was over.”⁸⁵ Croatian historian Ivo Goldstein has offered a nuanced and fair-minded portrait of Archbishop Stepinac, showing him worrying about the secondary features of the Croatian holocaust at a time when he should have kept his focus on the holocaust itself,⁸⁶ but also highlighting the archbishop’s efforts to save lives and the repeated criticisms of racism in his archdiocesan newsorgan, *Katolicki list*.⁸⁷ By contrast, the Catholic Church has endeavored, ever since his trial, to portray the ill-fated archbishop as a saintly man, a Croatian hero, who not only did not collaborate with the fascists but bravely stood up to them, even beatifying him in 1998!⁸⁸ For Croats, thus, the trial of Stepinac can be understood only in one of three senses: an endeavor by Tito to ‘balance’ the 1946 trial of Chetnik leader Mihailović with the trial of an appropriately prominent Croat (Stepinac thus serving as a stand-in for the absent Maček); a reprisal against the archbishop for his refusal to break with Rome and set up a schismatic Church under communist influence⁸⁹; or simply part of the communist effort to ‘tame’ the Churches more generally. And thus, as one Croatian writer has put it recently, “[w]ithout regard for the truth, Stepinac was accused of being an instigator of *Križari*, *Ustaša*, and terrorist actions [after the war had

⁸⁵ . Theresa Marie Ursić, *Religious Freedom in Post-World War II Yugoslavia: The Case of Roman Catholic Nuns in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1945–1960* (Lanham, Md.: International Scholars Publications, 2001), p. 9.

⁸⁶ . Ivo Goldstein, in interview with Zoran Daškalović, “Crkva zatvara vatra Europe”, in *Feral Tribune* (Split), no. 853 (19 January 2002), p. 22. See also Ivo Goldstein, with Slavko Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu* (Zagreb: Novi liber & Židovska općina Zagreb, 2001), p. 567 and passim.

⁸⁷ . Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu*, pp. 49, 540, and passim.

⁸⁸ . For an example of a work written in this spirit, see O. Aleksa Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac. Hrvatski Kardinal* (Rome: Žiral, 1974).

⁸⁹ . On this notion, see Benigar, *Alojzije Stepinac*, p. 639; also *Polet* (8 and 15 February 1985), as cited in *Glas koncila* (Zagreb), 24 February 1985, p. 3.

ended] and of an involvement in a methodical plan to bring back Maček, the *Ustaša*, and the King.”⁹⁰

In Croatian memory, the years 1945—66 are associated with “the persecutions and liquidations of many people,” with the establishment of a leadership cult centered on Comrade Tito, and with attacks on the Churches. During much of that period, Aleksandar Ranković, vice president and head of UDBa (the secret police), exercised particular power within the party apparatus. Then, on 1 July 1966, Tito fired Ranković, accusing him, among other things, of having formed a political faction with the goal of seizing power and of having authorized illegal wiretaps on some of the leading figures in the party, including Tito himself.⁹¹ The years up to 1966 are remembered as a time of “cultural aggression against Croatia.”⁹² By contrast, during the years 1967—71, the era of the ‘Croatian Spring’, many Croats felt that they were at last coming out from under Belgrade’s heel and the Croatian communist triumvirate – Miko Tripalo, Savka Dabčević-Kučar, and Pero Pirker – became enormously popular among Croats, as did the oppositionistic economic historian, Šime Djodan. This period is remembered as a time when Croatia tried to win “greater economic and political independence,” albeit within the Yugoslav framework.⁹³ During these years, Croats raised demands for the removal of Serbian linguistic infiltrations from the Croatian language, for the rehabilitation of Stjepan Radić, and for the return of the equestrian statue of Ban Josip Jelačić to Zagreb’s main square. There were also complaints aired publicly to the effect that Serbian firms were investing in hotels along the Croatian coast and bringing in Serbs to work in the

⁹⁰ . Zdenko Radelić, *Križari gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.—1950*. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest & Dom i svijet, 2002), p. 138.

⁹¹ . *Nova Makedonija* (Skopje), 3 July 1966, p. 3. Concerning Ranković, see Vojin Lukić, *Sećanja i saznanja. Aleksandar Ranković i Brionski plenum* (Titograd: Novica Jovović, 1989).

hotels, rather than hiring locals. When Tito removed the popular Croatian leadership at the end of 1971, ejecting tens of thousands of persons from the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), and aborting the career prospects of at least as many young Croats, many Croats became deeply alienated. In spite of that, more than 25% of Croats (2,055 out of 7,779 surveyed) reported in the aforementioned poll conducted in late 2003 that they considered Tito to be “the greatest Croat”— putting Tito well ahead of second-place Nikola Tesla.⁹⁴ Of course, as already noted, Tito was half-Croat and half-Slovene, while Tesla was a Serb from Croatia who emigrated to the United States.

While many Serbs came to view the 1974 constitution as somehow “anti-Serb” in nature, Croats were told, and continue to be taught, that Serbian agitation against the constitution was motivated by a desire to establish Serbian predominance in Yugoslavia.⁹⁵

For their part, Croats remember that, throughout the communist era, the Serbs of Croatia were overrepresented, relative to their proportion of the population of Croatia, in the LCC, in the police apparatus of Croatia, and in the upper ranks of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Indeed, as of 1988, about 60% of the general staff of the JNA consisted of Serbs and Montenegrins, who, combined, made up less than 40% of the population of Yugoslavia.⁹⁶ In Croats’ view, it was *they*, and not the Serbs, who were the victims of discrimination in communist-era Yugoslavia. Croats also remember their joint

⁹² . Matković and Mirošević, *Povijest 4*, p. 239.

⁹³ . Koren, *Povijest 8*, p. 216.

⁹⁴ . “Tito najveći Hrvat” [note 53], pp. 46—47. Tesla attracted 1,614 votes, third-place Rudjer Bošković had 628 votes, and fourth-place Miroslav Krleža garnered 515 votes. Franjo Tuđman finished in fifth place, with 343 votes. No one else attracted more than 300 votes, and only five had between 150 and 300 votes.

⁹⁵ . Koren, *Povijest 8*, p. 225. See also Matković and Mirošević, *Povijest 4*, pp. 262—263.

⁹⁶ . Viktor Meier, “Jugoslawiens Krise wird politisch”, in *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Vol. 68, No. 2 (February 1988), p. 101.

initiative with Slovenia to promote a confederalization plan in October 1990 as a genuine effort to salvage what could be salvaged of the Yugoslav union. Then, when, on 27 July 1989, *Il Tempo*, an Italian magazine, “published the text of an interview with Serbian writer Dobrica Ćosić, which seemed to Croats to open up the question of reassigning Istria, Zadar, and the Adriatic islands to another republic, that is, of taking them away from Croatia,”⁹⁷ Croats were furious and the Ćosić interview, republished in many places, dominated political conversations in Croatia throughout the late summer of that year. Since this interview was given not only before Tudjman was elected president, but even before the elections in which he would enjoy victory had been called, it cannot be represented as a response to anything involving Tudjman personally.

According to the Croatian historical narrative, Tudjman’s firing of Serbs from positions in the bureaucracy and the police can be criticized, at the most, for being hasty and ill-considered, but not for being unjustified. The checkerboard coat of arms has been a symbol of Croatian statehood since medieval times and was featured also in the coat of arms of the republic of Croatia during socialist times; moreover, Croats emphasize, the checkerboard as used in both the socialist era and since then begins with a red square in the upper left-hand corner, whereas the checkerboard used in the NDH began with a white square.⁹⁸ Moreover, where Serb nationalists claimed that the fascist appropriation of Croatia’s millennium-old historical symbols invalidated their use for all time to come, Croats replied that the appropriation of symbols by fascists does not change their original and true meaning – it only coats them with a false meaning, which should be rejected. Croats blame Serbs for setting up illegal paramilitary units on Croatian territory in the

⁹⁷ . Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias* [note 39], p. 368..

course of 1990, for erecting barricades around Knin and its environs already in August 1990, and for declaring the establishment, on 21 December 1990, of a Serbian Autonomous Region, with its capital in Knin, thus six months before Croatia would declare its separation from the dying SFRY.⁹⁹ According to the Croatian historical narrative, it was Milošević and “the Serbs” who planned and started the war, in order to make a grab for Croatian territory. Slaven Letica puts it this way:

The defense of the Serbian ‘Lebensraum’ and the protection of the Serbian minority – the same fictitious motives which were behind the German national-socialism – served as a pretext for an all-out war against the Croatian people. The aim was the conquest of Croatia. Serbia launched the war in May, 1991... The war in Croatia lays bare the worthlessness and falsehood of the allegations that the Byzantine civilization and the Serbian people are in danger of a genocide.¹⁰⁰

Thus, the war should be understood, according to the Croatian historical narrative, as a war of Serbian aggression against Croatia, in which local Serbs took the side of Serbia, rather than as a civil war.

Where the war in Bosnia is concerned, the Croatian historical narrative holds that Tudjman’s famous meeting with Milošević in Karadjordjevo in March 1991, where the fate of Bosnia was discussed, was intended, by Tudjman, to set up a contingency plan, and should not be viewed as the commitment by Tudjman to a program of partition and

⁹⁸ . On the checkerboard, see Slavko Granić, “The Croatian Coat of Arms: Historical Emblem or Controversial Symbol?”, in *Journal of Croatian Studies*, Vol. 34—35 (1993—94), pp. 5—28.

⁹⁹ . See Mønnesland, *Før Jugoslavia og etter*, [note 15], pp. 256—257.

¹⁰⁰ . Slaven Letica, *Obećana zemlja. Politički antimemoari* (Zagreb: Ex ungue leonem, n.d.), p. 475.

occupation.¹⁰¹ As for the Muslim-Croat conflict which later ensued, this was, according to the Croatian historical narrative, the result of unprovoked Muslim (Bosniak) attacks on the local Croatian population.¹⁰²

The (Kosovar-)Albanian historical narrative. For any people, the myth of its origins has an importance; where the Albanians are concerned, the importance attached to the ethnogenetic myth or theory is perhaps greater than for many other peoples, at least in Europe. The first such theory traced Albanian ethnogenesis back to the ancient Pelasgians, described by Kristo Dako as “the first people who came to Europe.”¹⁰³ The Caucasian theory of Albanian origins came later, and finally, the ‘Illyrian’ theory, which claimed that the Albanians are the descendants of an ancient ‘Illyrian’ people. The point stressed by the Albanians of Kosovo (or Kosova, as the Albanians spell it) is that these ancient Illyrian people who inhabited the Roman province of Dardania inhabited Kosovo for hundreds of years before the arrival of the Serbs – a point argued in extenso by Noel Malcolm in his critically acclaimed history of Kosovo.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, the Albanians of Kosovo tend to dismiss the Serbian migration of 1690 as largely irrelevant to local

¹⁰¹ . I am indebted to Jim Sadkovich for this interpretation. Hrvoje Šarinić, at one time diplomatic adviser to Franjo Tuđman, told the weekly magazine, *Nacional*, in 2004 that there was no concrete agreement reached at Karadjordjevo. See Robert Bajrušić, “Deal Tuđmana i Miloševića spriječila je plitka Neretva”, in *Nacional* (Zagreb), no. 428 (27 January 2004), pp. 20—22. See also Dunja Melčić, “Croatia’s Discourse about the Past and Some Problems of Croatian-Bosnian Understanding”, in Sabrina P. Ramet, Konrad Clewing, and Reneo Lukic (eds.), *Croatia since Independence: War, Politics, Society, Foreign Relations* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, in production).

¹⁰² . For two works expostulating this view, see: *Dossier: Crimes of Muslim Units Against the Croats in BiH 1992—1994* (Mostar: Centre for Investigation and Documentation, 1999); and Charles R. Shrader, *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992—1994* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2003). See also Željko Ivanković and Dunja Melčić, “Der bosniakisch-kroatische ‘Krieg im Kriege’”, in Melčić (ed.), *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg*, pp. 423—445.

