STEPHEN
GREENBLATT begins his most theoretical
statement about New Historicism, "Towards a Poetics of Culture,"
by stating that his methodology is, at best a "practice" rather
than a "doctrine": "One of the peculiar characteristics
of the 'new historicism' in literary studies is precisely how unresolved
and in some ways disingenuous it has been—I have been—about
the relation to literary theory" (1).
He goes to point out some of the influences on the school (Michel
Foucault and European anthropological and social theorists) while
distinguishing the approach from both Marxist critics like Fredric
Jameson and poststructructuralist critics like Jean-François
Lyotard. On the one hand, he questions Jameson's characterization of
capitalism as a force seeking to establish a false separation between
private and public spheres or between aesthetic and political domains,
while rejecting Jameson's belief in a utopic future moment when we will
finally achieve a classless future, stating that poststructuralism "has
raised serious questions about such a vision, challenging both its underlying
oppositions and the primal organic unity that it posits as either paradisal
origin or utopian, eschatological end" (3).
On the other hand, Greenblatt questions Jean-François Lyotard's
tendency to associate capitalism with the effort to impose a single
language onto all experience, thus destroying all differences between
people or cultural spheres as well as all differences between aesthetics
and politics. Greenblatt argues that both Jameson and Lyotard employ
"history" in an effort to support one theoretical viewpoint
that in turn leads to their monolithic and contradictory versions of
capitalism:
The difference between Jameson's capitalism, the perpetrator
of separate discursive domains, the agent of privacy, psychology,
and the individual, and Lyotard's capitalism, the enemy of such domains
and the destroyer of privacy, psychology, and the individual, may
in part be traced to a difference between Marxist and poststructuralist
projects. Jameson, seeking to expose the fallaciousness of a separate
artistic sphere and to celebrate the materialist integration of all
discourses, finds capitalism at the root of the false differentiation;
Lyotard, seeking to celebrate the differentiation of all discourses
and to expose the fallaciousness of monological unity, finds capitalism
at the root of the false integration. History functions in both cases
as a convenient anecdotal ornament upon a theoretical structure, and
capitalism appears not as a complex social and economic development
in the West but as a malign philosophical principle. (5).
Greenblatt argues that New Historicism, by contrast, works
to remain always attuned to the contradictions of any historical moment,
including those moments dominated by capitalism. On the issue of the
relation between private and public or between the aesthetic and political
realms, Greenblatt argues that "the effortless invocation of two
apparently contradictory accounts of art is characteristic of American
capitalism in the late twentieth century and an outcome of long-term
tendencies in the relationship of art and capital; in the same moment
a working distinction between the aesthetic and the real is established
and abrogated" (7).
What characterizes capitalism is, rather, a "circulation"
between the two apparently contradictory versions of capitalism that
Greenblatt associates with Jameson and Lyotard: "I am suggesting
that the oscillation between totalization and difference, uniformity
and the diversity of names, unitary truth and a proliferation of distinct
entities—in short, between Lyotard's capitalism and Jameson's—is
built into the poetics of everyday behavior in America" (8).
The result of such attunement to the contradictions of
any given historical moment lead Greenblatt (and other New Historicists)
into a number of basic premises: 1) one should begin with specific details,
anecdotes, and examples in order to avoid a totalizing version of history;
2) one should proceed from such details to illustrate how they are tied
up with larger contradictory forces in a given time period, no matter
how apparently innocuous the detail may seem at first; 3) one should
remain self-conscious about one's methodologies, thus resisting "a
historicism based upon faith in the transparency of signs and interpretative
procedures" (12);
4) one should be suspicious of liberatory narratives: everything is,
on some level, caught up in the circulations of power in a given time
period; and 5) all cultural products, whether they are high art, political
documents, personal letters, or trash, are a part of larger discursive
structures and, so, can offer clues to the ideological contradictions
of a given time period.