¹⁰³ . Piro Misha, “Invention of a Nationalism: Myth and Amnesia”, in Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer (eds.), *Albanian Identities: Myth and History* (London: Hurst, 2002), p. 42; and Noel Malcolm, “Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the Works of

demographics, insisting that they were already present in Kosovo in large numbers even before 1690. Moreover, where the Serbs recall that they were “driven out” of Kosovo in the final decades of the nineteenth century, Albanians claim that the League of Prizren which they established in 1878 was purely defensive and deny any systematic or large-scale injustices against Serbs. They recall that some 60,000 Albanian families were driven out of lands taken by Serbia in 1877—78, many of them freezing or starving to death on the sides of the roads.¹⁰⁵ In addition, Albanians were proud of their resistance to Ottoman armies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, harkening back to the resistance of their national hero, Skenderbeg (1405—1468), who held off Ottoman armies for 25 years at a time when no one else in Europe had yet successfully stood up to the Ottomans. Albanians have consistently, over the years, maintained that Albania should include not only Kosovo but also portions of southern Montenegro and western Macedonia, and even portions of northern Greece; publications circulating among émigré Albanians (such as the *Albanian Catholic Bulletin*, published in California in the 1970s and 1980s) often featured a map of ‘Greater Albania’, within the borders indicated, on the back cover or elsewhere. Albanians remember that when they proclaimed the establishment of their national state in 1912, it was intended that it would include Kosovo, but when the Serbian army moved into the province, carrying out ethnic cleansing in order to change the demographic balance,¹⁰⁶ the London conference (1913) recognized Serbian annexation.

While Serbs complain that they have been the victims of Albanian terror and ‘genocide’, the Albanians reverse the allegation and maintain that, except for the years

Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century”, in Schwandner-Sievers and Fischer (eds.), *Albanian Identities*, p. 73.

¹⁰⁴ . See Malcolm, *Kosovo*, passim; also Malcolm, “Myths of Albanian National Identity”, pp. 73—75.

¹⁰⁵ . Frances Trix, private correspondence with the author, 4 March 2004.

1941—45 and 1968—81, they were at the receiving end of a policy of discrimination and repression lasting from 1918 (with the restoration of Belgrade's authority) until 1999 (which is not to deny that things became dramatically worse for local Albanians soon after Milošević took power in Belgrade in late 1987). In the interwar kingdom, Albanian children were denied access to education in the secular school system. In addition, Belgrade authorities confiscated land from the Albanians and, according to Von Kohl and Libal, some 45,000 Albanians fled from Kosovo during the years 1918—41; some 10,877 Serb and Montenegrin families were brought to Kosovo to move into the homes abandoned by the Albanians.¹⁰⁷ Where Belgrade cast this settlement program in terms of a 'return' to Kosovo, the Albanians viewed it as theft and even local Kosovar Serbs resented the special treatment given these newcomers. The Albanians of Kosovo recall great suffering in the interwar years, including the burning of their homes and the killing of their people. The aforementioned confiscations of land from the Albanians continued into the late 1930s. Vaso Čubrilović prepared a programmatic manifesto calling for the expulsion of "a few hundred thousand Albanians" from Kosovo. His manifesto also advocated the destruction of Albanian cemeteries and places of worship, the incineration of their villages and city quarters, their dismissal from employment, police harassment of them in general, and so forth. Between 90,000 and 150,000 Albanians and other Muslims fled Kosovo between the two world wars. In addition, Belgrade entered into an agreement with Turkey to pay Istanbul to accept thousands more Albanian families.

¹⁰⁶ . Wolfgang Petritsch, Karl Kaser, and Robert Pichler, *Kosovo, Kosova. Mythen, Daten, Fakten* (Klagenfurt & Wien: Wieser Verlag, 1999), pp. 90—91.

¹⁰⁷ . Schools, Banac, *National Question*, p. 299; 45,000 Albanians, Christine von Kohl and Wolfgang Libal, *Kosovo: gordischer Knoten des Balkan* (Vienna & Zürich: Europaverlag, 1992), pp. 42—43, 44; Serb and Montenegrin families, Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 105.

During World War Two, collaboration with the Axis could easily be cast as Albanian patriotism, at least among the Albanians of Kosovo, since, under Italian suzerainty, Kosovo was reunited with Albania to create a 'Greater Albania'. It was also under the Italians that the Kosovar Albanians were able to send their children to school for the first time in 40 years. The converse was that the Partisans found it more difficult to recruit among the Kosovar Albanians than among any other people of occupied Yugoslavia. Even so, among Albanian communists, the hope was nurtured that, in the postwar settlement, Kosovo might be permitted to join communist Albania. Then, when the realization of that aspiration was denied, Kosovar Albanians who had joined the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) hoped, at least, that Kosovo might be granted status as a republic. For them, the establishment of Kosovo as an autonomous region within the republic of Serbia was a poor second-best; indeed, while Serbs viewed this arrangement as a concession to Albanian sentiments, the Albanians viewed it as a concession to the Serbs.¹⁰⁸

Albanians remember the massacres at the end of World War Two, the house searches conducted by UDBa during the early post-war years, and the general atmosphere of terror, and claim that some 100 Albanians were killed by security forces during 1956 alone. Some Albanians simply gave up on Yugoslavia and between 1953 and 1957, some 195,000 Albanians left Yugoslavia; by 1966, this figure had grown to 220,000.¹⁰⁹ Kosovo also had severe economic problems, and was admitted, by the communists, to be the poorest part of socialist Yugoslavia. The communists therefore set up a special fund

¹⁰⁸ . For further discussion, see Miloš Mišović, *Ko je tražio republiku: Kosovo, 1945—1985* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1987).

¹⁰⁹ . Sabrina P. Ramet, "Kosovo: A Liberal Approach", in *Society*, Vol. 36, No. 6 (September/October 1999), p. 66.

which was supposed to funnel investment monies into lesser developed areas, especially Kosovo. But in spite of this fund, Kosovo actually slipped behind the rest of Yugoslavia, in terms of the standard economic measures, and Albanians complained that the funds were inadequate, often delayed, and largely invested into capital-intensive, rather than labor-intensive, enterprises. As a result, unemployment remained high in the province and discontent continued unabated. In the years before Milošević, protests by the Albanians – protests driven by economic frustration, lack of work, and inequality relative to the Serbs and other groups in Yugoslavia – grew into larger demonstrations in November 1968 and again in April 1981. In both cases, the protests were driven by economic frustration, anti-Serb sentiments, and a feeling that they, as Albanians, were second-class citizens in Yugoslavia. In the 1968 case, a pervasive feeling of political impotence also fueled the riots.

Politically – as already noted – the Albanians of Kosovo made some significant gains after 1968, both in terms of high proportions of Albanians in the local bureaucracy and police force and in terms of local autonomy. Where the Serbs recall the years 1968—81 as years of repression, the Albanians recall those years as years when they started to be treated as equals. But during the early 1980s, their gains were eroded and with the rise of Slobodan Milošević, Albanians were subjected to constant police harassment and were fired wholesale from the local bureaucracy, the police, the university, the hospitals, and so forth. The Albanians responded by creating an underground economy. A particular sore point for the Albanians of Kosovo in the 1980s was the closure of the public schools to Albanian pupils/students – a policy which seemed to revive the Serbian strategy of the interwar era. But ironically, as Denisa

Kostovicova has argued, "...the Serbian policy of prohibition and restriction on education in Albanian gave impetus to the sustained effort on the part of the Albanians to nourish their sense of nationhood. As a result, the Albanian national identity in Kosovo was clearly delineated in opposition to the Serbs as the ethnic 'Other'."¹¹⁰ It was also during the late 1980s that Belgrade had firearms distributed to local Serb civilians in Kosovo.

The Albanians also note that police harassment included beatings, during the years that Milošević was in power, and particularly resented the unilateral abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, by the Milošević government, in 1989—90. Where the Serbs charged them with applying pressure on local Serbs in the 1980s to leave, Albanians would insist that those Serbs who left the province at that time were economic migrants, looking for a better life elsewhere. Albanians resented the illegal removal of Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari from the provincial leadership at the end of the 1980s and staged demonstrations in support of the 1974 constitution, which they feared was being subverted by Belgrade.¹¹¹ Frictions were escalating so quickly that the Aspen Institute predicted, in 1989 or 1990, that war was about to erupt in Kosovo. The prediction, although misplaced, was not unreasonable. But Ibrahim Rugova, a literary scholar who had assumed the leadership of the opposition Democratic League of Kosova, counseled self-restraint and succeeded in convincing Kosovar Albanians, until 1997, to adhere to a Gandhian posture of coordinated and strategic non-violent resistance, abjuring violence. Albanians today remember their Gandhianism less with pride than with a feeling that,

¹¹⁰ . Denisa Kostovicova, "*Shkolla Shqipe* and Nationhood: Albanians in Pursuit of Education in the Native Language in Interwar (1918—41) and Post-Autonomy (1989—98) Kosovo", in Schwandner-Sievers and Fischer (eds.), *Albanian Identities*, p. 170.

¹¹¹ . Petritsch, Kaser, and Pichler, *Kosovo, Kosova* [note 97], pp. 175—176.

however well that approach might have worked against the British in India, it proved to be a hopeless tactic when dealing with Serbian authorities in Kosovo.

The Slovenian historical narrative. It is resentment which keeps historical memory alive. Nothing illustrates this maxim so well as the Slovenian case, where the ‘Slovenian historical narrative’, already by the 1980s, was marked by some telling lacunae. Although Slovenian nationalism has tended to be more focused on language and culture, Slovenes from time to time expressed support for a Slovene national program to unite all Slovene ethnic territory into one state where Slovene would be the official language. Moreover, while some Slovenes have reconciled themselves to the decision taken by their ethnic kin in Carinthia, in a referendum conducted at the end of World War One, to remain in Austria, other Slovenes continue to view the vote as having come out “wrong”. Yet, for all that, in the early 1980s, immediately after Tito’s death, and again in the early 1990s, Slovenian university students could sometimes be heard singing the strident patriotic song, ‘Od Vardara do Triglava’. In history textbooks for elementary and secondary schools in Slovenia, the interwar kingdom (1918—41) has been presented as undemocratic and characterized by Serb hegemony “over Slovenes and Croats who were economically and culturally more developed.”¹¹² Slovenian history textbooks also point out that Prime Minister Stojadinović (who served in that office from 1935 to 1939) admired the Nazi and fascist systems.¹¹³ Although Slovenes could celebrate the opening of the University of Ljubljana in 1920/21 (it had been officially proclaimed in 1919) and

¹¹² . Ervin Dolenc, Aleš Gabrič, and Marjan Rode, *Koraki v času – 20. stoletje* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1997), p. 57. See also Branimir Nešović and Janko Prunk, *20. stoletje* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1993), p. 59. The same sentence also occurs in Ervin Dolenc and Aleš Gabrič, *Zgodovina 4* (Ljubljana: DZS, 2002), p.

¹¹³ . Dolenc and Gabrič, *Zgodovina 4*, p. 91.

other achievements, the perception took hold that joining the kingdom had subjected Slovenes to assimilatory pressures and relegated them to ‘minority’ status.¹¹⁴ Moreover, as Rizman notes, citing Peter Vodopivec, “...many Serbian and Slovene negative stereotypes had emerged as early as 1920 (and persist to this day)...[F]or example,...Slovene papers stigmatized Serbian Balkanism, hegemonism, militarism and their inclination toward authoritarianism.”¹¹⁵ Yet, for all that, Slovenes held some ministerial posts in the interwar kingdom, a few ambassadorial posts, and some lesser posts in the administrative hierarchy, and Slovenian economic, cultural, and scientific life developed rapidly in these years.¹¹⁶ As was the case with other non-Serbs, Slovenes were underrepresented in such positions.

Memories connected to World War Two are more complex because, as in the case of the Serbs and the Croats, there are alternative narratives where this period is concerned.¹¹⁷ Those more to the left identify with the Partisan tradition and reject the collaboration of, for example, Gen. Leon Rupnik and the Home Guards (*Domobranci*); those more to the right deprecate the Partisans and embrace the wartime collaborators. Perhaps curiously, one elementary school textbook published in Ljubljana in 1993 argued that “During both wars [i.e., both World War One and World War Two], although without political independence or constitutional autonomy, Slovenia felt more

¹¹⁴ . Rudolf Martin Rizman, *(Un)certain Path: The Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Slovenia* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, forthcoming in 2005), ms., p. 57.

¹¹⁵ . *Ibid.*, p. 57.

¹¹⁶ . Janko Prunk, “The Origins of an Independent Slovenia”, in Danica Fink-Hafner and John R. Robbins (eds.), *Making a New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers, 1997), p. 24.

¹¹⁷ . For a concise exposition of this period in Slovenian history, see Janko Prunk, *Slowenien. Ein Abriss seiner Geschichte* (Ljubljana: Založba Grad, 1996), pp. 127—135. For fuller treatments, see: Helga H. Harriman, *Slovenia under Nazi Occupation, 1941—1945* (New York & Washington: Studia Slovenica, 1977); and Tamara Griesser-Pecar, *Das zerrissene Volk – Slowenien 1941—1946. Okkupation, Kollaboration, Bürgerkrieg, Revolution* (Wien & Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2003).

autonomous in economic matters and especially in educational and cultural life.”¹¹⁸

Where interethnic dynamics in socialist Yugoslavia are concerned, what should be stressed is that Slovenia’s experience in World War Two did not involve resentments against any other Yugoslav people; on the contrary, resentment was directed largely either toward Nazi Germany or Italy or toward each other, i.e., with the Partisans and their offspring (whether literal offspring or ideological offspring) engaging in polemics with the collaborators and their offspring. Indeed, for Slovenes, the most traumatic events associated with the war were the massacres at Kočevje and Teharje.

Slovenian schoolbooks estimate that some 65,000 Slovenes lost their lives as a result of World War Two.¹¹⁹ This doesn’t count the 7,000—12,000 *Domobranci* killed by the Partisans immediately after the war’s end.¹²⁰ As for judgments about Mihailović and Stepinac, the Slovenian historical narrative coincides here with the Croatian narrative, which is to say that Slovenian textbooks find Mihailović guilty of collaboration with occupation forces,¹²¹ while noting that Zagreb’s archbishop Stepinac kept his distance from the Ustaša regime and “protested in the name of persecuted Jews and Serbs from time to time.”¹²²

Unlike the Albanians of Kosovo, the Slovenes returned to Yugoslavia at war’s end voluntarily – but not blindly. Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kidrič, Slovenia’s two most influential politicians at the time, were concerned about the dangers which they

¹¹⁸ . Nešović and Prunk, *20. stoletje*, p. 70.

¹¹⁹ . Dolenc and Gabrič, *Zgodovina 4*, p. 162.

¹²⁰ . Dolenc, Gabrič, and Rode, *Koraki v času*, p. 109.

¹²¹ . Nešović and Prunk, *20. stoletje*, p. 120. See also Božo Repe, *Naša doba* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1995), p. 156; and Božo Repe, *Sodobna zgodovina* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2002), passim. Chetnik collaboration with the Axis, although denied by prominent figures in Serbia’s post-Milošević regime, has been extensively documented, including in works published in Belgrade. See, for example, Branko Latas (compiler), *Saradnja Četnika Draže Mihailovića sa okupatorima i ustašama (1941—1945). Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941—1945., 1999).

associated with centralism, with Kidrič telling the Third Session of the Central Committee of the CP Slovenia (29 March 1945) that centralist politics was potentially “...dangerous, because strong tendencies towards hegemonism still exist within the Serbian middle-class bourgeoisie.”¹²³ Kardelj and Ranković soon began a sparring match which ended only with Ranković’s removal from office in 1966; Slovenes may or may not remember the attempted assassination of Kardelj in 1959 (not mentioned in any of the seven schoolbooks which have been in use in Slovenia which were consulted in connection with this chapter¹²⁴) – an attempt which Kardelj’s wife, Pepca, blamed on Ranković personally.¹²⁵ But whatever Slovenes may still remember of that era, the frictions between Kardelj and Ranković contributed to sowing the notion that Serbian politics could be dangerous for Slovenes.

Perhaps the noisiest ‘affair’ – to use the favored Yugoslav term – was the Slovenian ‘road affair’ of 1969, when the Slovenian assembly, in a rather unusual move, publicly protested the allocation of World Bank funds for road construction. Nearly two decades later, the issuance of the famous ‘Memorandum’ by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art (SANU) sent ripples through Slovenia, where local intellectuals decided to respond with their own national program. The result was the famous issue 57 of the journal *Nova revija*, in which contributors expressed their fears of “cultural extinction

¹²² . Repe, *Naša doba*, p. 157.

¹²³ . Quoted in Božo Repe, “Slovenians and the Federal Yugoslavia”, in *Balkan Forum* (Skopje), Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1995), p. 143.

¹²⁴ . In addition to those schoolbooks cited in notes 111 and 120, these include also: Ana Kern, Dušan Nećak, and Božo Repe, *Naše stoljete* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1998); and Stane Berzelak, *Zgodovina 2 za tehniške in druge strokovne šole* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 1998).

¹²⁵ . Boro Krivokapić, *Jugoslavija i komunisti: adresa Jovana Djordjevića* (Belgrade: Mladost, 1988), p. 55.

and [Serbian] political domination.”¹²⁶ Released in February 1987, the issue was devoted to the ‘Slovenian national program’, “which included, among other things, a protest against the second-class status of the Slovenian language in Yugoslavia. The issue was quickly subjected to attack in other republics in Yugoslavia, where some people expressed concern that the Slovenes were sliding in the direction of secessionism.”¹²⁷ In fact, there *was* a growing sentiment among Slovenes that they did not belong in Yugoslavia, that this was not their country, that the cultural icons, music, and patterns of thought which they found elsewhere in the country were not their own.¹²⁸

In summer 1988, four young Slovenes (among them, Janez Janša, who would be elected prime minister in 2004) were put on trial in Ljubljana on charges of having purloined a secret document from the Ljubljana Military District with the intent to publish it.¹²⁹ Slovenes were enraged by the trial and began to protest on the streets. Slovenes believed (as they do today) that the JNA was discussing a possible coup in Slovenia, in which liberals were to be arrested and were outraged that the four young men who had done their best to expose this conspiracy were put on trial. To add insult to injury, the JNA held the trial, which was taking place in Ljubljana, in Serbo-Croatian, even though the official language of Slovenia was Slovenian. This was widely interpreted as a violation of Slovenia’s sovereignty and Slovenes circulated petitions in

¹²⁶ . Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 20.

¹²⁷ . Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, chap. 10. The issue is summarized in *Svet* (Belgrade), September 1989, pp. 50—51. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (12 June 1987), p. 7. For an elaborate discussion of the special issue of *Nova revija*, see Mirjana Kasapović, “O slovenskom nacionalnom programu”, in *Naše teme*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 771--786

¹²⁸ . For a scientific measure of differences in the political cultures of Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples in the 1970s and regarding the cultural specificity of the Slovenes, see Bertsch, Gary K. and M. George Zaninovich. “A Factor-Analytic Method of Identifying Different Political Cultures: The Multinational Yugoslav Case”, in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (January 1974), pp. 219—244.

¹²⁹ . Janez Janša, *The Making of the Slovenian State 1988—1992: The Collapse of Yugoslavia*, trans. by AMIDAS d.o.o., ed. by Aleksandar Zorn (Ljubljana: Založba Mladinska knjiga, 1994), p. 13.

support of ‘the Four’. A Committee for the Defense of Human Rights was set up, with the Slovenian government’s implicit acquiescence, and on 22 June 1988, at least 40,000 persons from around Slovenia jammed onto Ljubljana’s Liberation Square in a massive protest against the trial.¹³⁰ The outrage felt by Slovenes generally at this trial is hard to overestimate and generated a tidal wave of political change as political parties were quickly formed on local initiative.

During the years 1988—90, fear became the dominant theme in Slovenian discourse. Slovenes watched in dread as Milošević and his cohorts pushed for changes to the constitution which would have weakened republican autonomy (under the slogan, “one man, one vote”). That same year, Serbian authorities asked for Slovenian support for amendments to the Serbian constitution, but the Slovenes demurred, claiming that even offering their support would be tantamount to interference in Serbia’s domestic affairs.¹³¹ The Serbs pushed ahead with their amendments anyway, granting the government in Belgrade the right to change the status of the autonomous provinces unilaterally; in the view of Janez Drnovšek, who would become president of the SFRY presidency in May 1989, this change to Serbia’s constitution was inconsistent with the SFRY constitution, and therefore illegal.¹³² Slovenia crossed swords with Serbia over a third issue in 1988, viz., an amendment backed by Serbia to change the mechanism for funding the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). But there was a more fundamental, even visceral, reason why Slovenes began to feel deep foreboding in regard to Serbia at that time, and that had to do with the growing cult of the personality sponsored by

¹³⁰ . Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 4th ed. [note 41], p. 32.

¹³¹ . Jože Smole, president of the Republic Conference of SAWP-Slovenia, as cited in *Politika* (21 September 1988), p. 12.

Milošević's people in Serbia. Talking about Serbs' glorification of Milošević in an interview in 1988, Janez Stanovnik, then president of Slovenia, commented: "This Stalinist concept of 'democratic centralism' unavoidably leads to extolling the central figure [and transforming him] into a living god. When you start worshipping a leader, you no longer have a population that is able to act democratically."¹³³

By the end of 1988, Slovenian and Serbian leaders were engaging in polemical exchanges. Serbs started to boycott Slovenian products and citizens of Belgrade began to withdraw their savings from the Bank of Ljubljana. These developments also contributed to a charged atmosphere in which Slovenes felt under growing threat. In the course of 1989, Milošević took steps to bring Kosovo under his firm control, suppressing its assembly and stationing some 15,000 army troops in the province under measures called a "state of exception" (a euphemism for a "state of emergency"). When Albanian miners went on strike at the Trepča mine complex in a show of defiance of Belgrade's repression, the Slovenian Association of Writers organized a public meeting at Cankarjev Dom in Ljubljana, in a show of solidarity with the miners. The Serbian Association of Writers responded by breaking off institutional contacts with its Slovenian sister organization.¹³⁴ The conflict escalated to the level of the political leaderships of the two republics. Then, on 23 May 1989, Milošević gave a speech in Novi Sad in which he called Slovenia a "lackey" of Western Europe and declared that it had no right to speak

¹³² . Veljko Kadijević, *Moje vidjenje raspada. Vojska bez države* (Belgrade: Politika, 1993), p. 104; and Janez Drnovšek, *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg. Meine Wahrheit*, trans. from Slovenian by Doris Debeniak (Kilchberg, Switz.: Smartbooks, 1998), p. 222.

¹³³ . Quoted in Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia*, 2nd ed., p. 240, from *New York Times* (15 October 1988), p. 4.

¹³⁴ . Rudi Seligo, president of the Slovenian Association of Writers, in interview with SPR, Ljubljana, 4 September 1989.

out concerning Kosovo.¹³⁵ The following day, Drnovšek, who had assumed the post of president of the presidency barely a week before, criticized the repressive measures being applied in Kosovo at a session of the presidency, and demanded an end such the incarceration of Albanians in conditions of solitary confinement, among other things. He also let it be known that, in his view, the question of the legality of Serbia's suppression of the Kosovar assembly should have been (indeed, should be) referred to the Constitutional Court for adjudication. For Drnovšek, Kosovo was the arena in which the system's respect for and ability to protect human rights were being tested. As he told *Oslobodjenje* in the course of an interview the following year, "If the question of the protection of human rights, for example of individual persons in Kosovo, is posed, that is immediately treated as interference in the internal affairs of Serbia, and in this way the essence of the protection of individual human rights is ignored."¹³⁶

On 6 September 1989, Dimitrije Rupel – then a professor of sociology at the University of Ljubljana and the founder of the fledgling Slovenian Democratic Union, but later foreign minister of the Republic of Slovenia – granted me an interview. In the course of our conversation, Rupel admitted that there were stirrings for independence among the Slovenes. "In 1987," he recounted,

an opinion poll among Slovenes found that 57% of Slovenes felt that Slovenia would be more prosperous if it were independent of Yugoslavia. We interpret that as an expression of a sentiment for secession. The figure has risen enormously this year; it is 70% in 1989. If you talk to people in the street, they will say, yes I think we should secede, and leave the

¹³⁵ . See *Borba* (24 May 1989), p. 3; and *Delo* (Ljubljana), 24 May 1989, p. 3.

country in its mess. But obviously it is not such an easy thing to do, and the most dangerous thing would be to be carried away by feelings. Still I think – and this is also the position of my party – that sometime in the not so distant future, Slovenia will become an independent state, maybe in 20 years, maybe in 10 years...I myself think that what we should strive for at the present moment is a proper confederation.¹³⁷

What should be emphasized in this declaration by Rupel is his conviction that Yugoslavia was in a “mess” – a mess which, in his view, did not admit of any easy remedies.

In September 1989, Slovenia passed a package of amendments to its own constitution, which Slovenes generally viewed as defensive measures against Serbia. As if to confirm that it did in fact constitute a threat, the Serb Committee for the Organization of Public Meetings, a body operating under Milošević’s influence, announced its intention to bring some 30,000—40,000 Serbs and Montenegrins to Slovenia in order to “explain” to Slovenes what was “really” going on in Kosovo. Taking note of the role played by that same committee in destabilizing and overthrowing the governments of Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo, the Slovenian government decided that the proffered “explanation” was a threat and arranged with the Slovenian and Croatian railway unions to stop the trains carrying the would-be protesters and turn them back.¹³⁸ When Serbia replied by declaring a full-scale boycott of Slovenian products, cutting off all cooperative economic links with Slovenia, the Slovenian

¹³⁶ . Drnovšek, in interview with *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo), 30 September 1990, as quoted in Drnovšek, *Der Jugoslawien-Krieg*, p. 224.

¹³⁷ . Rupel in Pedro Ramet [Sabrina P. Ramet], “‘Slovenia Will Become an Independent State’: An Interview with Dimitrije Rupel” (Ljubljana, 6 September 1989), in *South Slav Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 1—2 (Spring—Summer 1989), p. 85.

¹³⁸ . More details in Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 2nd ed., pp. 241—242. See also Nešović and Prunk, *20. stoletje*, p. 243.

Assembly terminated payments to the federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK).

Subsequently, when, in spring 1990, the JNA took steps to confiscate the weaponry which had been purchased by Slovenia for its territorial defense system, the sense of threat among Slovenes increased exponentially. What they may not have known at the time was that the Milošević regime, although largely consentaneous with the JNA, had its own objectives and strategies, which departed radically from those of the JNA when it came to Slovenia. This became clear on 24 January 1991 when then-President of Slovenia Milan Kučan met in private with Milošević; as Kučan told me in 1999, in exchange for Milošević's assurances that Belgrade had no territorial pretensions vis-à-vis Slovenia, he assured Milošević of his "understanding" for Milošević's interest in uniting all Serbs in a Greater Serbia.¹³⁹ Milošević confirmed this in private conversation with Borisav Jović, the Serbian member of the SFRY presidency who served as its president between May 1990 and May 1991, telling the latter in February 1991, for example, "Slovenia should be left in peace," and reiterating in June 1991, "What is it to us to defend the Slovenian borders – that is temporary. We should defend what will last."¹⁴⁰

But there were two final shocks for the Slovenes before they left the dying federation. The first was connected with the effort by Milošević, Jović, and the two Kostićeš to block the supposedly routine rotation in the SFRY presidency was effected finally only as a result of direct pressure from the European Community.¹⁴¹ In Kučan's view, the blockage of Mesić's succession amounted to nothing less than "a camouflaged

¹³⁹ . Milan Kučan, President of Slovenia, in interview with SPR, Ljubljana, 6 September 1999.

¹⁴⁰ . As quoted in Borisav Jović, *Poslednji dani SFRJ. Izvodi iz dnevnika* (Belgrade: Politika, 1995), pp. 281 (entry of 28 February 1991) and 343 (entry of 27 June 1991).

coup d’etat” by the Serbian leaders.¹⁴² The second shock came when Franjo Tudjman, Croatia’s president, who had signed a mutual defense agreement with Kučan, “opposed action to help Slovenia during the aggression by the YNA [i.e., JNA].”¹⁴³

Yet of all the peoples discussed here, the Slovenes have had by far the easiest exit from the SFRY. Although the 10-day war inflicted some \$2.7 billion worth of damage on Slovenia and cost the republic 17 dead and 149 wounded,¹⁴⁴ it has entered into Slovenian lore as a heroic struggle for independence in which an underarmed but courageous republic stood up to the much mightier JNA and won.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, the Slovenes were well aware that the conflict was the result of a decision taken by Defense Minister Veljko Kadijević and Prime Minister Ante Marković to send in the troops, and that the deployment of the JNA did not reflect the intentions of either Milošević or Borisav Jović. For all that, however, Slovenes blamed Milošević and Jović for pushing Yugoslavia along a path where meltdown was the eventual result.

In spite of the confiscation of as much of the weaponry of the Slovenian Territorial Defense forces as the JNA could manage, in spite of the trial of ‘the Four’ and the outrage which they provoked among Slovenes, in spite of the theft by the Republic of Serbia (behind the screen of an unsecured ‘loan’) of 28 billion dinars (about \$1.8 billion) from the National Bank of Yugoslavia, in spite of Borisav Jović’s illegal ‘pocket veto’ of the Slovenian-Croatian proposal (of October 1990) to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation (which, under Yugoslav law, he was obliged to forward to the Federal

¹⁴¹ . Stipe Mesić, *The Demise of Yugoslavia: A Political Memoir*, trans. from Croatian by Milena Benini (Budapest & New York: Central European University Press, 2004), pp. 90—92.

¹⁴² . *The Guardian* (London), 16 May 1991, at www.guardian.co.uk.

¹⁴³ . Quoted in Janša, *The Making of the Slovenian State*, p. 250.

¹⁴⁴ . Damage, Janša, *The Making of the Slovenian State*, p. 203; dead and wounded, Nicole Janigro, *L’Esposizione delle Nazioni: Il caso Jugoslavo* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1993), p. 21.

Assembly for debate), in spite of the various violations of the SFRY constitution and laws by Serbian authorities, and in spite of the establishment and arming, at federal expense, of Serbian militias in Croatia and Bosnia, militias intended to figure in a war to expand Serbia's borders – in spite of all of these rather uncomfortable conditions, some observers continue to insist that the Slovenes should have remained in Yugoslavia to 'assist' the other republics in resolving their issues, as former US Ambassador Warren Zimmermann suggested to me in 2001,¹⁴⁶ while others have gone so far as to suggest that the Slovenes must share some of the blame for the sanguinary war which broke out in the course of 1991. This criticism of Slovenia will be discussed below, in the section on 'private narratives'.

The Bosniak historical narrative. The term 'Bosniak', which had been in circulation for centuries, was officially adopted in 1993 to replace the term 'Muslim', which had been accepted by the LCY as an official term for nationality in 1968; where the term 'Bosnian' refers to all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the term 'Bosniak' is usually considered an ethnic label, and although most Bosniaks are Muslims, some local Catholics have also reportedly declared themselves 'Bosniaks'. Thus, one can be a 'Bosnian Serb' or a 'Bosnian Croat' without any contradiction in terms; although there are also Bosniaks in the Sandžak (part of Serbia), the term 'Bosniak' is used *without* prefixing it with the modifier 'Bosnian'. In fact, the notion of a 'Bosniak' or 'Bosnian Muslim' identity "...may be traced as far back as the seventeenth century, when at least

¹⁴⁵ . See Niko Grafenauer (ed.), *The Case of Slovenia*, A special edition of *Nova revija* (Ljubljana: Nova revija, July 1991).

¹⁴⁶ . Warren Zimmermann, in interview with SPR, Washington D.C., March 2001. See also his *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers*, Updated ed. (New York: Times Books, 1999).

some Bosnian Muslims (for example, Muhamed Hevaji Uskufi and the early Bosnian journalist Mehmed Šaćir Kurtćehajić) viewed themselves as Slavs. Later, many Slavophone Muslims outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, starting with the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, viewed themselves as Bosnians [or Bosniaks] and called their language Bosnian... And by the nineteenth century, the culturally influential Franciscans of Bosnia were referring to the language as ‘Bosnian’.¹⁴⁷ By the nineteenth century, moreover, there were four alternative and, to a large extent, interchangeable terms in use in Bosnia – Bosanac, Bošnjak, Bošnjanim, and Bošnjo – which dated from different times.

In Tito’s day, if not also before, perhaps the greatest controversy had to do with the origins of the Bosnian Muslims (to use the name they bore in that era). Serb nationalists claimed that the Bosnian Muslims were Serbs who had converted to Islam, Croatian nationalists claimed that they were actually Croats – indeed, the “purest” branch of the Croatian nation – the Muslims themselves said that their ancestors had been adherents of the Bosnian Church who had converted to Islam after the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia, Serbs claimed that the Muslims were Serbs of the Islamic faith, others claimed that they were the descendants of Turks who had learned to speak Bosnian (Serbo-Croatian), and the LCY itself adopted a synthetic approach, endorsing all four theories and emphasizing that the Bosnian Muslims had emerged as a historically new ethnic community.¹⁴⁸ These rival claims, which flared in the nineteenth century (when Ante

¹⁴⁷ . Sabrina P. Ramet, “Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia’s Muslims, Reconsidered”, in Andreas Kappeler et al. (eds.), *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 115. See also Muhamed Hadžijahić, *Od tradicije do identiteta. Geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih muslimana* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1974), pp. 8, 22, 25.

¹⁴⁸ . See Kasim Suljević, *Nacionalnost Muslimana* (Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1981). For an excellent overview of aspects of Bosnian history, see Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation & Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, trans. from Slovenian by Rang’ichi Ng’inja (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2003).

Starčević, for example, insisted that the Muslims of Bosnia were the “purest” branch of the Croatian nation), revived in force at the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, with the ironic result that the Serb nationalists, for example, were simultaneously claiming that the Bosniaks were ‘really’ Serbs and assailing them for having betrayed Serbdom by their conversion from Orthodox Christianity. In the 1980s, as war clouds were gathering, the textbooks in use in Bosnia-Herzegovina only rubbed salt into old wounds. As Wayne Nelles writes, “there is little doubt that pre-war education in BiH perpetuated the conflicting agendas of the three nationalist [sic] and ethno-religious constituencies by stereotyping, and by promoting divisive political histories.”¹⁴⁹

The war only reinforced tendencies toward divisive historical narratives. In textbooks used in Bosniak schools in the late 1990s, Franz Ferdinand’s assassin was portrayed as an extremist, rather than as a patriot, and the interwar kingdom was described, in the first place, in terms of the negative impact of Belgrade’s policies on the lives of Bosnia’s Muslims; separate chapters were devoted, for example, to ‘Evictions and Violence Directed against the Muslims in Sandžak’ and ‘The Abolition of the Autonomy of the Islamic Community in Bosnia.’¹⁵⁰ Indeed, in the interwar kingdom, the governing circles of this ‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’ (renamed the ‘Kingdom of Yugoslavia’ in October 1929) behaved as if the cultural identity and national consciousness of the Bosniaks did not matter. The most graphic illustration of this came in August 1939, when Maček and Cvetković reached an agreement in which various parts of historical Bosnia-Herzegovina were assigned to the Croatian banovina. Across Bosnia, there was shock, and protest meetings were held. As early as 30 August

¹⁴⁹ . Wayne Nelles, “Bosnian Education for Security and Peacebuilding?”, in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2006), p. 231.

1939, in an effort to fight back, representatives of all Bosniak political, cultural, and religious organizations met in Sarajevo and formed the Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁵¹ In November of that year, a meeting of local leaders in Sarajevo demanded the establishment of an “autonomous unit of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its historic borders.”¹⁵² But Maček was inflexible and said that the borders of Croatia had been set; he was not prepared to discuss any adjustments to the Croatian frontiers.

Although the education system in the Federation is decentralized, with each canton in charge of “making education policy, including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of education,”¹⁵³ segregation along national lines has been the dominant feature of education in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the war, with different curricula, rival textbooks, and a tendency among the Croats and the Serbs to use textbooks published respectively in Croatia and Serbia and taking those states, rather than Bosnia-Herzegovina as their respective reference states. As Gordana Bozic has pointed out, both “during and after the war, each constituent people [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] embarked on reeducating the Bosnian heart through biased and ideologically driven interpretations of history, geography, language, and literature.”¹⁵⁴ Indeed, in 2003 a commission on textbook reform found that there were abusive contents in Bosnian textbooks (among all three groups) for languages and literature, history,

¹⁵⁰ . *Dallas Morning News* [note 20].

¹⁵¹ . Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka*, 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Bošnjačka zajednica kulture, 1998), p. 521.

¹⁵² . Šaćir Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću* (Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998), p. 107.

¹⁵³ . *Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, as quoted in Gordana Bozic, “Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 321. See also Adila Pasalic-Kreso, “Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Minority Inclusion and Majority Rules: The system of education in BiH as a paradigm of political violence on education”, in *Current Issues in Comparative Education*, Vol. 2, no. 1 (1999), at www.tc.columbia.edu/CICE/Archives/2.1/21pasalickreso.pdf [accessed on 11 June 2006].

¹⁵⁴ . Bozic, “Reeducating the Hearts”, p. 341.

geography, science, social studies, and religion.¹⁵⁵ Not surprisingly, the result has been, as a Bosnian Croat mother of three complained in 2005, that “the children here have begun to hate each other.”¹⁵⁶

This is little surprise, given that the post-war textbooks in use among Bosniaks make very liberal use of the word “genocide” in their accounts, for example in characterizing the NDH’s policy of trying to assimilate Bosniaks into Ustasa-style mainstream Croatian society as “genocide”.¹⁵⁷ A recent textbook by Muhamed Ganibegovic continues this trend by describing the early years of the interwar Kingdom (1921—29) as amounting to nothing less than the attempted “political genocide of the Muslims” while emphasizing the sufferings of the Muslims during World War Two.¹⁵⁸ Gunibegovic presents Croatian party leader Stjepan Radic in a positive light, for having stood up to the Serbs, but has harsh words for the *Sporazum*, which benefited Croatian political ambitions at the expense of the historic borders of Bosnia. If the Bosniak reaction to the *sporazum* suggests the seeds of resentment against the Croats, the events of the Second World War did much more to stir Bosniak resentment against the Serbs because of the repeated attacks on Muslim villages by Chetnik forces. Mihailović’s Chetniks, as is well known, entered into a collaborationist arrangement with the Italian occupation forces early in the war and continued to collaborate with them until the Italian capitulation in September 1943, while Chetniks loyal to Kosta Pećanac collaborated with

¹⁵⁵ . SRNA (Bijeljina), 3 July 2003, trans. in *NewsBank – Access World News*, at infoweb.newsbank.com.

¹⁵⁶ . Quoted in Daria Sito-Sucic, “School splits jinx Bosnia’s multi-ethnic future”, *Reuters* (27 October 2005), at today.reuters.com [accessed on 8 November 2005].

¹⁵⁷ . Muhamed Ganibegovic, Enes Durmisevic, and Muhidin Pelesic, *Historija – Povijest za 4. razred gimnazije i drugih srednjih skola* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2001).

¹⁵⁸ . Muhamed Ganibegovic, *Historija – Povijest za 8. razred osnovne skole*, 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2004).

the Germans beginning in August 1941.¹⁵⁹ But General Mario Roatta, commander of the Italian Second Army, found that the Chetniks were uncooperative allies who, in the middle of combat operations against the Partisans, would take “time off” to attack Bosniak and Croat villages and butcher local civilians.¹⁶⁰ Gunibegovic’s textbook says explicitly that Chetnik leader Draza Mihailovic ordered the destruction of the Bosnian Muslims. The history of Chetnik depredations also fed into a victimology in which Bosniak intellectuals claimed that their people had been victims of Serb violence across history.¹⁶¹ That these Chetnik attacks sowed resentment among Bosniaks and Croats goes without saying. Some Muslims (and also Croats) joined the German-sponsored Handžar Division which fought shoulder to shoulder with the forces of the NDH during World War Two,¹⁶² but nothing is said about this in schoolbooks in use in Bosniak schools today.

Yet many Serbs had joined the Partisans, indeed, in Croatia and Bosnia, in larger numbers than Croats and Bosniaks initially, and following the war, Serbs reaped their reward through ample representation in bureaucratic, administrative, and other positions of responsibility in Bosnia, while the Bosniaks were marginalized. In 1965, for example, Serbs comprised 54.4% of the deputies to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina – a full 11% more than their share of Bosnia’s population, while other national groups were underrepresented. Serbs were also overrepresented in positions of

¹⁵⁹ . Regarding Mihailović, see Walter Manoschek, ‘Serbien ist judenfrei’. *Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941/42* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 152—153.

¹⁶⁰ . Jelić-Butić, *Četnici u Hrvatskoj*, pp. 149—150.

¹⁶¹ . See, for example, Ibrahim Pašić, *Od hajduka do četnika. Stradanje i genocid nad glasinačkim bošnjacima od najstarijih vremena do 1994.* (Sarajevo: Dokumenti, 2000).

¹⁶² . “The division numbered thirteen thousand men in 1943 and was under direct German command: almost all of the officers were German.” -- Mitja Velikonja, *Religious Separation & Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, trans. from Slovenian by Rang’ichi Ng’inja (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), p. 180.

authority in the media, corporations, banks, etc. By the 1970s, however, the national structure of the republic assembly had been brought into line with the ethnic distribution in the republic. But inequalities persisted at other levels.

Bosniak consciousness also continued to be stifled. Then, in 1961, Bosniaks were allowed to register as “Muslims in an ethnic sense,” but even so, according to Noel Malcolm, Josip Potkožorac¹⁶³ was able to publish a book in 1969 in which he alleged “that the entire population of Bosnia (and of Dalmatia too) was ‘really’ Serb.”¹⁶⁴ Tito claimed, toward the end of his life, that the ‘national question’ had been solved ‘in principle’ in Bosnia. What did ‘in principle’ mean? It meant that he claimed to have figured out the best formula for overcoming the resentments sown over the years since 1918. But even this very cautious claim was too optimistic, and by the end of the 1980s, local newspapers were reporting an escalation of low-level tensions between Serbs and non-Serbs in various towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Bosniaks have not been inclined to accept the Serb nationalist portrait of Alija Izetbegović as an Islamic zealot; on the contrary, they say, Izetbegović was a reasonable man, open to discussion and committed to the principle of building a tolerant state in which all peoples could live in peace. Bosniaks also say that the ‘Islamic declaration’ has been misrepresented and is not a piece of fanaticism at all, or even a statement about Yugoslavia; it is, they say, simply an expostulation of certain Islamic principles. Izetbegović himself complained, in his autobiography, that critics were over-analyzing his words.¹⁶⁵ Finally, as to how the war came to Bosnia, for the Bosniaks, they are the

¹⁶³ . Evidently a Serbian writer in spite of his typically Croatian first name.

¹⁶⁴ . Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press, 1994), p. 204.

¹⁶⁵ . Izetbegović, *Sjećanja*, pp. 35, 37.

pure victims. As they remember it, it was Milošević, Karadžić, and Ražnatović, on the Serbian side, and Tudjman and Boban, on the Croatian side, who brought the war to their republic. Indeed, Izetbegović took pains to stay out of the war in Croatia during 1991, allowing the JNA to cross through Bosnian territory to Croatia as a sign of respect for the legal fiction that the SFRY still, in some sense, existed. Some Croats interpreted this as a form of ‘collaboration’ with the aggressor.

From the Bosniaks’ perspective, the decision, taken on 25 January 1992, to hold a referendum on independence was an expression of the democratic right of the people of Bosnia and came in response to express instructions from the EU. The question posed on the referendum asked voters to decide if they wanted an independent citizens’ state guaranteeing full equality to all its peoples. In other words, as the Bosniaks remember it, the referendum was not a first step toward the establishment of an Islamic state, as the Serb historical narrative would have it, but should be seen instead as an endorsement of the liberal principle of equality. In December 1994, Izetbegović would admit, in an interview with the weekly magazine *Dani*, that there were at least two currents within the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) – one more liberal, the other more fundamentalist¹⁶⁶ – but he continued to insist to the end of his days that his purpose as president was to build a liberal, democratic, secular state.

If the Bosniak portrait of the Serbs was unflattering before 1991, it became much more so after then. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, for example, writes in 2000 that “Serb

¹⁶⁶ . See *Ibid.*, p. 440.

history is full of examples of the comprehensive slaughter of Muslims. In general, these killings did not take place as a result of war.”¹⁶⁷

Cosmopolitan narratives. The foregoing narratives are all specifically and characteristically *national*, emphasizing the trials and sufferings *of the nation* and identifying those nations which should be held responsible for one’s own nation’s suffering. There have always been advocates of an alternative way of thinking about history, advocates of *cosmopolitan narratives*. For example, in recalling the ‘Croatian Spring’, the subject of continued disputes between Serbian and Croatian nationalists, Latinka Perović urges that, Serb nationalist claims notwithstanding, the ‘Croatian Spring’ was not focused on secession at all; rather, it was part of a broader movement within Yugoslavia as a whole, a movement aiming at the reform of the entire system.¹⁶⁸

In the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav context, cosmopolitan narratives have included liberal, feminist, social democratic, and socialist/communist narratives, each having its own view of the past, its own understanding of the challenges which history has thrown up. In none of the cosmopolitan narratives is history cast as the struggle of one’s own nation against hostile neighboring nations. In the Yugoslav context, “Yugoslavism” (or sometimes, “Yugoslav socialist patriotism”) was seen as signifying the subscription to precisely such a cosmopolitan narrative.¹⁶⁹ Or again, for those Serbs who remained loyal to the Bosnian government of which Alija Izetbegović was the president, neither the Serbian nor the Bosniak historical narrative was operative, but

¹⁶⁷ . Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, *Bosnia the Good: Tolerance and Tradition*, trans. from Bosnian by Marina Bowder (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), p. 205.

¹⁶⁸ . Latinka Perović, in conversation with SPR, Belgrade, 12 June 2004.

rather a cosmopolitan narrative. I would count the historical narrative propounded by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, with its emphasis on the people's liberation war, the struggle with Stalin, Yugoslavia's ideological trailblazing in setting up workers' councils, and self-congratulation for its work in the nonaligned movement as a "pseudo-cosmopolitan" narrative, insofar as the communists' heavy stress on the evils perpetrated by Ustaše and Chetniks alike and heavy-handed dismissal of almost all pre-communist politicians as "bourgeois" politicians did not serve to build a good foundation for mutual trust.

The availability of cosmopolitan narratives suggests that people are *not* doomed to replicate the patterns of the past, indeed that they are *not* historically determined to act out patterns of behavior which might seem to be entailed in one or another national historical narrative. Societies and their leaders are, ultimately, responsible for their actions and for the consequences of their actions.

Rival narratives. In addition to the historical narratives which are relevant to the argument of this chapter, there are also various other points of contention, which feed into one or another narrative. These points of contention may take the form of disputes about facts (such as the Montenegrin claim that the abolition of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in 1920 was carried out uncanonically, against the Serbian claim that the abolition of that Church over the protests of its leaders was nonetheless canonical) or disputes about how to interpret the facts, such as the apparently endless arguments about whether the Slovenes were somehow to blame for what happened to socialist Yugoslavia.

¹⁶⁹ . On this point, see Audrey Helfant Budding, "Yugoslavs into Serbs: Serbian National Identity, 1961—1971", in *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1997), esp. pp. 407—410.

There are also narratives which demonize one or another nation, usually Germany (and sometimes also the Vatican). One of the earliest examples of this is the interpretation, advanced with vigor by Veljko Kadijević in his memoirs, that the Yugoslav breakup was engineered by the U.S. and Germany, with the latter specifically pushing Izetbegović into war and aspiring to “dominate” the Balkan peninsula.¹⁷⁰ Croatia was part of the anti-Serbian conspiracy, according to Kadijević, who describes the conquest of Vukovar by the JNA as a “liberation”.¹⁷¹ When the Vatican is blamed, it is usually thought to have acted in league with Austria and Germany to orchestrate the breakup of Yugoslavia, while other interpretations cast the blame for the war on Germany alone (a difficult theory to maintain consistently, because it requires that one hold Milosevic blameless), or the appearance of the ‘Ustaša’, or greedy Slovenes, or Muslim fundamentalists. What is striking is that all of these latter narratives stress blame and conspiracy and generally appear to fit with an extremist Serbian radical right narrative (which is also why I did not include them under the ‘Serbian nationalist narrative’ above). During 1991—92, there were some in the West, such as the *New York Times* columnist Leslie Gelb, who were inclined to treat seriously the suggestion that the Croats were largely fascistic and that the *Ustaša* crimes of half a century earlier somehow ‘justified’ JNA/Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia. But, except for some marginal polemical treatments, no serious scholar has considered the demonization of the Croats, the Vatican, Austria, or Muslim fundamentalists to be serious. The demonization of Germany and Slovenia has, however, gained some support among well-meaning scholars and students, albeit, as I have argued elsewhere, not for any good reason. The chief reasons inspiring the anti-

¹⁷⁰ . Kadijević, *Moje vidjenje raspada*, pp. 15—16, 18, 26—27.

¹⁷¹ . *Ibid.*, p.137.

German backlash in 1991—92 were resentment at German reunification, lingering anti-German sentiment derived from the struggle against Naziism in World War Two, and a desire, in some circles, to find a scapegoat for the failure of international mediation in 1991. The case against the demonization of Germany has been made elsewhere and there is no need to repeat it here.¹⁷²

Observers tend to be able to consider the Slovenian case without prejudice, though there is a temptation on the part of some to jump to conclusions without an adequate factual basis. The demonization of Slovenia probably owes something to jealousy, within Yugoslavia, of Slovenia's greater economic prosperity – this, at least, is suggested by the repeated insinuations of Slovenes' alleged 'greed'. Be that as it may, the proclivity to blame Slovenes for the breakup of Yugoslavia requires that one discount the coincidence in time of genuine democratization occurring in Slovenia and growing authoritarianism in Serbia as irrelevant, discount the Slovenian-Croatian proposal to redesign Yugoslavia as a confederation as a propaganda ploy rather than a serious proposal, discount the fact that Jović declined (as already mentioned) to forward that proposal to the Federal Assembly, discount the efforts by the Committee to Organize Public Meetings to hold a 'meeting for truth' in Slovenia in late 1989 as irrelevant, discount the Serbian boycott of Slovenian goods declared unilaterally by Serbia in December 1989 as irrelevant, discount Slovenian fears of Milošević and his regime's various unconstitutional moves, and discount the fact that the SFRY was dissolving

¹⁷² . For critical responses to the criticism of Germany, see: Daniele Conversi, *German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies No. 16 (Seattle: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies of the University of Washington, March 1998); and Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty Coffin, "German Foreign Policy Toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991—1999", in *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (January—February 2001), pp. 48—64.

around them as irrelevant in Slovenian calculations.¹⁷³ Indeed, in order to mount a case against the Slovenes, so much must be discounted as to render the case against the Slovenes not entirely reasonable and not entirely justified.

Summary. The various injustices and perceived injustices perpetrated (or thought to have been perpetrated) during the years 1918—91 did not ‘cause’ the Yugoslav meltdown. What they did was to contribute to maintain intergroup boundaries and intergroup distrust and resentment, laying down themes on the basis of which it would be conceivable for an ambitious politician to mobilize his own group against others. The differences in perceptions of both more remote and more proximate history also help to account for the receptivity of the population to certain propaganda themes, indeed to *different* propaganda themes. It should perhaps be stressed that only the Serbs had a notion of national entitlement, captured in the phrase ‘Heavenly Serbia’, while all the peoples of Yugoslavia have seen themselves as victims, including the Slovenes, some of whom continue to brood about historical experiences with Germanization and Italianization, not to mention more recent experience with ‘Yugoslavization’. The difference between the behavior of self-conceived victims and those who do not think of themselves as victims is well known to psychologists. Certainly, from the foregoing account, it should be clear that Serbs could cite reasons why they resented Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovar Albanians (and perhaps also why they feared Kosovo’s Albanians), Croats could cite reasons why they resented and feared Serbs, Bosniaks could cite reasons why they resented and feared Serbs and may have nurtured some continued anger about the boundaries of the shortlived banovina, and Kosovo’s Albanians had

¹⁷³ . For details, see Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, 4th ed. [note 41], chap. 3.

reasons to resent and fear Serbs. In addition, according to Roger Petersen, the breakup of Yugoslavia may have triggered emotional reactions among the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia. Specifically, he suggests, “[b]oth Croats and Serbs found the possibility of Muslims occupying a superior position on an ethnic hierarchy unnatural and distasteful. In other words, Resentment, as well as Fear, motivated [the] perpetrators.”¹⁷⁴ This may have been a secondary theme for Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs, perhaps, but the primary theme in the way in which the Yugoslav meltdown played out in Bosnia was the concept of state. Milošević was seeking to establish a ‘Greater Serbia’, Tudjman was excited at the prospect of restoring the borders of the banovina, and Izetbegović wanted to preserve the Bosnian republic within its existing borders; with three such incompatible rival concepts, the potential for conflict was clearly present – with or without postulating a resentment about Muslims rising up the bureaucratic ladder. Petersen places an especial emphasis on his observation that “there is no reason to assume that elites always constrain and manipulate [the] masses rather than the other way around. Many times it is impossible to determine who is leading whom.”¹⁷⁵ But it may also be that leaders are not just concocting notions out of the blue, or merely being held on strings like marionettes by a self-conscious public. The reality, as Petersen would surely concede, may be symbiotic, with leaders playing to receptive audiences, using the resentments of the past as a kind of fuel for their drive to power. It is, thus, no coincidence that the themes of successful propaganda, whether in Yugoslavia or elsewhere, have often played on preexisting fears and resentments.

¹⁷⁴ . Roger D. Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 237.

REVITALIZATION AND MELTDOWN¹⁷⁶

By the early 1980s, leading figures in the party were warning about the dangers of ‘Lebanonization’; by the late 1980s, warnings about crisis and the danger of meltdown had become commonplace in Yugoslavia. Economic deterioration was a driving force in this deadly equation. During the years 1981—88, produced national income declined every year except 1984 (when there was no growth) and 1986; gross agricultural output declined four out of the eight years, and the growth in gross industrial output was unsteady.¹⁷⁷ In a word, Yugoslavia was in economic crisis – a crisis also reflected in rising foreign debt, rising unemployment, and rising inflation. People found ways to cut expenses, for example by slashing their use of electricity, and took to the streets in a series of protests. The country tottered toward apparent economic collapse, and people who had been willing to put up with the one-party system became fed up. Magazines such as *NIN*, *Duga*, *Start*, *Zum reporter*, *Mladina*, and *Svijet* filled their pages with articles and interviews which admitted the depth of the crisis and demanded change. In Slovenia and Croatia there was a considerable amount of grumbling to the effect that they were being pressed to pick up the tab for most of the bad debts accumulated by Yugoslavia. Some leading figures in the party were even admitting that the country was sinking into political crisis and even moral crisis.¹⁷⁸ But the translation from crisis to war was not automatic. To take a people who had been neighbors, in-laws, friends, and

¹⁷⁵ . *Ibid.*, p. 251.

¹⁷⁶ . This section is a modified version of an article previously published under the title, “A theory about the causes of the Yugoslav meltdown: the Serbian national awakening as a ‘revitalization movement’”, in *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 2004).

¹⁷⁷ . See the detailed figures in Sabrina P. Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation*, 2nd ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 33—35.

¹⁷⁸ . See the discussion in Pedro Ramet, “Yugoslavia and the Threat of Internal and External Discontents”, in *Orbis*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 103—121.

comrades and lead them into a fratricidal war involved a choice of strategy; it involved human agency – and money. Where the latter was concerned, Milošević diverted the \$151 million raised among the Serb diaspora supposedly as a Loan for the Reconstruction of Serbia – a campaign with putatively economic purposes – into his war chest.¹⁷⁹

What emerged at this point, in Serbia, was a revitalization movement, defined as “a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture.”¹⁸⁰ In calling the Serbian national revival movement a ‘revitalization movement’, I am suggesting that it had something in common with reform movements of other kinds, including religious cults, and utopian experiments. All of these phenomena share some common dynamics. Revitalization is always preceded by a period of individual or social stress, reaching a level which the individuals concerned or the society at large come to consider unacceptable. As a result, established assumptions and ways of doing things are abandoned (in a process called ‘cultural distortion’), leading to the rise of the ‘revitalization movement’.¹⁸¹ Some revitalization movements may fail, of course, though the Serbian national revival movement proved to be only a partial failure: it failed to attain its territorial goals in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but succeeded in transforming the political culture of Serbia.

The proliferation of individual and social stress in the Yugoslav case may be associated with the early 1980s. Included in this phase were the death of Tito, the province-wide riots in Kosovo in April 1981, the rise in self-consciousness of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia, the appointment of the

¹⁷⁹ . Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 126—127.

¹⁸⁰ . Anthony F. C. Wallace, “Revitalization Movements”, in *American Anthropologist*, New series, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April 1956), p. 265.

commissions headed by Boris Kraigher¹⁸² and Tihomir Vlaškalić, tasked to study the growing dysfunctionality of the economic and political systems, and “a clear decline in the effectiveness of established decision-making institutions and procedures.”¹⁸³

Discontent flared throughout the country, with Slovenes expressing resentment over the taxes they were paying to help the less developed federal units, Slovenes especially resentful of the exit tax imposed by the Planinc government (involving a sum of 500,000 dinars to be deposited with the authorities to exit the country), Albanians bitter about their continued underdevelopment, conservative Serbs upset about the extent of federalization, and many Croats quietly nurturing ire and resentment about the quashing of the Croatian spring at the end of 1971. In Montenegro, several thousand shoppers smashed up some 50 shops in downtown Titograd in January 1983, leaving 20 persons injured, when it became apparent that supplies of detergent were inadequate. About the same time, more than a thousand factory workers in Zagreb went on strike for two days to demand a 40% increase in pay.¹⁸⁴ More significantly, opinion polls revealed a dramatic decline in the credibility of self-management and in popular confidence in the system. This in turn fueled a wide-ranging debate which splashed onto the pages of Yugoslav journals and in which even the introduction of a two-party system was broached.

The ensuing ‘cultural distortion’ in the 1980s, in the course of which long-established assumptions and behaviors were abandoned, was most intense among the Serbs. It was the Serbs of Kosovo who mounted three shattering treks to Belgrade to

¹⁸¹ . *Ibid.*, p. 268.

¹⁸² . This is the correct Slovenian spelling of his name. In Serbian sources, his name has conventionally been written ‘Krajger’.

confront legislators and demand protection. It was from the ranks of the Serbian Orthodox Church that a petition emerged for the protection of the Serbian people of Kosovo and their holy shrines. It was the Serbs whose Academy of Sciences and Art drafted the aforementioned memorandum, which sent shock waves through all of Yugoslavia. It was Serbian historians who first began the process of reexamining the way in which the story about World War Two had been told, rehabilitating Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović along the way. It was *NIN*, the leading Serbian weekly magazine, which opened up a long-overdue discussion about the concentration camps run by Tito at Lepoglava and Goli Otok and led the way in a far-ranging reexamination of the Tito era. It was Serbian television that broadcast a Kosovar Serb sobbing as she recounted what she had experienced at the hands of Albanians; the broadcast broke with the Tito-era rules of disengagement and had a throttling effect on Serbs. Cumulatively, these sundry breaches of the maze set Serbia on a path to revitalization.

The initiation of the period of revitalization coincides with the appearance of a leader who comes to embody the hopes of the nation or group. In Serbia, there were two rival leaders either of whom could, at least potentially, have embodied the hopes of the nation: politician Slobodan Milošević and novelist Dobrica Ćosić, whose novel, *A Time of Death*, had already enjoyed huge influence among the public. Milošević emerged as the leader of the national revival movement in Serbia because his political position gave him resources which Ćosić lacked. Milošević was even able to harness the legend of Tsar Lazar to build his power. In 1389, on the eve of his great battle with Sultan Murad's army, the Serbian tsar had a dream, in which an angel of God appeared to him and

¹⁸³ . Steven L. Burg, "Elite Conflict in Post-Tito Yugoslavia", in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1986), p. 170.

offered him the choice between winning the battle and establishing a great earthly kingdom, on the one hand, and losing the battle, dying a martyr for the Christian faith, and thereby winning a heavenly kingdom, on the other. According to legend, Lazar chose martyrdom and the heavenly kingdom, thereby sanctifying Serbia, celestial Serbia, for all time. For Serbs, this legend also lent their historic claim to Kosovo an air of heavenly sanction. Milošević, the reincarnated Tsar Lazar, had come to lay claim to the patrimony of Lazar, to claim for Serbs the earthy kingdom they are earned through Lazar's renunciation of it.

In April 1987, Milošević was sent to Kosovo to meet with about 300 party delegates in Priština. Most of these delegates were Albanians and the meeting was supposed to be closed to the public; but about 15,000 local Serbs and Montenegrins came to the meeting hall and tried to force their way in. Police stopped them and began to beat them. Then, Milošević raised his hand and ordered the police to stop and to allow the Serbs and Montenegrins to come into the hall. Then, turning to the crowd, he said, "Nobody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you."¹⁸⁵ Milošević then stayed in the hall through the night, listening to hundreds of Serbs tell their stories, blaming Albanian leaders for their suffering. It was an electrifying moment for Milošević, the night that he became a prophet-king. A Serbian journalist noted, "After that night, suddenly there was a psychological change in him. All at once, he discovered he had this power over people."¹⁸⁶ His mentor, Ivan Stambolić, also saw the change in his longtime

¹⁸⁴ . Ramet, "Yugoslavia and the Threat", p. 108.

¹⁸⁵ . As quoted in *The Chicago Tribune* (17 October 1988).

¹⁸⁶ . As quoted in *The Washington Post* (4 February 1990).

colleague: “Milošević was transformed, set afire by Kosovo.”¹⁸⁷ His declaration that no one should ever beat Serbs again was rebroadcast repeatedly on Serbian television, to the point that it became a kind of mantra, establishing his extra-legal authority.

Serbs began to stage rallies holding portraits of Tsar Lazar, Saint Sava, and Slobodan Milošević, and singing songs such as,

The people have a great question:
Who will replace Tito for us?
Now we know who the new Tito is,
Slobodan is his proud name.
Who[ever] touches, who[ever] touches
Our Slobodan
His head will fly, his head will fly
From his shoulders.¹⁸⁸

After this transformation, Milošević, the prophet-king, promoted a new cultural system or ideology, following a pattern common to the leaders of revitalization movements. In the Serbian case, again following a well-known pattern, there was, of course, the renunciation of the ‘wicked West’ and the claim to be defending the Orthodox soul from the impure West and the infidel Muslims.¹⁸⁹ Milošević also began making repeated allusions to threats and dangers from outside Serbia. In May 1990, for example, he claimed that the pressures on Serbia “could only be compared to the situation of

¹⁸⁷ . As quoted in Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books & BBC Books, 1995), p. 37.

¹⁸⁸ . As quoted in Nebojša Popov, “Serbian Populism and the Fall of Yugoslavia”, in *Uncaptive Minds*, Vol. 8, Nos. 3—4 (Fall—Winter 1995/96), p. 99. Popov’s article was originally published in Serbian in *Vreme* (Belgrade), 24 May 1993.

¹⁸⁹ . On this point, see Ivan Čolović, *The Politics of Symbol in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology*, trans. from Serbian by Celia Hawkesworth (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

1914,”¹⁹⁰ while a statue was erected to Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović and General Milan Nedić, Serbia’s own quisling during World War Two, was now declared to be the “architect” of Serbian national unity.¹⁹¹ Even doctrinal escalation was characteristic of the Serbian national revival movement. Thus, Milošević began by championing the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ (which, if operationalized according to his formula, would have weakened Slovenia and Croatia, relative to Serbia) and by calling for an ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’. Since people all over the world are inclined to distrust bureaucracies, this message found a ready audience and, on the face of it, scarcely seemed radical. Milošević even gave speeches in the early days emphasizing that Serbia had no interest in revising its borders with any of the neighboring republics.¹⁹² But processes of doctrinal escalation typically work quickly. Soon Milošević was demanding and effecting the abolition of the two autonomous provinces, demanding the passage of a fifth post-war constitution (to replace the 1974 constitution), and when the latter objective proved unattainable, pushing for the revision of Serbia’s borders after all. Milošević, Čosić, and other prominent Serbs executed a dramatic ‘escalation’ when they began to insist that all Serbs were entitled to live in one state, in an expanded Serbia which would embrace all contiguous lands inhabited by Serbs. In due course, Milošević became the organizer and pay-master for processes of ethnic cleansing, diverting about 20% of the FRY’s gross national product to Serb insurgents in Croatia and Bosnia (according to official figures of the Belgrade government),¹⁹³ setting up paramilitary

¹⁹⁰ . As quoted in Popov, “Serbian Populism”, p. 100.

¹⁹¹ . *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁹² . See Slobodan Milošević, *Godine Raspleta*, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1989), p. 264.

¹⁹³ . As cited in Marie-Janine Calic, *Krieg und Frieden in Bosnien-Herzegovina*, Expanded ed. (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 1996), p. 171.

training centers, for example in the Tara valley in Montenegro,¹⁹⁴ and taking the Serbs into a war for which many had no enthusiasm. This is not to suggest that the ‘propheting’ was able to anticipate the destructive force of the processes which were unfolding. Quite the contrary, Miloš Vasić has suggested that Milošević “himself was surprised by the fact that the war of ethnic extermination gained such a momentum as to make it a self-supporting suicidal machine.”¹⁹⁵

The popular response to Milošević’s rhetoric in Serbia was one of euphoria. He was attuned to the Serb historical narrative and touted it *against* the Yugoslav narrative forged by the communist party, and he seemed to offer real solutions to problems, rather than merely the continuation of the process of the ‘harmonization of viewpoints’, as per communist practice. But euphoria is a dangerous, even pathological condition, much like infatuation, in which one’s sense of reality is severely impacted, one’s capacity for rational judgment is dulled, and even one’s sense of self is damaged. Moreover, this was a euphoria based on the *Serb* historical narrative which, unlike the *Yugoslav* historical narrative, could not integrate non-Serbs into a common historical project.

Revitalization can, however, engender resistance, since a revitalization movement is revolutionary in nature. The movement may choose some form of adaptation, for example by some form of “doctrinal modification” whether this might involve “adding to, emphasizing, playing down, [or] eliminating selected elements” of the original

¹⁹⁴ . Paolo Rumiz, *Masken für ein Massaker. Der manipulierte Krieg: Spurensuche auf dem Balkan*, trans. from Italian by Friederike Hausmann and Gesa Schröder (Munich: Verlag Antje Kunstmann, 2000), p. 143.

¹⁹⁵ . Miloš Vasić, “The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies”, in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda (eds.), *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth* (Harlow: Longman, 1996), p. 132, as quoted in Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy* (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 116.

program.¹⁹⁶ Resistance may also create rifts within the revitalization movement, involving differences over doctrine or strategy or tactics. The rift which developed between Milošević and Karadžić by spring 1993 may be taken as an instance of this. More particularly, the Serb revitalization movement encountered resistance both internally and externally. Internal resistance came in the form of the consistent liberal critique, articulated by such persons as Žarana Papić, Sonja Licht, Vesna Pešić, and Sonja Biserko, Radomir Konstantinović, Filip David, Ivan Čolović, and others, and, in some cases, associated with feminism, and the form of an inconsistent anti-war critique, associated with such opposition figures as Vuk Drašković and Zoran Djindjić. It was also manifested in the flight of draft-age men from Serbia, in the well publicized brain drain from Serbia, in the anti-war rock concerts staged in Belgrade and elsewhere in 1991—92, and in recurrent but inconsistent criticism from the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose prelates also lent their explicit endorsement to the Serb expansionist project.¹⁹⁷ In May 1992, for example, Patriarch Pavle conducted a mass for peace – this at a time when Serbian forces were making territorial gains in Bosnia! – and, that same month, the Holy Synod of the Church issued a statement calling on Milošević to step down from power.¹⁹⁸ Then, on 14 June, the patriarch led a procession of several thousand angry Serbs through downtown Belgrade, demanding that Milošević resign.

After reaching the Saborna Church, Patriarch Pavle gave a 10-minute sermon, in which he criticized Milošević obliquely for having spread hatred and conflict in ways ‘that would shame the devil.’ After

¹⁹⁶ . Wallace, “Revitalization Movements”, pp. 274—275.

¹⁹⁷ . Milorad Tomanić, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njog* (Belgrade: Medijska knjižara, 2001), esp. pp. 39—40, 43—44, 56, 58—59.

bemoaning recent criticism by ‘individual people’ that the Church was ‘meddling in politics,’ the patriarch avowed that ‘these people...do not have eyes or do not wish to see what is actually happening with the Serbian nation today, and in what danger the Serbian nation is from outside and inside.’¹⁹⁹

External resistance was demonstrated on the battlefields of Croatia and Bosnia and in the nonviolent resistance of the Albanian people of Kosovo. While the Bosnian government tried, with mixed success, to counter nationalism with a cosmopolitan secularism and the Albanians endeavored, above all, to avoid giving provocation to the better armed Serbian state, the Croats reacted with a defensive but no less strident or intolerant nationalism (which could not be said to have been purely defensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina). There were, indeed, huge differences between the Croatian national movement, which was not embedded in a revitalization movement, and the Serbian national movement, which derived its sense of entitlement in part from its character as a revitalization movement. Moreover, although reports of repeated appearances by the Blessed Virgin Mary at the Herzegovinan village of Medjugorje, beginning in 1981,²⁰⁰ were exploited by Croatian nationalists up to a point, the Medjugorje phenomenon remained above all a religious phenomenon and was, in any event, marginal to the Croatian national revival. For all that, however, Tudjman would, in due course, invoke

¹⁹⁸ . Memorandum of the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in *Politika* (29 May 1992), p. 10, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 11 June 1992, p. 56.

¹⁹⁹ . Sabrina Petra Ramet, “The Serbian Church and the Serbian Nation”, in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiša S. Adamovich (eds.), *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 117.

²⁰⁰ . For a provocative reading of the alleged apparition, see Mart Bax, “Mass Graves, Stagnating Identification, and Violence: A Case Study in the Local Sources of ‘the War’ in Bosnia Hercegovina”, in *Anthropological Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 11—19.

the alleged miracle at Medjugorje in support of the Croatian national program. “The Madonna’s appearance,” he told a peace conference in May 1993, announced “the re-awakening of the Croatian nation,” and suggested that this signified the Virgin’s partiality for the Croatian side.²⁰¹ David Bruce MacDonald has argued for a more political reading of Medjugorje than I am suggesting here. In his view, Medjugorje *was* a political phenomenon, which “elevated Croatian Catholicism to a chosen and superior religion.”²⁰² But this is a stretch: although Tudjman, like Milošević, did his best to ingratiate himself with the Church and to instrumentalize the Church for his own purposes, Medjugorje remained, as already stated, a religious phenomenon and for most people it was viewed as such.

The twin themes of victimization and persecution also emerged in the Croatian movement, with the Serbs cast as the historic villains. Branko Miletić, a Croatian historian, asked rhetorically, “What drives the docile Serb peasant to rape, butcher and incinerate his peaceful Muslim or Croat neighbor?”²⁰³ In Miletić’s calculation, “Greater Serbianism has cost the lives of some 600,000 Croats, 400,000 Muslims, 100,000 Albanians, and countless others this century.”²⁰⁴ Croatian writers seemed to put more emphasis,²⁰⁵ if that is possible, than Serbian writers on the *Načertanije* penned by the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Ilija Garašanin in 1844, in which a Serb expansionist project was spelled out. And where the Serbian movement saw the rehabilitation of the Chetniks of World War Two, its Croatian counterpart saw the rehabilitation of the

²⁰¹ . As quoted in David Bruce MacDonald, *Balkan holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 120.

²⁰² . *Ibid.*, pp. 121—122.

²⁰³ . As quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 210.

²⁰⁴ . As quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 210.

²⁰⁵ . See, for example, Dušan Bilandžić et al., *Croatia between War and Independence* (Zagreb: University of Zagreb & OKC, November 1991), pp. 22—23.

Ustaše. Croatian nationalism, at least as instrumentalized by Tudjman and Šušak, had another feature in common with its Serbian counterpart, viz., a program of territorial expansionism. On the other hand, there was little by way of doctrinal escalation in the Croatian movement, and such euphoria as there was in Tudjman's Croatia was largely limited to the months preceding the outbreak of war.

Instead of euphoria, the hallmark of the Croatian war effort was fear of Serbia and more general anxiety, even, for those fleeing from the front lines, frenzy, and for purposes of building power, fear and frenzy were as useful as euphoria. Moreover, given the commitment of Tudjman and Gojko Šušak, his eventual defense minister, to a program of territorial expansion at Bosnia's expense, not to mention their common desire to build a national state as rapidly and as irreversibly as possible, war was an essential part of their strategy. This is why Šušak, who was already a high-ranking adviser to President Tudjman, went to Borovo Selo in April 1991, accompanied by some Croatian recruits, to fire three shoulder-launched Ambrust missiles into the Serb-populated village.²⁰⁶ For that matter, Martin Špegelj has argued that Tudjman did not want to see the war end in 1991, but specifically wanted it to continue for some years, in order to maintain conditions in which portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina might be annexed to the Croatian state.²⁰⁷ Of course, one may well wonder how the international community, which had extended diplomatic recognition to Croatia only grudgingly, would have

²⁰⁶ . Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War*, pp. 60—61. See also Ludwig Steindorff, *Kroatien. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (Regensburg/Munich: Verlag Friedrich Pustet & Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 2001), p. 220.

²⁰⁷ . Martin Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika*, ed. by Ivo Žanić (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001), pp. 218—219, 292, and *passim*.

reacted had Croatia managed to mount a serious operation in early 1992.²⁰⁸ But, as in Serbia, there were liberal pacifists who stood up to the Tudjman regime and opposed the nationalist tide. Among these persons one may mention Ivo Banac, Josip Reihl-Kir, and the editorial board of *Feral Tribune*.

Does the foregoing analysis suggest that all sides were equally guilty? Frankly, I cannot imagine how this inference could be drawn, since the appeal to revitalization theory provides a means for explaining how and why the problem began in Serbia and provides a way to highlight Milošević's culpability as the 'cult leader' of the movement. Does this approach let the international community off the hook, by suggesting that the situation was completely hopeless from the start? Again, anyone drawing this conclusion is likely to be merely dragging his or her own intellectual baggage into the discussion. Quite the contrary, insofar as Western diplomats might have been expected to have some understanding of political processes which were out of the ordinary and, for that matter, involving repeated breaches of the national constitution and laws of the land, one could have expected that some remedial action could have been taken before more than 200,000 persons lost their lives.²⁰⁹

Summary. The Serbian revitalization movement of which Dobrica Ćosić and Slobodan Milošević became champions was ultimately defeated, as a combination of two lost wars, a failed economy, the growing despair and disenchantment of Serbs, and a

²⁰⁸ . Špegelj's argument is that the Croatian Army could have retaken all the lands occupied by Serbian paramilitaries and the JNA by sometime in spring at the latest. For his evidence, see Špegelj, *Sjećanja vojnika*, passim.

²⁰⁹ . For a clear expostulation of the culpability of the international community, see James Gow, *The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London: Hurst & Co., 1997); also Sabrina P. Ramet, "The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding 'Vietnam' and Blundering into 'Abyssinia'", in *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 189—219.

finally-successful effort on the part of the anti-Milošević opposition to mount a coordinated electoral challenge to his rule. But the effort to establish a more satisfactory steady state in the wake of the overthrow of Milošević has hit a reef – the reef of Serbian nationalism. The ideas associated with the Serbian revitalization movement are still in circulation in Serbia, as evinced in the recent electoral success of the Serbian Radical Party. Whether the same judgment may be passed on the HDZ is open to controversy; certainly, unlike Šešelj or Koštunica, for that matter, Sanader has not made well publicized statements suggesting a continued interest in annexing parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But the sixth and seventh stages in the life of the Serbian revitalization movement – defeat and efforts to build a new steady state – do not occupy us here. What does concern us is the character of the Serb nationalist movement as a revitalization movement. It is also important to stress that there was no comparable movement in either Croatia or Bosnia, let alone Slovenia or Kosovo. But what does it matter if the nationalist mobilization in Serbia may be understood as a revitalization movement? First, this may help us to understand the appeal of nationalist movements as stress-reducing mechanisms. Second, it provides a clue as to the way in which nationalist mobilization effects radical changes in perception and behavior. Third, it highlights the relationship between the “extreme emotional excitement”²¹⁰ generated by nationalist mobilization and the aforementioned changes. Fourth, understanding nationalist mobilization in this way clarifies the role of the nationalist leader, who figures thus as a cult leader, thereby explaining his striking ability to act outside the law. And fifth, this understanding

²¹⁰ . John J. Collins, *The Cult Experience: An Overview of Cults, their Traditions, and Why People Join Them* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1991), p. 8, citing Robert S. Ellwood, Jr.

suggests that ‘de-programming’ may be required, in order to return a mobilized society to something approximating its premobilized state.²¹¹ In the absence of such ‘de-programming, as Robert George has suggested,²¹² bad ‘moral ecology’ can have consequences which may carry over influencing successive generations directly or indirectly.

CONCLUSION

Many Serbian politicians looked on the Yugoslav state as a framework within which they could realize the Serbian national idea,²¹³ which is to say, the idea that all Serbs and Serb-inhabited areas should be united in one state. Many Croats had a comparable notion, always resenting the fact that the Serbs constituted the largest national group in the country and dreaming of an independent Croatian state. Of course, there were both Serbs and Croats who were sincere Yugoslavs, dedicated to preserving their common state.

The typical questions raised about the Yugoslav meltdown include: was it ‘inevitable’? what role was played by specific persons or to what extent was the meltdown the result of ‘historical forces’? whose fault was it? and, among less informed members of the general public, why do these people hate each other so much? The foregoing analysis suggests, however, that these questions are missing the bigger picture

²¹¹ . The concerted Allied effort after World War Two to ‘de-program’ and ‘re-program’ the people of Germany, Austria, and Italy through carefully tailored restructuring of the educational and media systems and by engaging the Churches in a dialogue of toleration stands as an important historical example of such ‘de-programming’. The absence of any even remotely comparable international effort in post-Dayton Serbia is surely not unrelated to the persistence of support for Vojislav Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party. Regarding the Allied effort, see book by John Herz.

²¹² . See Robert P. George, *Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), introduction and chap. 1.

²¹³ . This paragraph was written by Darko Gavrilović.

or, in the case of the last question, totally misguided. One may, of course, isolate individual factors such as the economic downturn, the problem of legitimacy, the fissure lines provided by the federal system, the presence of rival historical narratives, and the rise of ambitious nationalist leaders, in the persons of Milošević and Tudjman. Such an analysis certainly establishes the basic factors at play, but not necessarily *why* they produced *this particular result*, rather than some other result. The descent to internecine conflict involved a syndrome, in which these sundry factors came into play, were assigned values, and operationalized. Economic deterioration, for example, was factored into historical narratives of resentment and blame, so that one could find someone (some other nation) to blame for one's own nation's economic difficulties: if one was a Serb, one could blame the Slovenes or the Croats or the Bosniaks; if one was an Albanian, one could blame the Serbs; if one was a Slovene, one could blame the Serbs or the underdeveloped areas or the inefficient managers of the federal fund. As Ljubomir Madžar has put it, "each one of the eight Yugoslav republics and provinces emphasized its alleged exploitation, and 'proved' that the system was set specifically against its interests."²¹⁴ The problem of legitimacy was also filtered through the lenses of the historical narrative, so that the system bequeathed by Tito was not just 'the communist system', but (for Serbs) 'the anti-Serb federal system, created by the Croat, Tito' or (for Croats) 'the anti-Croat communist system, dominated by Serbs at the expense of Croats' or (for Albanians) 'the land of the South Slavs, in which non-Slavs are second class citizens and in which the legitimate rights of the Albanians are quashed.' This account already reveals the way in which the federal system itself was disparaged and demonized,

²¹⁴ . Ljubomir Madžar, "Who Exploited Whom?", in Nebojša Popov (ed.), *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis*, English version ed. by Drinka Gojković (Budapest: Central European University

even by those republic elites who owed their power to the federal principle. The Serbian party was, after 1974, arguably the most frustrated with the constitutional order, but discontent extended to Kosovo, Croatia, Slovenia, and elsewhere in the system. But discussions of the federal system were typically figured into the context set by the given historical narrative so that this factor too was filtered, interpreted, and comprehended through national lenses. And finally, Milošević as the ‘prophet-king’ of the Serbs and Tudjman as the ‘all-knowing Father’ of the Croats were viewed differently from one republic to the next, and framed within the perspective of each nation’s historical narrative.

There is much to be said for Jack Snyder’s observation that the reason that Milošević embraced Serbian nationalism was that this was the only way for him to retain power.²¹⁵ Still, it would be going too far to see the subsequent aggression as merely the price of holding onto power; on the contrary, the war was the necessary instrument to achieve “the secession of the center”, as Daniele Conversi puts it,²¹⁶ and the construction – so it was hoped by Milošević’s supporters both at home and abroad – of a Greater Serbian state.

Press, 2000), p. 173.

²¹⁵ . See Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), pp. 15—31, 39—42, 45—220, 313—353. Concerning a recent book written by V. P. Gagnon, Eric Gordy writes: “Gagnon contests the popularly held belief that the wars of succession in the former Yugoslavia were driven by widespread nationalist mobilization or deep-rooted ethnic conflict. He argues instead that national conflict was produced by elites in a period of instability in order to eliminate the possibility of political mobilization which might lead to real social or political change. Effectively, the outcome of national conflict was to demobilize the population and maintain the power structures which were already in place and which survived the demise of communism.” -- Eric Gordy, email to SPR (12 February 2005). In fact, no legitimate scholar has ever held that the War of Yugoslav Succession could be, by any stretch of the imagination, traced back to supposedly “ancient” hatreds, and Gagnon’s argument appears to reinforce the growing consensus in the field that local elites must bear responsibility for the outbreak of fighting, even if other factors contributed to that outcome.

²¹⁶ . Daniele Conversi, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Secession by the Centre?”, in John Coakley (ed.), *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*, 2nd rev. & expanded ed. (London & Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 267—269.

Revitalization movements appear because there is widespread discontent. In both the Serbian and Croatian cases, protests and memoranda emerging from the nationalist opposition in the course of the 1970s and 1980s (in the Croatian case, one may think of people such as Marko Veselica, Dobroslav Paraga, and for that matter Tadjman himself) established a template for potential nationalist mobilization, a template invoking elements of the historical narrative, a template which could be appropriated by an ambitious politician at the right moment. But revitalization movements have other features which are by no means irrelevant to this analysis. First of all, they often function as mechanisms for pecuniary accumulation, drawing funds from the members of the movement and concentrating them in the coffers of the movement leaders: the Unification Church of the Rev. Moon has operated in this way as did the Transcendental Meditation Movement; so too did the Milošević and Tadjman regimes, which enriched their inner circles at the expense of their societies – though politicians closer to home have shown that the use of public office for private enrichment is not limited to ‘revitalization’ movements. Second, the radical break with the preexisting society which revitalization movements effect is so rapid that their ultimate course cannot be controlled; this is why violence, even self-destructive violence, is commonly associated with revitalization movements, or at least with failed revitalization movements. Third, given the speed with which revitalization movements seek to refashion the culture, it is essentially inevitable that a large portion of their members (in this case, members of the societies) will be affected psychologically by the strife which such movements may engender. Those who escape with mere remorse or depression are the lucky ones; those who suffer post-traumatic stress disorder or other psychiatric disorders are less

fortunate.²¹⁷ And fourth, the phenomenon of collective euphoria which is associated with revitalization movements in their crucial early phases provides at least part of the explanation as to why people who had lived side by side as neighbors and friends could be mobilized to kill each other.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ . Interview research conducted among 534 adults from families living in the Varaždin Bosnian refugee camp in Croatia in 1996 and 1999 found that those interviewed suffered from “high levels of chronic psychiatric disorders and disability.” Parallel research among 206 Bosnian refugees in Sweden found that their “symptoms included sleeping problems, nightmares, depression, startle reactions, a tendency toward isolation, irritability, emotional difficulty, bodily tension, and fear of places or situations resembling the traumatic event.” -- Richard F. Mollica, Narcisa Sarajlić, Miriam Chernoff, James Lavelle, Iris Sarajlić Vuković, and Michael P. Massagli, “Longitudinal Study of Psychiatric Symptoms, Disability, Mortality, and Emigration Among Bosnian Refugees”, in *Journal of the American Medical Association* (JAMA), Vol. 286, No. 5 (1 August 2001), p. 553; and “Civil War Stress”, in JAMA, Vol. 281, No. 6 (10 February 1999), p. 503.

²¹⁸ . For further discussion of this point, see Calic, *Krieg und Frieden*, pp. 141—146.
